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Purpose and Scope of Thesis 
The point of departure for this work is to sympa­
thetically critique American radical criminology from an 
anarchist philosophical and theological viewpoint. Most
criticism of radical criminology has thus far come from
1
politically conventional and orthodox Marxist sources.
Anarchism is to the left of Marxism or scientific socialism
and has been characteristically left of conservatism and 
2
liberalism. By sympathetic critique what is meant is that 
this author tends to favor and support most of the criticism 
radical criminology has levelled against conventional crim­
inology. However, radical criminology is apparently unwil­
ling to critically comprehend its own essentially anarcho- 
religious, rather than authentically Marxist character.
Thus, the criticism herein is mainly to assist radical crimin­
ology in its search for a Weltanschauung which best fits its 
purposes and ends.
A philosophical and theological critique of radical 
criminology is a difficult task, especially since it is to 
be done in a sympathetic rather than hostile manner. For 
reasons of clarity the author has restricted the theological 
discussion mainly to the Epilogue and deals with differing 
ideological and political questions in the bulk of the thesis.
2The reader should understand that at back of all that is 
presented herein is the question of what relationship does 
religious anarchism have with radical criminology? Such 
terms as orthodox, heterodox, heresy, prophetic, secular and 
existential confusion should clue the reader into the author's 
own Weltanschauug which is Christian anarchist in focus. 
Further and also for the sake of clarity, this thesis inter­
prets orthodox Marxism as the equivalent of scientific social­
ism, while unorthodox or heterodox Marxism is seen as the 
equivalent of a New Left anarcho-utopian and religious world­
view. This interpretation does not deny that Marx was anarch­
ist, utopianist or religious but rather it tries to be honest 
to what Marx himself believed his system to be: scientific 
socialism.
Anarchism, Marxism, Radical Criminology and Religion 
Nineteenth century secular anarchism was viciously
attacked by Marx for being a brand of "left utopian opportun- 
3
ism". Engels denounced anarchists as "madmen and provaca- 
4
teurs". Lenin accused anarchism and utopian socialism of
being little more than "left-wing communism: an infantile
5
disorder." Contemporary secular anarchism as represented 
by New Left ideology, has been accused by orthodox Marxists 
and non-Marxists alike of moving beyond scientific socialism 
or Marxism in that, contrary to Marx, it has "stressed the
6
individual, the deviant, the Utopian and anarchistic aspects" 
of Marx's prophetic beliefs. Terrence Ball, an orthodox
3Marxist -sociologist, commenting on the contemporary American 
academic "doctoring of Marxism" by New Left social theorists 
has written that:
Indeed, today history repeats itself. If 
the bowdlerizing of Marx by the Revisionists 
/■Bernstein and Kautsky: mine; was a tragedy, 
the current "rediscovery" of a respectable/ 
young/Hegelian/humanist/social democratic 
Marx has all the making of a farce. The 
farceurs include those whose brand of Marxism 
has affinities with religion of one kind 
(Christianity) or another (Zen Buddhism); 
with a contentless "humanism"; with philo­
sophical idealism with piecemeal reformism, 
and social democracy; and so on.7
8
Contrary to the unconscious "academic prophesy"
of radical criminology Marx himself held that "the criticism
9
of religion is the premise of all criticism". Marx under­
stood his own system to be scientific and thus unprophetic 
and irreligious to the extent that:
It is the task of history, therefore, once 
the otherworld of truth has vanished, to estab­
lish the truth of this world. The immediate 
task of philosophy, which is in the service 
of history, is to unmask human self-alienation 
in its secular form now that it has been un­
masked in its sacred form. Thus the criticism 
of heaven is transformed into criticism of 
earth, the criticism of religion into the 
criticism of law, and the criticism of theology 
into the criticism of politics.
If in terms of orthodox Marxist criticism, law
and politics are seen as secularized transformations of
religion and theology, then, of course, the flip-side is
true: religion and theology are the sacramentalization of
law and politics. The result is that the combination of
law and politics is theoretically, if not functionally,
4equivalent in as far as orthodox Marxist criticism is con­
cerned. Without advocating extreme elasticity in thinking, 
radical criticism of law and politics must entail a simul­
taneous criticism of religion and theology. Unorthodox 
radical criminology, following this line of thought, should 
not only be critical of the political and juridical status- 
quo, but more, the religious and theological establishment. 
Practically speaking the historical and present reality of 
American attitudes towards the interpretation and disposition
of criminal action have been shaped by both combinations of
11
law and politics, religion and theology. Moreover the 
shaping of American attitudes on crime has come from ortho­
dox and heterodox combinations of law and politics, religion 
and theology. In order for radical criminology to take this 
leap or judgemental step of becoming critical of the ortho­
dox religious influence on crime, it must realize that such 
an influence is there. This author thinks that such a step 
can be taken if radical criminology first understands its 
own prophetic quality. The difficulty of such an understanding 
becomes acute because of radical criminology's association 
with the orthodox Marxist paradigm which seeks to dismiss 
religion and theology on plausible but fallacious grounds.
One religious system should not critically dismiss 
another religious system on the grounds of the other system's 
religiousness, for that would be akin to the Marxist and lib­
eral criticism of each other as ideology. Ideology and pol-
5itics are relative and so is religion. A religious system 
should point to another religious system*s insufficient 
religiousness. Just as much as anarchist ideology criticizes 
orthodox Marxism for not being true to its ideology.
But, Marx and Engels themselves mistook orthodox 
Christianity and Judiasm for ’’religion as such” and in so 
doing misunderstood two things. First they misunderstood 
the difference between religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy, 
such that their criticism of religion as an ideological 
apology for the power of the ruling classes never dealt with 
revolutionary Christianity which has also been historically 
critical of state, and juridical power, private property
12
and hierarchial social relations (see the Epilogue herein).
It is not that Marx and Engels were totally unaware of rev­
olutionary religion, for they both, along with later ortho­
dox Marxists like Ernst Block and Roger Garaudy, appreciated
the eschatological Messianism in the thinking and practice
13
of revolutionary Christianity. Second because their 
critical attention was focused on orthodox and not hetero­
dox religious radicalism; Marx and Engels failed to compre­
hend their own inverted religiousness— i .e., where 
the God-hypothesis is inverted to read mankind writ large 
across the universe— — and by such failure did not grasp 
the transphysical, moralistic, prophetic and unscientific 
nature of their system of socialism.
Given Marx and Engels failure to comprehend the
6religiousness of their system of thought, New Left radical
criminology in its acceptance of the Marxist paradigm has
unconsciously repeated the religious error of the founders
of scientific socialism. Hence, herein radical criminology
will have its religious dimension exposed and it will be
shown that even this religious dimension is more in tune
with a political theology of anarchism than with Christian-
Marxism which itself promises a new fusion of orthodoxy in
14
left religious and political circles.
The prophetic anomaly in Marx's thought has been 
commented upon by political philosopher Robert C. Tucker 
and a host of others:
The religious essence of Marxism is super­
ficially obscured by Marx's rejection of the 
traditional religions. This took the form 
of a repudiation of religion as such and an 
espousal of atheism. Marx's athiesm, however, 
meant only a negation of the trans-mundane 
God of traditional Western religion. It did 
not mean the denial of a supreme being...
From a structural viewpoint, moreover, Marxism 
invites analysis as a religious system...it 
has a number of basic characteristics in common 
with Christian system in its Augustinian and 
later medieval expression...Marx defines class­
ification under any one of the accepted modern 
specialized headings, such as, economist, soci­
ologist, historian, or even philosopher. This, 
of course, indicates a source of his system's 
appeal to some modern men in whom the hold of 
traditional religion has loosened but the 
craving for an all-inclusive world-view remains 
alive and strong.15
Radical criminologists may be such modern men who 
crave for an all-inclusive grasp of the reality of crime. 
The logic of the radical investigation into crime and its
7disposition pushes far beyond the confines of conventional 
approaches to crime. So far that radical criminology has 
begun to deal, however with questions of ultimate human 
reality i.e., metaphysical questions which are commonly 
thought to be in the domain of political philosophy and/ 
or political theology.
Ultimate Questions that Radical Criminology
has Failed to Answer
Radical criminology is now engaged in a dialectical 
criticism of criminology and is thus forced to deal with 
ultimate questions about human realities. It attempts, but 
has not adequately, come to grips with such ultimate quest­
ions as:
1. What is the most rational approach to a
7
crime free society.
2. Can individual and social alienation, the 
basic foundations for the existence of 
crime, ever be overcome, no matter soci­
ety's economic organization?
3. Are injustice and inequality, in the forms 
of class antagonisms, racism, sexism or 
plain-old socially differentiated politi­
cal domination, essential or otherwise 
unnecessary features of human existence?
4. Is human order possible without resort to 
state enforced governmental control?
8Given the above questions radical criminology 
requires a left political-theological criticism because of 
its misunderstanding of itself, in relation to:
' 1. Its claim that it is not ideological thinking.
2. Its claim that it is not utopian thinking.
3. Its claim that it is authentic Marxism.
4. An unconsciousness of being part of New Left 
theorizing.
5. An unconsciousness of being more of a secular 
prophecy and system of anarchistic thinking 
about crime, than a strict Marxist view of 
crime and crime control. The religious char­
acter of radical criminology must be brought 
to the surface.
Radical Criminology's Theoretical Confusion
This work's main line of argument is thus developed 
around radical criminology's theoretical confusion about its 
Mew Left anarcho-religious alternatives to the existing soci­
ety. It is not that the radicals have not pointed the way 
toward such alternatives. On the contrary, radical crimin­
ology is unique in comparison to conventional criminology in 
its willingness to offer a liberative vision of society and 
should certainly be applauded for its efforts to date. Exis­
ting society does need to be changed root and branch and not 
just maintained for the benefit of a powerful segment. Essen­
tially, though the claims and proposals of radical criminology
9are inadequate when faced with the admittedly difficult
16
questions posed above. It is to these "perennial questions" 
of political philosophy (and to this writer political theol­
ogy) that radical criminology has thus far fallen short.
As an instance, most radical criminologists confus­
edly posit ultimate human freedom in collectivist terms and 
end up opting for a majoritarian state power of the many who 
would exercise hegemony over deviant minorities. Tne call 
of Richard Quinney for even a democratic socialism is a call
/
for a political society where power will be located in some
17
ruling segment of society. Those who would not enjoy powerv
are those in a deviant political minority or the enemies of 
socialism. It is not too difficult to understand that those 
in the powerless minorities would become easily suspect as 
criminals. It will be contended, throughout these pages,
that most.brands of socialism or for that matter liberal democ-
'Zracy can ever "require the elimination of bureaucracies and
18
all hierarchial forms" because of the simple reason that
v
both of these political philosophies view power in society 
as necessarily unequally distributed with respect to the 
hegemony of a dominant social class or segment over and 
against the desires and wishes of other classes.
Concerns of a Political Theology of Anarchism 
One of Christian-anarchism's guiding principles is 
to overcome state power which is the highest expression of
10
organized political society. In this regard it is not in
19
any respect different than secular anarchistic communism.
^As a left political theology it converges at most points 
with radical criminology's critique of conventional crim-
V
vinological thinking. But unlike radical criminology it does 
not see the state in either its capitalist or socialist guises 
as a legitimate guarantor of social justice and the potential 
for human freedom, either in theory or relevant empirical 
practice (e.g., human rights violations are as much a part 
of American state power as is the same category of violations 
in the Soviet Union). Rather than merely a protector of cit­
izens in their struggles against criminal activities state 
power usually serves the crime control interests of some ruling 
class.
To Christian-anarchism the conditions for a guaranteed
social justice and human freedom must be found by a resort to
a theory and praxis wherein people freely associate themselves
into decentralized arrangements for specifically agreed upon
social ends. This conception of society radically diverges
from the social contract tenet of liberal democratic thinking
where an absolute social contract under state enforcement is
20
falsely presumed for all of society's members for all time; 
no matter the social inequality in actual existence or the lack 
of social consensus about different issues. Moreover, a soci-
/
" ety of voluntaristic associations parts company with orthodox
21
Marxist socialism in that social theory's insistence upon
11
collectivist material production as the perpetual organizing 
rationale for the existence of a liberative future society. 
Anarchistic political theology interprets this element of 
socialist theory as pure dogma in that it disallows the nec­
essary flexibility inherent in including alternative societal 
rationales and behaviors, some of which may consistently have 
nothing at all to do with material production.
The origins of anarchistic political theology can 
be traced to the earliest conceptions of Christianity where
the libertarian concern of a world without law informed the
22
thinking of the first Christian theorists. The early Christian 
conception of a society without law was in direct revolution­
ary opposition to Romanist state power and its companion legal­
istic theories. The first Christian theorists sought to spir­
itually and politically undermine not only Roman power but 
indirectly the foundations of every human society dependant
upon the restrictions of legal compulsion, whether criminal 
23
or otherwise. Social compulsion was seen as the unjust anti­
thesis of human freedom and it was understood that state power 
could not force society's members to be free, but on the con­
trary, state power would continue social enslavement.
Social freedom from the yoke of state enforced legal
control continued to inform much of early Christian thinking
24
until the period of Constantine. At this historical juncture 
established Christianity officially aligned itself with the 
state and Christian-anarchism became a dangerous deviation
12
in the thinking of a heretical fringe. Therefore 19th
century secular anarchists like Michael Bakunin, and even
Karl Marx (in his post-socialist view of communism) were
entirely correct in their bitter denunciations of what they
viewed as the alienating and hypocritical theology and pract-
25
ice of orthodox religion. Indeed orthodox religious intol­
erance and participation in state enforced ideological and 
legal repression of the masses of people remains ’’the opium 
of the people"to this day. However, in all fairness to
orthodox Scholastic and Reformation political theology, it
26 27'
must be remembered that the Schoolmen and Luther consis­
tently condemned the devices of interest and usury in early 
capitalist development. These religious thinkers developed 
the concept of jus turn pretium or just price which was founded 
on a strictly labor theory of value; a theory of value essen­
tially in agreement with Marx’s own notion of economic value
28
and from which his theory of surplus value derives.
Thus, although orthodox religion stands in constant 
need of denunciation for its on-going collusion with the cap­
italist state’s repressive tendencies, upon a sound historical 
reflection the close kinship between modern secular anarchism 
and its sentiments for a communistic world without law, if 
compared to earlier Christian-anarchism, remains in fundamental 
accord.
In its course of development this critique will expand 
on the above issues in a more incisive manner. Before that
13
the main features of emergent radical criminology in its 
confrontations with conventional criminology must be dealt 
with, because to a great extent radical criminology is an 
outcome of criticism leveled against conservative and lib­
eral (conventional) theories of crime.
Chapter Descriptions
Chapter I, The Ideological Character of Recent 
Criminology, analyzes the role ideology has come to play in 
contemporary American criminological inquiry. The chapter 
is investigatory and has the objectives of:
1. Explaining how and why the ideological 
dimension emerged.
2. Defining ideology as essentially a political 
manifestation which reflects contemporary 
political struggles in academia and the at- 
large society.
3. Showing that ideology is relativistic and 
ubiquitous in that all criminological theory 
has at least a tacit political quality and 
is value-ladened; radical criminology not­
withstanding .
Chapter II, A Thematic Analysis of Ideology in 
Conventional Criminology, critically compares recent works 
of the "left" liberal Ramsey Clark, and the neo-conservative 
James Q. Uilson with a series of ideologically differentiated
14
criminological constructions developed by Walter B. Miller.
The objectives of such a comparison are to:
1. Illustrate the unspoken ideological under­
pinnings of liberal and conservative crimin­
ology.
2. Demonstrate that on most questions of polit­
ical import liberal and conservative crimin­
ology are in fundamental accord. Thus both 
can be viewed as conventional.
3. Comprehend radical criminology as politically 
different from conventional thinking with 
respect to general purposes, functions and 
goals.
Chapter III, Radical Criminology: Is it a Marxist 
or New Left Theory of Crime? Speculatively explores the 
evolution of Anglo-American radical criminological thinking 
from the early 1960's to the present. Selected writings of 
Richard Quinney, Anthony Platt and the British criminologists, 
Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young are critically exam­
ined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the career 
evolvement of radical criminology is toward or away from au­
thentic Marxism,
The author will attempt to show that radical crimin­
ology has been, from its inception, a theory of crime in
search of a philosophical orientation. It has infrequently 
found comfort with itself and continually seeks new theoret-
15
ical horizons. To date that search has lead radical crimin­
ology, like radical sociology, to its present unclaimed 
identification with New Left ideology; a New Left that has 
an undeniable affinity with anarcho-utopianism rather than 
with Marxist scientific socialism.
Some of the primary avenues to be.explored are:
1. Why is radical criminology existentially con­
fused about its political allegiance?
2. Can there be an orthodox Marxist analysis 
of crime?
3. Has radical criminology transcended orthodox Marxism?
4. Is radical criminology based on the New Left 
ideology of anarcho-utopianism?
Chapter IV, Radical Criminology: Is Its Heretical 
Marxism Actually an Unconscious Anarchist Theory of Crime?, 
proposes that American radical criminology, as a New Left 
and heretical deviation from Marxist orthodoxy, is an uncon­
scious anarchist statement about crime. The chapter explores 
the works of secular anarchist thinkers, from the classical 
period to the present. To build support for the foregoing 
proposal, a comparison is made between secular anarchist 
political philosophy and ten major theoretical features in 
radical criminology thinking. The outcome of the comparison 
suggests that radical criminology, especially in its consis­
tent employment of a liberation ideal with respect to the 
nature, function and disposition of crime in society, is more
16
akin to anarchism than it is to Marxist orthodoxy.
Further, the chapter proposes that radical crimin­
ology should become conscious of itself as an anarchist theory 
of crime. Toward this end, the proposal illustrates what a 
deliberate anarchist criminology would entail, by examining 
four questions regarding ultimate human reality in light of 
the possibility of a crime free future society. In the exam­
ination of those four questions, it is noticed that overcoming 
social divisions, in the form of racism, sexism and political 
domination, should be as important to anarchist criminology 
as the overcoming class divisions is presently. With this 
in mind an anarchist criminology would be mandated not to 
engage in economic reductionism as in the case with Marxist 
orthodoxy.
In the Epilogue, Christian Anarchism in Relation to 
Radical Criminology, the present author offers a defense of 
the religious facet of radical American criminology from the 
standpoint of a political theology of Christian anarchism. The 
purpose is to explain the sources from which the religious dimen­
sion in radical criminology is most probably derived by a hist­
orical interpretation of Christian anarchist literature. The 
question of how religious anarchism became secularized is 
dealt with, as is Christian anarchism's historic relationship 
to other forms of Christian radicalism. Moreover the differ­
ences between Christian and Christian-Marxism is clarified.
Of primary importance is the argument that the libertarian
17
ideal of Christian anarchism is the probable influential 
source of the prophetic quality in radical criminology.
The examination also attempts to explain the religious 
facet of radical criminology by an analysis of left-wing 
political faith in the secular "religion of humanity."
Further, an examination of the history of conven­
tional sociological criminology suggests that it also has 
held a faith in the "religion of humanity" and since this 
is the case the grounds for an eventual reconciliation 
between it and radical criminology can be understood in 
religious terms.
The Epilogue ends by proposing that reconciliation 
is possible if both variants of American criminology are 
willing to emphasize and connect those elements in each 
theory that speaks to human liberation.
18
CHAPTER I
THE IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF RECENT CRIMINOLOGY
The Problem of Ideology
The role ideology plays within American criminology
is currently a question of no small amount of discussion and
concern. In the past few years several criminologists have
begun the task of ferreting out the ideological basis of much
of the discipline, and in so doing have sought to make the
discipline’s various ideological underpinnings explicit while
speculating about the implications of certain ideological ten-
1
dencies within the field. The newly emergent criminological
investigation of its ideological basis signifies a quest for
2
alternative social arrangements, and is an overt challenge
3
to received thinking within the criminological enterprise.
The importance of the concept of ideology in crimin­
ological thinking can be seen as matter of proper concern 
because of the very nature of criminology itself. The study 
of crime is often directly concerned with the making of pol­
icy proposals about how society is to best view and proceed
4
with the disposition of crime related behaviors. Questions 
of individual and social freedom, social control, morality, 
distribution of power and justice are of utmost import to the 
field. These kind of questions have long been at issue within
19
the general society. Criminological approaches that seek 
to answer any of these questions ought to do so with skill 
and caution, since studies and answers offered may dramatic­
ally effect the status of individuals in society.
Ideological viewpoints held by criminologists then 
have a bearing on the fortunes of individuals and groups in 
society. Given this, a contribution toward the further invest­
igation of criminological theorizing as informed by ideology 
is of clear value.
Although recent criminological thinking has shown an 
increased attention toward ideological content in theorizing 
few writers have dealt systematically with ideology as a con­
cept. Often, as it shall be shown, criminologists have not 
come to agreement on what ideology means politically and def- 
initionally. The concept of ideology is used in ways that are 
somewhat ambigious, obscurant, and frequently bewildering, even 
contradictory. This lack of clarity and thoroughness about 
ideology severely limits discussions of ideology and crime to 
a decidedly meager understanding of the role which ideology 
actually does play.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to clearly 
define the meaning of ideology and its practical significance. 
The focus of attention will be primarily on academic crimin­
ologists in their theorizing about crime. Obviously, other
personnel within the criminal justice enterprise hold their
5
own ideological views; however, the scope of this work is
20
restricted in the main to formulators of criminological theory 
who are academically situated in American universities, al­
though reference is made to Eastern and Western European crim­
inologists and other social thinkers, some academic, some not, 
who have been engaged in activity that influences "thinking 
about crime".
Ideology as a Reflection 
of Political Struggles in Society
Essentially the concept of ideology emerged 
from political struggles— — the suspicion of 
ideology grows more formidable with the increa­
sing bitterness of political conflict.6
All definitions and theories of deviation 
and social problems are normative. They define 
and explain behavior from socially situated 
value positions.7
No kind of social inquiry can honestly proceed in 
a vacuum divorced from the ebb and flow of political debate 
about the course society should take. Criminological inquiry 
with its unique subject matter necessarily operates within a 
political environment. A.s Radzinowicz has noted "a comprehen­
sion of attitudes toward the study of crime’must make refer­
ence to the culture and society which gave them birth in the 
8
pas t."
The recent history of political struggles in American 
society, and criminology's reflection of these struggles, at 
least since the mid-1960's, has lead to an increased awareness 
of ideology as a component part of criminological thinking.
The field of criminology has been recently moved to criti-
21
cally question and confront established theoretical formu­
lations about crime. At back of this internal questioning 
have been the spectre of political struggles in the larger 
society. Such larger societal issues as: racism, sexism, 
human rights, imperialism and neo-colonialism have forced
criminological thinking to critically reflect upon its pur-
9
poses and objectives. The result of these reflections
has been a new consciousness of the role that ideology plays
in theory construction. The increased awareness of ideology
as a component of criminological thinking has in turn led
to political struggles within the discipline and has been
felt most sharply at the University of California at Berkeley
where the School of Criminology was recently "sanitized” of
its radical challengers by administrative elimination of the 
10
School itself.
In a major part then, a good portion of criminolog­
ical thinking since the mid-1960,s has been ideological to 
the extent that it has been an internalization of struggles 
over power in the at-large society. Awareness of this ideo­
logical element in criminology is also monotonously predict­
able: increased societal conflicts will tend to increase 
ideological conflict over the appropriate course and direct­
ion of criminological inquiry. Decreased societal conflicts 
will tend toward a corresponding decrease over the ideolog­
ical nature of criminological inquiry.
Since political struggles in the larger society have
22
\
their reflection in recent criminological thinking, it is 
important to know the ideological issues involved. The pri­
mary conflicts are over what Allen, among others, has called
"the questions which criminological inquiry has traditionally
( 11
either neglected or excluded from discussion."
The questions that traditional or conventional crim­
inology excludes may be summarized as follows:
1. What should be the ultimate purposes and 
goals of the American criminal justice 
sys tem?
2. What is the legitimate use of state power 
as administered through the system of crim­
inal justice?
3. What kind of societal behaviors should be 
selected out as criminal or deviant?
4. Can criminal justice be fairly and equitably 
meted out to all segments of the population?
5. Does the criminal justice system foster or 
thwart the potential for human liberation?
6. Have traditional approaches to crime and 
crime control been merely exercises in sup­
port of an economic and political status- 
quo which seeks to repress individuals and 
movements aimed at wholesale societal change?
7. Are there any real alternatives to the exis­
ting criminal justice system?
23
A close inspection of the foregoing seven questions
reveals that they are clearly questions with deep political
reference. They testify to an "explicit political conscious- 
12
ness" with regard to issues in criminal justice. No longer 
can theorists luxuriously construct paradigms of the crimin­
ological universe in some neutral or detached manner without 
being called to account for holding some particular ideolog­
ical view about how society ought to function. Indeed some 
recent criminological inquiry is more akin to the enter­
prises of political science, political sociology, political
13
philosophy and even political theology.
The seeming apoliticality formerly portrayed by
most in the discipline has changed so much in the past few
years that Jerome Slcolnick has declared that he sees, "....
less and less of a distinction between political science as
a discipline and the sociology of crime, or criminology as a 
14
discipline." Ideology relative to criminological theorizing
15
thus implies at least a "tacit theory of politics" where 
certain courses of theoretically informed action are prefer­
able to others because of the criminologist's peculiar world­
view and social situation.
If "law and order is the basic political question 
16of our day", then a clear and forceful specification of 
the politicality in criminological thinking is required. A 
political definition of the ideological element in recent 
criminological thought is not apparent in the conventional
24
17 18
writings of Miller , Gibbons and Blake , Gibbons and 
19 20 
Garabedian and P.adzinowicz all of whom have recently
written extensive articles about ideology and criminology.
Only Miller specifics how he is using the term ideology.
Gibbons, et al talk about perspectives, schools of thought,
approaches and the like without as much as mentioning the
term ideology. Radzinowicz employs the terms in the title
of his work and stops there. All use the standard political
labels of conservative, liberal and radical, but one is
left with little political feel for any real tug-of-war
between competing ideologies in these works. On the other
21 22
hand, radical criminologists like Quinney and Platt have
written works which are definite engagements in political
23 24
polemics. Taylor, Walton and Young along with Krisberg 
25
and Pierce have also shown that the historical development
of criminological theory is associated with intermittent
political conflicts between the various schools of thought
within the discipline. Bucholz, et al have even seen the
birth of classical criminology as,
. . . a scientific discipline filling the gap
left by the bourgeois jurisprudence of the 
day. The new discipline was seeking to answer 
the questions which the official criminal law 
theory either failed to pose or was reluctant 
to answer. Much as the ruling bourgeois cir­
cles were interested in defending, their crim­
inal law theory, the bourgeois nevertheless 
demanded a theory which it believed would ex­
plain criminality as a social phenomena and 
propose more effective measures than those of 
criminal law, in hope that it might thus suc­





For the purposes of this work ideology is: that 
component of any criminological theory which seeks to study 
crime within a normative framework that rationalizes and 
defends certain political ideals about how society should 
operate. The questions of whether the ideological compon­
ent in various criminological approaches are true or false, 
conscious or unconscious becomes relativized in this defin­
ition. All criminological thinking has some degree of truth 
and never are all ideological assumptions about crime explic­
itly formulated in a particular criminological theory. Hence, 
a criminology^without an inherent amount of ideology is im­
possible since all social theory comes with at least a tacit 
theory of political ideals.
It may be that the non-radical criminologists are
attempting to uphold what Wagner calls the "cherished social
27
science tenets" of objectivity, detachment and value-neu- 
trality in their interpretations. Whatever the reasons are, 
the real consequences are ideological in the sense that non­
radical authors attempt to defend an unnamed point of view 
and refute or repudiate the works of others they disagree 
with. Without risk then, the non-radical authors mentioned 
have not come to grips with a precise political understan­
ding of ideology as a concept.
Besides a primary political dimension, ideology,
26
in all kinds of social inquiry refers to what the Theodorsons 
define as,
The system of interdependant ideas, beliefs, 
traditions, principles and myths held by a social 
group or society, which reflects, rationalizes 
and defends its particular social, moral, relig­
ious, economic, political and institutional 
interests.28
At its most abstract level ideology is the
We11anschauug or worldview of interconnected ideas held by
particular sub-groups and individuals within criminology.
Most often non-radical criminologists do not announce their
particular ideological perspective. Some may not even be
aware of the ideological element within their thinking. Even
29
authors like Miller may define ideology in the abstract 
politically but omit applying the definition to their own 
concrete situation (i.e., by taking note of the particular 
ideology that underpins the work they have at hand).
Other more specified definitions of ideology would
be:
1. Ideology as a set of value assumptions about 
reality which serves the interests of class 
domination.
2. Ideology as a manifestation of false conscious­
ness held by a politically subordinate group 
would be understood as an active participant
in its own oppression.
Illustrations of the above two definitions of ideol-
27
ogy in recent criminological thinking are in order here.
Ideology as a servant of class interests becomes generally
apparent when criminology is "engaged in legal concerns for
the purpose of preserving the capitalist order, including
30
the welfare state associated with that order." Moreover, 
when criminologists, as experts, are employed by the govern­
ment or private foundations, as is more and more the case 
recently, the deliberate or unconscious creation and dissem­
ination of value assumptions about crime and its control
becomes a tendency directed toward the maintenance of soci-
31
etal class interests. The manifestation of false con­
sciousness by a subordinate group is somewhat more difficult 
to point out (assuming that most criminologists are not 
normally subjected to the outcomes of their own formulations). 
In an important sense the liberal rehabilitative ideal of 
contemporary corrections can be viewed as an example of the 
production of false consciousness if it is true that rehab­
ilitation is for all intents a myth in that it does not work. 
Prisoners must, as a requirement, conform to expected behav­
ior patterns based upon the rehabilitative ideal. If these 
behavioral expectations are internalized by the convict this 
can be understood as active participation in one's own sub­
jection. A better example of a similar sort would be one 
where some convicts refuse to overtly act in concert with 
other convicts as they protest prison conditions and treatment. 
A refusal to act being based on some narrow advantage they
28
expect to gain from their institutional oppressors (i.e., 
the prison bureaucracy). Obviously the spectre of penal 
coercion would enter into and distort this example, but one 
could avoid this objection by pointing out that prison trust­
ees in their relations with other convicts may often falsely 
conceive of themselves to be unoppressed because of their 
more intimate relationship to the prison bureaucracy.
Coping with 
Ideological Relativism
Obviously the relativism or ubiquitous nature of 
ideology is problematic for those concerned with grounding 
their theories of crime in some kind of ideological void.
Karl Mannheim, the liberal oriented father of the sociology 
of knowledge, attempted to overcome the difficulty by re­
sorting to a neo-Platonism, where intellectuals become the
social group who were "able to reach Olympian detachment
32
from the mundane traces of earthly involvement." Orthodox
Marxists, on the other hand, ground the truth value of their
social theories in the supposed historical objectivity of
the proletariat (historical objectivity being supposedly non- 
33
ideological). Pecent criminological writings concerned
with ideology hardly broach the question of ideological rel- 
34
ativism. This is the case for both radical and non-radical 
criminologists.
Prather than trying to deny that any criminological 
theory has an ideological component by resorting to devices
29
which in themselves are value-loaded, the reasonable prescript­
ion for coping with ideological relativism would be for theor­
ists to:
1. Admit quite frankly that their theory comes 
wrapped with ideological ribbons.
2. State exactly what it is in terms of polit­
ical ends the theory is aimed at.
3. If the ideological component of the theory 
is seen as a great hindrance, seek to denude 
the theory of as much ideology as is humanly 
possible.
4. Seek to state the ideology in terms of a 
clear-headed political analysis of crime 
in relation to society and not feel defen­
sive about others attacking the view as false 
consciousness or as mere opinion.
William E. Connolly, a liberal political scientist,
has proposed an idealization of the responsible ideologue:
The responsible ideology is one in which 
a serious and continuing effort is made to elu­
cidate publicly all of the factors involved in 
its formulation and in which a similar effort 
is made to test the position at strategic points 
by all available means. A continuous shuttle 
is established between the levels of self-clari­
fication, formulating and testing beliefs about 
the environment, recommending appropriate public 
action and attitudes, and specifying the expected 
consequences of the proposed action. In this 
way a maximum effort is made to keep all factors 
involved in the formulated ideology at the fore­
front of attention, and every opportunity is 
grasped to confront these recognized factors
30
with the hard facts of the environment:
The responsibly formulated ideology, in 
short, unites . . . analytical precision . . . 
self-awareness . . . and the commitment to 
social relevance. 35
While an honest coping with ideology is obviously 
important, what is socially and politically relevant to one 
interest group in society may not be to another. For this 
reason ideology must ever be conceived of as a tool of politi­
cal struggle and interaction. For example, a conventional 
criminologist may be analytically precise and honest about 
the nature of his or her conservative belief. But it is the 
conventional belief itself that leads to conventional praxis.
Thus no amount of even honest coping can earn the political
36
’’respect and consideration” for ideology that Miller has
recently called for.
For an ideological perspective to earn political
’’respect and consideration," the respect must be earned in
a social atmosphere where all ideological viewpoints would
have an equal opportunity, for not only theoretical express-
37
ion but also practical application. No such atmosphere 
exists, although radical criminology has earned an equal 
opportunity to express itself theoretically, in some univers­
ities and publications. Given that the hallmark of academia 
is its so-called openness to theoretical debate and discussinn,
even this opportunity is no mean feat for radical criminol- 
38
ogy. Yet, unlike conventional criminology, the theoreti-
31
cal conclusions of the radicals are not presently applied 
in the field of criminal justice. Equality of opportunity 
stops short of allowing a radical praxis, in an academic 
environment which, through criminology, supplies policy opt­
ions to the criminal justice system.
Two rather obvious reasons explain this disallow­
ance of radical praxis: 1) radical praxis as revolutionary 
activity (at least ideally) is set against the cherished 
interests of conventionality and as such is political ana­
thema; 2) conventional theory and praxis wield ruling power 
both in academia and the general society. Ruling power 
usually concedes little without a protracted period of pol­
itical struggle. Out-of-power radical criminology cannot 
determine the concrete conditions for its application to 
what it studies because it is by political conventionality 
that such an application is determined. This second reason 
may indirectly explain why radical criminology, like New Left 
sociology, but in contrast to scientific socialism or ortho­
dox Marxism, has tended toward a non-violent revolutionary,
39
rather than a violent revolutionary strategy of social change, 
even though the radicals call their theories authentically 
Marxian. For radical criminologists to engage in an authen­
tically Marxian revolutionary praxis would necessarily mean 
a renunciation of their academic existence and a switch to 
the status of the criminal lumpenproletariat because as, 
the liberal professor of criminal law M. Cherif Bassiouni
32
has recently noted in his "horn-book", The Law of Dissent 
and Riots:
Some lawyers may wonder why a discussion 
of the rhetoric, tactics and goals of the 
New Left is relevant to them. The link is 
the law and what we call the role of the law.
In the final analysis, we are dealing with 
the guarantees and highest products of civ­
ilization itself . . . freedom, order, respect
for the rights of others . . . and with an
attack however haphazard, misguided and, one 
may hope, foredoomed to fail - on those ulti- 
mates. We lawyers have society itself as our 
client. We should attend to legal and illegal 
challenges to that society. The violent wing 
of the New Left is such a challenge.^
Unfairly then, radical praxis, in order to exist 
inside academia, must submit to at least the minimal demands 
of political conventionality, even though radical ideology 
may be given a relatively free avenue of expression. Submis­
sion must obtain until the radicals leave academia or until 
social evolution or even revolution transforms power rela­
tionships inside academia. An honest coping with ideology 
for radical criminologists may therefore be an unrespectable 
and inconsiderate suggestion by Miller, because his suggestion 
assumes a non-existent equality of power among competing 
ideologies in criminology. However, as is evidenced by soc­
ial revolution in socialist countries, ideological struggles
do not necessarily cease with a revolutionary take-over 
41
of power. In the final analysis, the archetypical revol­
ution has merely meant a change of political guard (then 
the issue becomes who will guard the new guards?). In the
33
event of social revolution in America what is now radical 
criminology would probably become conventionality and vice- 
versa. The relative nature of ideology would remain intact.
Thus, as a tool in political vocabulary and action 
ideology cannot be overcome until the social divisions of 
society are eliminated. Situated within criminology an 
overcoming of ideology in thinking about crime is dependent 
upon the elimination of crime itself. Coping does little 
more than require the ideologist to state a particular pol­
itical line or affiliation or, in the case of radical crimin­
ology, to suffer the handicap of not being able to immediately 
realize its revolutionary praxis. Nevertheless conventional 
criminology should openly admit and take steps to cope with 
its ideological dimension. Pvadical criminology should become 
aware that political expression in itself is synonomous with 
ideological expression, thus radical politics and radical 
ideology are equivalent, the so-called nnon-id.eologicaln 
objectivity of the Marxist proletariat notwithstanding.
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CHAPTER II
A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY IN 
CONVENTIONAL CRIMINOLOGY
To this juncture the main contention has been that 
the concept of ideology, however frequently mentioned rec­
ently by criminological theorists, has not received proper 
attention. Further a clearer understanding of ideology emer­
ges if the concept is defined politically in the sense of 
a justification and defense of certain ideals. As a way of 
illustrating this contention the thematic presentation below 
analyzes several recent idealized propositions from the
recent writings of two well known criminological authors,
1
James Q. Wilson, a political scientist and Ramsey Clark,
2
a former Attorney General , against the work of Walter B.
3
Miller.
The works of Wilson and Clark were selected because
they are representative of ideological distribution between 
4 5
conservative and liberal thinking respectively. Moreover, 
both of these works attempt to examine a broad range of crim­
inological issues which gives them depth and thus makes them 
attractive for analysis. Miller's work seeks to lay out an 
ideal construction of the left and right (politically spea­
king) ideological underpinnings of criminology and is also
35
broad enough to be useful in the presentation as a tool in 
comparative and contrastive analysis.
The purposes of the thematic analysis is to:
1. Illustrate the ideological presuppositions 
of liberal and conservative criminology.
2. Demonstrate that the lack of disunity over 
political ends indicates a fundamental un­
ity of conservative and liberal approaches 
to criminology and thereby these approaches 
can best be viewed as politically conven­
tional .
3. Comprehend the disjunction between conven­
tional and radical approaches to crimin­
ology as a political difference based on 
differing ideologies.
Six categories of investigation will be employed in 
order to give the analysis coherence and clarity. The cate­
gories are:
1. Ontology of human nature and society.
2. Social value orientation.
3. Etiology of crime.
4. Function of crime.
5. Function of criminal justice system.
6. Ideology, change, politicality and utopianism.
In some of the above six categories of analysis all
three of the authors may have nothing to say. The authors1-
36
silence may have to do with their unconsciousness of the 
relationship the category has to their statements. For 
example, few conventional criminological theorists would 
readily admit that their theories articulate certain polit­
ical lines, or that their thinking is utopianist. Again,
6
the ontological or metaphysical basis of their theories 
of human nature, for instance, would be difficult of admit­
tance. On the other hand their silence may be interpreted 
as a deliberate strategy of mystification. If the authors 
are silent with respect to a particular category, the pres­
ent author will attempt to glean (by inference) an answer 
to the omission.
When a comparison is made between the statements 
of Wilson or Clark or both to Miller's idealized construction 
it will be indicated by an equal sign (=). By the same 
token a contrast will be indicated by the not equal sign (^). 
After each of the categories of analysis is a comment by 
the present author which makes inferences about the equiv­
alency or non-equivalency of the statements to each other 
and to Miller's idealized proposition. Miller's construction 
schematically distinguishes left and right ideological posi­
tions; this procedure will be followed except for the inter- 
positional modification represented by the actual statements 
of Wilson and Clark.
Miller's left construction will be signified by 
M-L; hi's right construction by M-R. Clark's statements
37
will be signified by C, while Wilson's statements will be
signified by W. As a precaution, Miller's constructions
use a five point scale to measure what he calls "a single
major parameter of substantive variation along a left-right 
7
scale; however this author has reduced Miller's scale to 
one approximate and composite proposition or construction 
in order to simplify the thematic presentation. The reduct­
ion brings together into one focus the moderate and extreme 
propositions and thus functions to negate the possibility for
a centrist position of which Miller is not concerned with
8
presenting in any case. Finally, the question of whether 
the ideological constructions are moderate or extreme like 
the previously mentioned concern of ideological consciousness 
is relativized: ideology is ideology, whether moderate or 
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Comment on Ontology of Human Mature and Society
Clark’s ontology compares favorably with Wilson's 
partial assertion that behavior is the result of socializa­
tion. Human existence is a kind of tabula rasa, a clean 
slate that must be informed by external forces. However for 
Clark there is apparently no free will or choice: all human
behavior is equated with socialization. Wilson and the M-R 
construction posit freely willed behavior as the essence of 
being human, noting that people must deal with the consequences 
of their behavior irregardless of the social conditions.
Wilson obviously wants it both ways and as a neo-conservative 
he stands in the murky horizon between conservatism and 
liberalism. Countering these views the M-L proposition admits 
of humanity as being ontologically or existentially free but 
socially forced to make decisions that are contrary to its 
existential nature. Thus any comparison of H-L with the 
liberal statement of Clark is'cancelled by virtue of Clark's 
omittance of the question of will shaped by force. A reason­
able conclusion here would be that the M-L proposition bears 
little relation to either of the actual statements of Clark 
or Wilson and that Clark's position is akin to the liberal 
residue in Wilson’s neo-conservatism.
As regards the ontology of society, threats to the 
existing moral (social) order inform the thoughts of both 
Clark and Wilson and compare well to the M-R construction. 
Wilson equates specified immoral behavior with the possible
40
destruction of present society. Clark's position is more 
problematic for he does not manifestly deal with the question 
of morality anywhere in his book. One explanation for this 
may be that morality, like free will, is not a part of his 
ontology of humans in society. However, in actuality Clark 
himself does emphatically take ethical or moral stances, just 
as much as he also makes volitional choices when social con­
ditions allow. From his statement on society one can glean 
a latent moral posture by noting his emphasis on such terms 
as: ordered liberty, social discipline and social stability 
with respect to "present conditions" of society. These 
three terms compare well with Wilson's "moral horror" and 
M-R's "moral order". All three imply that present society 
should be based on ethical imperatives strong enough to 
cope with the challenges of destructive anti-social action. 
Clark even wants present society to use improved and less 
complex technology to insure that future society is not 
threatened by actions which would cause social instability.
The M-L construction, in contrast to the other perspectives, 
views present society as ethically unjust in its relation to 
the needs of the majority of people. It holds that the major­
ity of people are not being honestly dealt with by those who 
have the power to influence behavior, even though present 
conditions in society hold the. possibility for change. Again, 
the M-L proposition stands alone relative to the actual state­
ments of Clark and Wilson, while in an ontology of society
41
their statements best correspond with M-R.
42
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Comment on Social Value Orientation
On the three questions of social value orientation 
both Clark and Wilson are in fundamental agreement with the 
M-R construction while they divorce themselves from associa­
tion with the left point of view. On revolution, Clark assures 
us that reform must come without instability to the social order. 
He is certain that revolution is at minimum an obsolete roman­
ticism, at most intolerable. In the introduction to Clark's 
work Tom Wicker calls Clark "the most revolutionary public 
voice in America today," but as can be seen, Clark wants some­
thing other than what the M-L proposition is calling for.
Reform and revolution are not synonomous terms. Wilson also 
wants reform but in a right direction. His view is to confine 
criminals as a way of securing society against the threat of 
criminality produced by evil people.
The stratified nature of existing society is appar­
ently of positive value to Clark and Wilson. Wilson wants 
to divide blacks along class lines, with the black middle 
class as the moral superior of the other black classes. On 
the other hand Clark's view is problematic. He at first seems 
to agree with the M-L proposition in its emphasis on crime 
as an outcomes of desperate maintenance; however, as it turns 
out he is more concerned with a liberal balance between order 
and justice or worse, by inference, justice and injustice, 
and the separation o*f criminal from the law-abiding. In the 
M-L perspective: struggles for justice and liberation arise 
from situation of disorder and instability not the contrary.
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The M-L construction represents threats to the exis­
ting society as acts of rebellion against social immorality. 
Wilson holds such left-wing talk in contempt and retorts that 
all societies evidence criminal behavior, no matter their econ­
omic arrangement. Again, Clark by proposing the rule of law 
as an end, seems to be suggesting that legality is the equiv­
alent of social morality and that as long as decisions are 
arrived at by democratic means all will be well. The problem 
with Clark*s reasoning with respect to the M-L proposition 
is: existing law itself is seen in left thinking as illegiti­
mate, as an immoral set of rules arrived at in an arbitrary 
and thus non-democratic manner. Any appeals to such laws, 
especially in circumstances of rebellion, would be interpreted 
as ideological apologetics for the status-quo and hence more 
in tune with the M-R construction in its concern for the main­
tenance of prevailing authority.
Faith in technological control unites Clark and
Wilson and distinguishes them from the M-L proposition.
Neither deal with the question of technology as a method of 
9repression. For them, science and its application is the 
answer to social instability, not revolution. The M-L prop­
osition does not fear the existence of technology, but does 
fear its use which increasingly has been aimed against the 
interests of the poor and minorities. Technology has a 
middle-class bias in the same fashion as law. Technology
47
according to the M-R proposition is to be used to direct max­
imum force against threats to the present social order.
Decentralization presents problems for both Clark 
and Wilson. Neither can agree with Miller's left or right 
constructions but they do agree with each other. Both want 
to maintain an organizational span of control which is ulti­
mately divorced from community auspices. To them crime is 
infinitely larger than the resources and capacities of any 
one local community. There must be more coordination and 
cooperation among fragmented elements of the criminal justice 
system. The need is to professionalize through training and 
other methods the existing criminal justice system. As for 
control, the power to determine policies would remain in 
the hands of crimunal justice administrators and the most 
the people could hope for would be better community relations 
with a crime control apparatus they are not to control.
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Comment on the Etiology and Function of Crime
Throughout his book Clark projects two mutually
exclusive views about the cause of crime. The first is that
crime is a function of distinctive social forces; the second
is that crime is a result of faulty personal psychology and
disregard for the customs and conventions of present society.
His main emphasis though is on the second view and thus he
must take exception to the M-L proposition's view of crime
as a product of society's differential power flow. Moreover,
he would object to the notion of regarding criminals as heroic;
so long as criminals disregard the rule of law they demonstrate
to Clark that they care little for the "systems and standards 
10
of society." The fatal question for Clark's ideology is:
11
"whose law, what, order?" For Wilson there is no difficulty. 
Poor and psychologically disturbed blacks are the cause of 
most crime. If these people could only cultivate white middle- 
class values like self-control and moral consciousness most 
crime would be almost eliminated. Wilson gives little credit 
to the historical and social forces that continue to enslave 
most blacks, nor is he or Clark concerned with an analysis 
of ruling class social control, which the M-L construction 
sees as problematic.
Most crime is dysfunctional for all the positions, 
but to the M-L proposition the bulk of crime is also justi­
fied. To the M-L construction the value is revolution not 
order maintenance, hence crime may provide a eufunctional
50
service to the structure and activities of revolution while
remaining dysfunctional to the ends of existing society.
Clark sees crime as corrosive to society and if practiced
by the more fortunate (upper class), crime presents great
questions about the moral order. Clark agrees with the
M-L construction about (upper-class) white-collar crime,
but could never countenance crime as justified, even though
society is oppressive or "criminal” in its behavior toward
the oppressed. Wilson in his concern for the security of
middle-class communities views crime as creating the condi-
12
tions for Hobbes' "war of all against all." It is interes­
ting that the competitive element of present capitalism is 
geared to individual calculation and advantage, rather than 
group sharing. Maybe in contradistinction to Wilson, crime
is merely another word for capitalism, for both atomize soci-
13
ety and both are predatory. The question for Wilson is: 
why condemn crime without an equal condemnation of capital­
ism and its pathologically immoral excesses?
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Comment on the Function of Criminal Justice System
A. Criminologists:
Both of the M propositions assert naively that crim­
inologists are oriented toward the left as is most social 
science. This bi-partisan assertion presents certain diffi­
culties which revolve around the improper use of political 
terminology. The term left in political discourse normally 
refers to them who profess views which find fault with and are
characterized by a desire to overthrow the existing social 
14
order. In contrast, the right usually makes reference to
a political philosophy that is based on social stability and
which stresses the need to maintain established institutions
and preferring gradual social development and reform to
15
abrupt and through-going societal change. Corresponding 
to the usual meanings of the two terms one would find a left 
criminology to be; the brand of criminology which at least 
theoretically seeks revolution and change in the way crime 
is defined and dealt with in the present society. A right 
criminology would define and handle crime in traditional 
ways in order to insure the stability of the established 
social order.
By the terms of the foregoing definitions neither 
academic criminology, nor jurists or lawyers are anywhere 
near being social revolutionists or leftists. Revolutionary 
criminology is not now offered in most universities: indeed 
this writer cannot think of any American educational insti-
57
tution with such offerings (mention has previously been made 
of the "sanitizing" of Berkeley). For a revolutionary jur­
ist to be seated in an American criminal docket is almost
a contradiction in terms; the same goes for the non-revol-
16utionary practice of law. Moreover, most academic social
science itself cannot in any conceivable stretch of the
imagination be favorably compared with left or revolutionary 
17
sentiments.
Wilson*s statement may hold the key to an explan­
ation of Miller's naivety about the difference between left 
and right criminologists. Wilson finds most sociologists to 
be liberal (criminology being for the most part derivative 
from sociology). He suggests that the presuppositions of
their discipline ought to guide liberal criminologists to
18
conservative conclusions, rather than liberal ones. Many 
of the presuppositions of conventional criminology have 
already been dealt with throughout these pages, i.e., social 
order maintenance, preference for traditional morality, 
criminal behavior as a product of poor socialization or 
devious psychology, and etc. Thus academic criminology in 
its conventional form is best thought of as an exercise in 
political conservatism and is rightest ideology. The term 
liberal can best be viewed as a variant of rightest ideology 
in the sense that when it comes to questions about the fun­
damental reorganization of existing society liberals and 
conservatives are in mutual agreement. Both find the true
58
left to be contemptible and both consciously do their utmost 
to restrict the true left from any real participation in 
the political, social or academic arenas of American life.
An example of liberal conservatism (left liberalism) is that 
of Clark who for all his rhetoric about change, justice, 
freedom, equality, etc., remains genuinely supportive of the 
police and other coercive elements of the existing criminal 
justice apparatus and who sought, while Attorney General, 
to enforce his cherished ’’rule of law” against the leftist 
activities of Dr. Spock and Rev. William Sloan Coffin among 
others.
The M construction about criminologists are thus 
in extreme error and ought to be restated to read:
1. Academic criminology reflecting academic 
social science is substantially oriented 
toward the right. (M-R).
2. A major role in eliminating crime is 
played by the great bulk of the great 
bulk of elitist right-oriented writers, 
educators, jurists, lawyers and others 
who contribute directly to crime reduction 
by supporting the values of the existing 
social order. (M-R).
B. Criminal Law:
Wilson is in agreement with the M-R concern that 
criminal law be based on the requirement of strict social
59
punishment or retribution. The conservative bias places 
a heavy emphasis on retribution. The conservative bias 
places a heavy emphasis on retribution because it is thought 
that strict punishment of offenders will have a salutary 
effect in deterring actions which threaten the social order. 
Clark like so many liberals talks of a government of laws 
and not men, and by such mystification, elevates criminal 
law to some ethereal strata where men and law are separate 
and unequal creatures acting out some strange and coercive 
drama based on the requirements of social system maintenance. 
To Clark criminal law needs to be made more efficient and 
as a corollary more effective if society's legal system 
of behavioral control is to be maintained. In not criti­
cizing criminal law application for its tendency to promote 
an unequal and unjust social order, Clark and the M-L con­
struction fail to reach any fundamental accord. Yet in 
his concern for the continuance of the existing social sys­
tem Clark shares common ground with Wilson and the M-R 
construction.
C. Police:
The police, as guardians against threats to the 
social order, is a theme which both liberals and conserva­
tives are comfortable with. Wilson proceeding with the 
scholar's guarded witness testify's that massive increases 
in police manpower tends to reduce street crimes. (The 
term "massive increase" is usually accepted as part of
60
conservative jargon when references to police arrangements 
are made). True to his liberalism Clark views mass violence 
for social change as a negation of the human potential.
Riots, rebellions and revolutions are to Clark a demonstration 
of a lack of faith in the existing social system. Police 
to both liberals and conservatives are the "thin blue line" 
between society and utter social destruction. Yet there is 
no evidence in either Clark or Wilson's writings that police 
serve as a force for the maintenance of societal class 
interests as the M-L construction claims. To the true left 
police are little more than the armed protectors of a class 
based society which refuses to deal humanely with its mar- 
ginated masses. To call for faith in an apparently hope­
less situation of police repression, as does Clark, is to 
exposit the absurd.
D. Judiciary:
According to the M-L proposition it is the bias 
of the lower courts and a greater rationalization of crim­
inal procedures which require remedial attention. Left 
in this state, without abridgement, the M-L construction 
bears a positive relation to Clark's concerns for perfec­
ting the existing judicial system. However, contrary 
to Miller's construction of left views about the judiciary, 
a true left position would understand, as the radical attor­
ney William Kunstler has that,
Unfortunately, it is not enough.to point
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out that, no matter how unjust the system 
may be at the trial level, [lower court: 
minej there are always the higher courts 
to undo the damage. The judges on those 
lofty tribunals come, in large measure, 
from the same milieu as their colleagues 
below, and react in much the same fashion 
to the social order which created and main­
tains them. Furthermore, even assuming 
courts which can rise above their own in­
stincts of self-preservation, the gradualism 
of the appellate process often runs counter 
to the immediacy of human needs at the very 
moment they most cry out for recognition
and fulfillment.^
As was pointed out above criminal law rationaliza­
tion and its justification, is not the aim of the true left. 
The present legal system, as a whole, is to the true left 
the antithesis of justice and liberation. To make the exis­
ting legal system more effective and/or efficient without 
revolutionary change in the conditions that create the need 
for such a system, is an exercise indouble-think or bad 
faith and it is not really a part of an authentically radi­
cal posture. Thus, the M-L construction is in fundamental 
error.
Wilson and the M-R construction hold seemingly 
divergent views about the judiciary. The M-R typology rep­
resents an extreme rightest view wherein left-oriented law­
yers and judges are deemed responsible for allowing criminals 
to go free. Wilson, as a scholar and neo-conservative is 
concerned about the dichotomy between judicial theory and 
judicial'practice. Of course, the M-R view is based on the 
misuse of the term left. Very few lawyers and judges are
revolutionaries, theoretically or in social praxis. There 
may be a predominate liberal and even left liberal tendency 
among higher court judges and a comparable conservative 
tendency among most lower court judges, but to describe 
either of these tendencies as revolutionary or left-oriented 
is to completely obscure reality. The convergence between 
Wilson and M-R comes at the point where both are disgruntled 
with the prospects of not having their conservative views 
about morality, retribution and deterrence always taken into 
liberal judicial sentencing determinations. As seen through 
out this analysis the conservative view is that criminals 
sould be strictly punished by judicial decision-makers.
When some liberal judges go counter to conservative ideals 
for the disposition of criminals a cry of intense anguish 
will most assuredly be heard from conservative quarters.
E. Prisons:
Wilson and the M-R construction are in perfect 
agreement as to the function of prisons: prisons are estab­
lished to isolate and punish offenses against society, not 
to rehabilitate. Interestingly enough, conservatives and 
left radicals are in agreement that rehabilitation is a 
myth and must be abandoned as a policy. But where the con­
servatives advocate prison punishment, left radicals advo­
cate the abolishment of prisons in their entirety. Clark 
is the odd-man out in the dialogue about rehabilitation 
though it is his liberal view that prevails in current penal
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thinking. Rather than seeing the incarcerated as basically 
political prisoners, Clark wants to force rational people 
to adjust their behavior to a 11 just society which has the 
ability to provide health and purpose and opportunity for 
all its citizens” . Clark has no problem in calling present 
society just and healthy but a true left comprehension of 
rehabilitation would reveal that the concept of rehabilita­
tion is a complete mystification of the real function of 
prisons which is to mainly isolate and punish society*s mar- 
ginated masses.
V I . Ideology, Change, Politicality and Utopianism
The thematic inquiry has thus far dealt mainly 
with substantive similarities between liberal and conserva­
tive variants of conventional criminology while simultantously 
delimiting the vastly divergent substantive horizons that 
separate conventional and radical criminology. The misap­
plication of the political term "leftist” has been demon­
strated by reference to Miller*s L construction which fails 
a positive comparison to the statements of Clark whose views 
are in essence "left” liberal and not really politically 
leftist. The next and final major category of thematic 
inquiry will vary from the preceeding five categories in 
that attention will now focus on some prime modal contrasts 
between the conventional and radical criminological statements 
expressed in the works of Clark and Wilson as compared to 
the idealized constructions of Miller. Rather than employing
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the schematic arrangement used above, the following presents 
four statements in sequential form:
M-L: The left provides the cutting edge 
of innovation, the capacity to isolate and 
identify those aspects of existing systems 
which are least adaptive, and the imagination 
and vision to devise new modes and new instru­
mentalities for accomodating emergent condi­
tions (p. 34) .
M-R: The right has the capacity to sense 
those elements of the established order that 
have strength, value and continuing usefulness, 
to serve as a brake on over rapid alteration 
of existing modes of adaptation, and to use what 
is valid in the past as a guide to the future 
(p. 34) .
Clark: To live in ordered liberty we must 
develop social disciplines and institutional 
actions relevant to present conditions and 
future directions...Through technology this 
generation first liberated mankind from bondage 
to nature...If human reason and purpose can 
control technology...Tragically neglected 
processes of criminal justice can enlarge both 
security for society and liberty for the indi­
vidual. (pp. 18-19).
Wilson: I argue for a sober view of man 
and his institutions that would permit reason­
able things to be accomplished, foolish things 
abandoned, and utopian things forgotten. A 
sober view of man requires a modest definition 
of progress...Were we to devote resources to
a strategy that is well within our abilities---
namely, to incapacitating a larger fraction of
the convicted... then not only a 20 percent
reduction is possible, but even larger ones are 
conceivable. (pp. 198-199).
These four statements will then be examined in 
light of their:
a. Ideological allegiances.
b. Position on social.change.
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c. Line of political articulation.
d. Utopianisms in political articulation.
a. Ideological allegiance:
By ideological allegiance reference is made to 
the ideological line of progression in each of the author's 
statements. If the essential difference between conventional 
and left criminology comes precisely at the juncture of re­
ceptivity to or rejection of existing social arrangements, 
then it is reasonable to presume that conventional criminol­
ogy, in its rather uncritical receptivity is a theoretical 
defense of the present power distribution in society. The 
contrary would be true of left criminology in its offensive 
against present arrangements and its advocacy of a new means 
and strategies which would undermine rather than bolster 
the structure of existing society.
The M-L proposition goes strangely astray when 
viewed in terms of ideological loyalty. Not only does it 
not take offense with the existing social order, but it un­
fortunately seeks to creatively adapt parts of the existing 
system to changing circumstances without changing the essen­
tial nature of the whole system. The erroneous M-L construct­
ion is a defense of the status-quo and merely calls for the 
introduction of technological novelty into a system in need 
of systematic overhaul. It advocates treating symptomatic 
criminal phenomena instead of treating the diseased whole
6*
social apparatus. Clark's statement correlates well with 
the erroneous M-L construction. His innovation would be 
to use greater and more rational technology to insure social 
stability and, by inference, to control anti-social behavior. 
Further, Clark's insistent rhetoric about society's ills 
places him at the cutting edge of a "heretical" or left 
liberalism which stops just short of advocating means dir­
ected towards the revampment of the entire pathological 
social order.
Wilson's "sober view of man" is akin to Clark's 
instrumental gradualism where innovative technological 
methods of control are devised to shore-up the present 
social order. To maintain sobriety in a situation seemingly 
demanding urgent attention is analogous to the calm of fis­
cal conservative Herbert Hoover just prior to the crash of 
1929. The only difference between Clark and Wilson on this 
point is whether to choose between selecting a new tool of 
social control (for Clark computers) or resorting to an old 
one which has fallen out of favor (increased incapacitation 
or punishment for Wilson).
b- Position on social change:
The modal contrasts here are extremely sharp. 
Conventional criminologists seek to extend social control 
by calling, like Clark does, for technologically efficient 
response to criminal behavior. Miller's construction, if 
it were restated to represent a true left position, would
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necessarily posit a radical rupture of social control by 
a revolutionary transformation of the whole social apparatus. 
The probable reason that total transformation is a threat 
to conventional thinking is that control of the transforma­
tion would not be exclusively located in the hands of est­
ablished societal power brokers or the ruling class. Inno­
vations, on the other hand, are usually controlled features 
’'rationally1’ introduced into the social system and designed
with a view toward merely ameliorative "band-aid" type 
20
action. Adaptation of improved methods of social coer­
cion, as in the case of the M-L statement is definitely 
not the theoretical posture of social change advanced by 
revolutionary left criminoloyg.
c. Line of political articulation:
What is meant by the line of political articulation 
is the author’s unconsciousness of or deliberate attachment 
to and advocacy of a particular political philosophy. Mention 
has been made above with respect to the improper use of pol­
itical terminology as was evident in some of Miller's left 
constructions. The M-L construction quoted above is a sum­
mary statement which reveals Miller’s entire position on what 
he thinks the function of left criminology is. One can only 
conclude from his summary that for Miller left criminology 
is in reality based on the principles of political liberal­
ism; a classic definition of political liberalism being: 
the favoring of principles which call for a disdain of con­
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servative reactionalism, coupled with a pronounced emphasis 
on economic and individual liberty and the introduction of 
political reforms to smooth over social demands. Clark 
unlike Miller at least acknowledges his allegiance to lib­
eralism and resists being associated with revolutionary 
leftist extremism.
Wilsonfs caution in pushing his "sober view of 
man" belies an adherence to a political philosophy of con­
servatism. The ideologies of sobriety, reasonableness, 
objectivity and scholarly detachment in the face of demands 
for drastic social change lend themselves well to conserva­
tism with its traditional emphasis on the maintenance of 
existing views and support of established institutions. 
Wilson, in confessing his pragmatic views below, remains 
decidedly confused about exactly where he is at in the 
left-right political continum.
Those who argue that we can eliminate 
crime if only we have the "will" to do so, 
whether by ending poverty (as the left argues) 
or by putting more police on the street and 
more gallows in our jails (as the right believes) 
seriously mistake what we are capable of under 
even the best of circumstances, and place the 
blame for our failings precisely where it
should not be on our will power, and
by implication on our governing morality. ^
Wilson in his pragmatism cannot escape being desig­
nated as a political conservative exponent of rightist ideol 
ogy, although he may advocate a line different (neo) from 
plain old conservatism.
6'9>
Like liberal and conservative (conventional) crim­
inology, left or radical criminology also adheres to a par­
ticular political line of articulation. As shall be shown 
in later chapters left criminology can be associated with 
Marxist socialism, utopian socialism, syndicalism, communism, 
and secular or religious anarchism. All of these are revo­
lutionary left-oriented political viewpoints and as such 
are highly critical of existing society, including the pur­
pose and function of the criminal justice system. Yet each 
of these radical political viewpoints are distinct entities 
unto themselves and are not revivalistic in the sense of 
Wilson’s moderate neo-conservative posture.
d . Utopianism in political articulation:
The great modern moral idea is that of 
individuality; it is at the heart of the 
m o d e m  liberalism, m o d e m  humanism, modern 
radicalism. There is no understanding utopia 
apart from these movements of thought: utopia 
is their culmination.22
Admittedly the concept of utopia is difficult of specifica­
tion. Some believe that, like Karl Mannheim, utopian thought
was transformed into various ideological tendencies after the
23
French Revolution. Others, along with the political philos­
opher Crane Brinton, see the American Dream and modern west­
ern democracy as a diffuse secular utopian experiment which 
first emerged with the 18th century emphasis on the rule of 
reason and unashamed pursuit of the good life as summed up 
in the credo of liberalism: liberty, equality and the inev-
70.
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itability of progress. Orthodox Marxism most often at­
tempts to explain away its utopian vision of communism
25
where the good life is finally achieved. Modern conserva­
tism for all its professed realism and moderacy retains a
profound nostalgia for an idyllic yesteryear that never was
26
part of reality at least for most people. This author
subscribes to the view that utopian tendencies are still
part of the political landscape,
...eschatological and paradisiacal elements 
in the colonization of North America by the 
pioneers, and the progressive transformation 
of the "American Paradise", giving rise to the 
myth of indefinite progress, to American opti­
mism, and to the cult of youth and novelty.27
Utopianisms in political articulation also makes
the broadest references to:
1. Speculations and images about what society should 
be in the light of its deficient actuality. 
Utopianisms in political thinking and action
is the secular counterpart to religious esch-
atology where, instead of God, humans mobilize
themselves to "make over the barbaric earthly
world...here man has a primary responsiblity
28
to create a better future."
2. A compassionate concern for social humanitarian 
ideals that call upon humans to constantly lib­
erate themselves from all kinds of tyranny.
3. A visualization and conceptualization of a
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future society, either near or far, that
is better in most respects than the immed­
iate society.
4. A consistent and insistent focus on social
policy changes which encourage the realization 
of social humanitarian ends.
Life magazine describes Clark’s book as one that
’’could stir people of conscience to demolish the courts, the
prison networks and to replace them with a system that is 
29
decent.” As has been demonstrated throughout this thematic 
inquiry, Clark is not really about demolishing or replacing 
any part of the criminal justice system. He is however, a
passionate liberal humanitarian reformer with a utopian
vision of what society's response to crime control ought to 
be given what is. The point is that one does not necessarily 
have to be a revolutionary to be utopian. Utopian visionar­
ies since Plato's Republic have more commonly been supporters
30
of the prevailing political ethos of society. Clark's 
gradualism is slow but it is definitely aimed at social pol­
icy changes which he believes will encourage the realization 
of social humanitarian ends. Thus, though Clark's vision is 
not leftist, it is very much utopian in its call for the am­
elioration of crime engendering and control activities.
Wilson’s moderate neo-conservatism is somewhat 
more difficult to weigh on the utopian scale. He is at 
once concerned about what works and advocates the abandon-
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ment of "ideological preconceptions about what ought
31
^emphasis: WilsonJ to work". Yet Wilson also believes 
that justice has suffered because criminal justice policy 
makers have not emphasized criminal incapacitation or strict 
punishment. Thus community and individual security are 
threatened because of the lack of will on the part of crim­
inal justice policy makers; lack of will in the sense of 
not using the tools already at their disposal. To solve 
this apparent paradox between ideals of justice and security 
and the lack of will with respect to criminal justice policy 
makers, Wilson advocates a pragmatic, utilitarian calculus 
for policy setting which entails an emphasis on what he 
thinks has worked (criminal incapacitation) as a guide to 
future policy implementation. The crucial question is: 
has criminal incapacitation actually ever worked in as far 
as deterrence is concerned or is this utopian thinking on 
the part of Wilson? At best the evidence is that criminal 
incapacitation or strict punishment for crimes is and has 
been an ambiguous project. Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins 
have noted recently that deterrence,
....figures most prominently throughout 
our punishing and sentencing decisions...yet 
we know very little about it.
Punishment sometimes deters, sometimes 
educates, sometimes has a habiticative effect 
in conditioning human behavior; but when and 
how? Our ignorance is a serious obstacle, 
whatever our regulatory objectives.32
Wilson's display of scholarly ignorance with respect
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to what he advocates leaves one with yet another question. 
If his proposed criminal incapacitation denies a rehabila- 
tative dimension and is ambiguous concerning deterrence, 
then what is left as the basis for policy? The answer is: 
societal revenge against law-breakers. Thus Wilson's util­
itarian calculus ought to be translated to read: the re­
venge element of criminal incapacitation has worked in the 
past and should work in the future. But to admit that re­
venge is the essential substance of punishment is to put
forward an ages-old view that by itself has not worked to
33
any appreciable degree in the course of western history.
There is thus little reason to expect that revenge will
decrease the occurrence of criminality in the future.
On the utopian scale Wilson's pragmatic realism
harks back to a revengeful society of yesteryear — one
long before the eighteenth-century criminological reform 
34
movement  that really did not work then (if it had
there would have been no need for reform) and, in the pres­
ent atmosphere of increasing personal freedom and social 
revolution, will not work. The chances for a better soci­
ety, which Wilson obviously values, would be jeopardized 
if revenge were the only object of a criminal justice pol­
icy of punishment. In sum, Wilson's humanitarian concern 
for community cohesiveness and security against threats 
of crime, coupled with his consistent and insistent advo­
cacy of a neo-conservative version of criminal sanction
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reform, puts him squarely but moderately in the utopian 
orbit.
Radical Criminology as a Political Reaction to
Convent ionality
It has been shown in the foregoing thematic presen­
tation that conventional criminology, in both its liberal 
and conservative forms, is in essence identifiable by its 
ideological tendency to support existing social arrangements.
Left or radical criminology is identifiable mainly 
by its counterideological denial of the validity of the 
present social order; pointing instead toward a utopian 
vision of a society quite unlike the one now in existence.
With this utopian view of a new society radical criminology 
of necessity has to announce and advocate in critical terms 
the means to such an end. It does this by conceiving of 
crime and the criminal justice apparatus in ways ideologically 
offensive to the received orthodoxy of conventional crimin­
ology .
Radical criminology can thus best be interpreted 
as a studied political reaction to the faults, sterility 
and lack of adequate approaches of conventional criminology 
in entertaining alternative conceptions of society. Ideo­
logical objectivity would seemingly require an admission 
by conventional criminologists that their construction of 
theory is an automatic engagement in a particular political 
stance. Paradoxically, radical criminologists themselves 
should counter the emerging radical dogma that radical
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social theory is not ideology. All social theory is laid 
out in line with some preconceived but not necessarily em­
pirically valid notion of what reality is and what it should 
be. For radical criminologists to deny that this is the 
case, while criticizing conventionality, borders on intel­
lectual dishonesty.
In the last decade certain malcontented criminolo­
gists, unsatisfied with conventional notions about crime, 
began to ascertain that whatever was needed in the field of 
criminology was not the forward reforms of liberalism or 
backward reforms of conservatism, but, more importantly, 
some kind of critical method of criminological analysis 
that would incorporate a political dimension which in turn
would give meaning to the political struggles that were
36
threatening to tear society asunder. Somewhat earlier 
certain segments of disgruntled sociologists had become 
unsatisfied with consensus theory in sociology and this 
led to the development of a critical and eclectic sociol­
ogy— a sociology which saw a number of its antecedents 
in the works of Karl Marx, Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, 
Max Weber, Ralf Dahrendorf, Herbert Marcuse, Karl Mannheim, 
George Lukacs and C. Wright Mills, among others. Academic
criminology also had its malcontents and being a sub-field 
37
of sociology initiated a critical approach. The new 
V conflict based paradigm to emerge emphasized dissensus 
instead of consensus; social change rather than social
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stability; ideological advocacy in place of value-neutral- 
ity; conscious defense of the powerless against the power­
ful, and the democratic participation of the many over 
and against the exclusivity of the few.
For criminology the radical emphasis brought about 
new definitions of crime and consequent methods of solution. 
Given the operation of dissensus in society, criminal law 
was no longer automatically thought of as embodying the 
highest ideals of a truly good society but rather criminal
 ^law began to be viewed as the political instrument of dom-
38
inant segments in society. The police, courts and prisons
became the enemies of the powerless in their just struggles
39
to gain power. Democratic theory itself was criticized
40
for its glaring alienation from actuality. The authority
and legitimacy of the state; which had been relegated to
the metaphysical heap of political philosophy, began to
be restored to their former eminence and became part of crim-
41
inological inquiry. The lumpenproletariat, contrary to 
Marxywere exalted, as victims of social control and became 
legitimate sources of academic inspiration. War, racism, 
sexism, imperialism, capitalism were determined to be crim­
inal acts in and of themselves and were so categorized for
42
radical investigation. Traditional explanations of crime 
were debunked as veiled exercises in ideological mystifi­
cation and status-quo maintenance. The whole enterprise 
of criminology was up for radical reconsideration.
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At this writing this development of radical crim­
inological criticism and reformulation is still in process 
and shows little sign of completion. It is in line with 
radical criminology's criticism of conventional criminology 
that this author aligns himself. However, to align oneself 
with a particular point of view does not necessarily denote
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CHAPTER III
RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: IS IT A MARXIST 
OR NEW LEFT THEORY OF CRIME?
Radical criminology, although it exhibits some 
diversity in terms of style and particular objects of study, 
is a fundamental unity in five over-arching ways:
1. A persistent and critical challenge of 
"the everyday political assumptions, prac­
tices and implications... of the /conven-
■ 1
tional: mine; science of criminology."
2. The understanding that in capitalist soci­
eties law and other components of the crim­
inal justice system are founded on an ideol-
2
ogy of "science and technology" which is 
supportive of order over justice in society.
3. The employment of a utopian and/or prophetic 
vision that posits a post-capitalist crime 
free society.
4. An attempt at balancing left political praxis
with radical theorizing.
3
5. A New Left method of thinking about crime 
that is distinct from orthodox Marxist soc­
ial science.
Given the unity of radical criminology, this chapter 
contends that radical criminology in its dialectical criti-
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t/cism, its utopianism and its antiauthoritarianism, is not 
only explicitly critical of conventional criminology (the 
argument of the last chapter), but it is also a critical 
departure from Marxist orthodoxy. The departure however 
is not clearly understood as such by radical theorists 
because these theorists have sought to identify their theor­
ies of crime with the Marxist paradigm, though Marx himself 
would have disavowed them for such an identification. It 
will be argued that radical criminology is actually a New 
Left theory of crime; a view of crime which initially emer­
ged in the late 1960's and by its nature is implicitly
if not explicitly critical of Old Left Marxist "ortho- 
4
praxis". In short the contention, then, is that radical 
criminology is a departure from or a transcendence of the 
bounds of Marxist "orthopraxis'1 and as such is in the pro­
cess of developing a New Left "heteropraxis" suitable to 
its distinctive purposes and ends.
To substantiate the above contention the chapter 
concentrates on a career analysis of five leading radical 
criminologists and is divided into the following segments:
1. Heretical liberal criminology of the 
early sixties, followed by this author's 
comment.
2. Political criminology from the period 1965- 
1973, followed by this author's comment.
3. Radical criminology from the period, 1973
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to the present. The question of is radical 
criminology really Marxist?, will be broached 
for the first time.
4. The question of radical criminology as a New
Left theorizing in criminology will be explored.
Radical Criminology; A Career Analysis
The academic careers of Richard Quinney, Anthony
Platt and the radical British collective of Ian Taylor,
Paul Walton and Jock Young lend themselves well as examples
5
of radicalization within the field of criminology. To some 
degree all have evolved on a career lattice through initial 
though heretical acceptance of conventionality to the pol­
itical rejection and substitution of same. Each has become 
prominent as an advocate of the radical position since the 
late 1960's. These authors were selected because it is felt 
that their careers and thoughts are symbolic of the most 
important themes in radical criminological analysis. The 
career evolvement of the authors is below illustrated by 
use of a time-consecutive presentation which shows the car­
eer progression of the writers' thoughts on criminology from 
the early 1960's to the present; following each time period 
is a comment by the present author.
I . Heretical Liberal Criminology: Early Sixties 
A. Richard Quinney
Quinney grew up in rural Wisconsin and
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is highly positive about the influence Midwestern 
populism has had on his academic career. As he 
describes it in populism there is the "still basic 
idea of the questioning of authority, of an at­
tempt to obtain basic human rights, but also the
pursual of a decent life that was more than econ- 
6
omic.” Yet prior to the mid-I960*s Quinney's 
populism was basically unquestioning in any rad­
ical sense and remained accepting of the authority 
of conventional canons in sociological criminology. 
Even before the completion of his doctoral disser­
tation in 1962, Quinney's interest in criminology 
was not in the least outside of the norm of con­
ventionality. His earliest work emphasized of­
fender shortcomings and individual psychology 
rather than oppressive social factors in relation 
to criminality. In fact his dissertation, Retail 
Pharmacy as a Marginal Occupation: A Study of 
Prescription Violation was, by his own account,
....devoid of legal considerations, 
the law being taken for granted....Yet I 
tried to go beyond the confines of crim­
inology by looking at the occupational 
structure. Where criminologists had tried 
to explain behavior in terms of the social 
characteristics of the individual, I turned 
to the characteristics of the occupation 
in which the individual was employed. 7
From 1962 until late 1964, while teaching at the
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University of Kentucky, Quinney expanded on the 
central feature of his dissertation: the relation 
between social structure and crime. In his first 
journal article, wrote in the fall of 1963, he 
concludes that,
...White-collar crime reflects the par­
ticular structure of the occupation and is 
a normal response to one’s particular loca­
tion within the occupation. 8
In April 1964 in an article on "Suicide, Homicide 
and Economic Development", Quinney found, after 
reviewing statistics on suicide and homicide 
rates in 48 countries, evidence which indicated 
that economic development— as measured by urban­
ization and industrialization"— "bears a constant 
relation to the frequency of suicide and homicide
and should be considered as causally separate 
9
phenomena. That economically developed countries 
have higher suicide but lower homicide rates than 
less developed nations is not a radically enlight­
ening piece of information by any reckoning. Yet 
it is the kind of nuts and bolts conventional 
criminology that occupied Quinney*s energies in 
this particular period.
Though Quinney*s work in the early sixties 
was conventionally oriented, it did become part 
of an emerging chorus of heretical voices that
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sought to incorporate the study of criminal law
into criminological theorizing. This had the
net effect of locating responsibility for criminal
behavior in external social arrangements rather
than merely explaining all criminal behavior from
the behavior patterns of criminal actors.' By
studying criminal law, the criminologist could
better discover why a particular behavior came
to be defined as a crime in the first instance.
It was Quinney*s continuing study of white-collar
crime that led him to conclude, in an article
devoted to a reorientation of criminological
research and theory, that:
...It is probably the case...that in 
some occupations certain behaviors have 
been a part (possibly deviant) of the occu­
pation for some time, but the fact that for 
some to reason a law was established made 
the behaviors criminal. The point is that 
that the relationship between social struct­
ure, criminal law, occupational norms, and 
criminal behaviors should be given further 
consideration. 10
B . Anthony Platt
Platt comes from an English background
where he successfully completed a high school
"scholarship factory" and thereafter received
his B.A. in jurisprudence from Oxford in 1963.
He decided against a legal career because of the
conservative orientation of a law professor he
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read under while at Oxford. His interest in 
criminology began at a seminar in his last under­
graduate semester at which he was put in contact 
with a University of California criminologist who 
suggested that he attend Berkeley. But Berkeley, 
prior to the 1964 Free Speech Movement, was a great 
disappointment to him because of its nontutorial 
educational emphasis and he decided to go back to 
Britain. Fortunately, a psychoanalyst and legal 
scholar got him interested in the discipline of
law and psychiatry and he took a job as a gradu-
11
ate research assistant.
Platt soon discovered that there were
interesting parallels between the legal definition
of madness and juvenile status; a discovery which
attracted him to David Matza's interactionist
perspective (as put forth in Delinquency and Drift) .
In addition to Matza's influence, several leading
labeling theorists were then active at Berkeley
and Platt found labeling theory's critical posture
12
toward the criminal justice system appealing.
Platt has noted that the labeling theorists,
...at that time were the "young Turks" 
of criminology and seemed to offer a radical 
alternative to traditional positivism and 
delinquency control theorists... and I embra­
ced it Clabeling theory: minej too quickly 
and without proper examination of its ideo­
logical assumptions. 13
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Illustrative of Platt's early uncritical assoc­
iation with interactionist and/or labeling theories 
are some of the works he had published even prior 
to his 1966 doctoral dissertation, The Child-Savers.
In the year 1965 Platt was named research editor 
for the first volume of the Berkeley Graduate Journal, 
Issues in Criminology, Appearing in this journal 
was (to this author's knowledge) his first published 
work: "The Origins and Development of the Wild 
Beast Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation 
to Theories of Criminal Responsibility." The 
basic concern of this journal article was to cor­
relate the historically reitified "wild beast" 
test of criminal responsibility with psycho-social 
theories which defined madness as essentially des­
tructive childlike behavior. The article is not­
ably excellent for its characteristically liberal 
and contradictory social policy recommendations.
On one hand, Platt was concerned that psycho-social 
theories which employ the child model of mental
illness emphasize "the fixed, irremedial position
14
of such persons" and thereby tends to arbitrarily 
segregate the mentally ill from the more normal. 
However, though the mentally ill were selected out 
for differential treatment from normal individuals 
(that is at law they are "children" of the state)
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Platt held that social policy based on the child
model is to be encouraged because:
...the wider society relates to the men­
tally ill in paternalistic attitudes... this 
social policy is to be encouraged because it 
encompasses all the compassionate and tolerant 
aspects of social welfare. 15
In a second early article, Platt discussed the
meaning of punishment as it relates to the schism
in modern penology "between some who take the
psychologically oriented treatment approach and
others who advocate an old fashioned punitive 
16
approach." Platt took the position that the 
historical trend is geared toward those advocating 
treatment as against retribution, while he admit­
ted that treatment is a necessarily coercive 
force set against criminal offenders. His recom­
mendations, which deal with the actual administra­
tion of the treatment approach merely asks that 
treatment, like old-fashioned punishment, be
subjected to legal regulations as a way of assuring
17
offenders "freedom and justice." Platt's recom­
mendation falls short of any critical understanding 
of criminal law's role as the formalized expression 
of the retributive ideal in penology.
C. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young 
The present author was basically unsuc­
cessful in an attempt to secure biographical infor-
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mation about these young British criminologists
which would be relevant to their academic careers
in the early 1960's. All of them probably began
publishing in the early seventies. Prior to 1968
18
the authors had not met each other. However, 
there is scant information available which is 
suggestive of the kinds of social and academic 
influences which made an impact on their early 
academic careers.
...Most of us were affiliated directly 
or indirectly with Left parties, factions 
or groups. And one of the features of these 
Left parties was that, however critically 
they welcomed the advent of the Labor 
Government in 1964 and the equivalent vict­
ories of other European Social Democratic 
parties in the early 1960's, they were un­
critical on questions of crime, penal policy 
or on questions of human dignity and diver­
sity in general. 19
But being active in left politics even under the 
most favorable conditions is not necessarily a pre­
condition for radical scholarship. Radical scholar 
ship is in tension with radical activisim because 
of what Howard S. Becker and Irving L. Horowitz
have called..." the differing time scales of the
20
two activities." The social scientist takes time
to collect evidence but the political activist"
must often make decisions prior to the compilation
21
of adequate evidence." The situation for Taylor 
et al prior to their academic radicalization was
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one in which they drew important insights and
inspiration from "American symbolic interaction-
ist sociology" as it was then manifested in the
22
non-radical works of Becker and Peter Berger.
The point is that they did not at first turn to
23
orthodox Marxism or Fabian socialism for theor­
etical insights to guide their early thinking, 
even though they were at the time engaged in left 
political activities. They were disappointed with 
the traditional positivism of most conventional 
criminology, but early in their careers naively 
latched on to theories held by "the young Turks" 
of American criminology whom they later came to 
criticize as failing to live up to their initial 
promises which were made in the early 1960's
"social reaction revolt against the structuralism
24
of the Mertonian anomie theorists."
D. Comment
In the early 1960*s much of American
criminology was interventionist and scientifically
oriented toward the administrative requirements of
25
criminal justice personnel. Positivism and struct 
ural-functionalism were the preferred methods of 
criminological investigation. Political consensus 
in the social order was deemed to be the normal
90
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state. Most criminologists took for granted
such concepts as: "bureaucratic rationality,
modern technology, centralized authority, and
27
scientific control." The research activity of 
criminology regularly represented the conserva­
tive status-quo interests of the powerful at the
28
expense of the less powerful.
In this conservative criminological atmos­
phere new and somewhat critical voices began to 
emerge and offer rather unorthodox alternatives 
to the dominant mentality. These new voices can 
be characteristically described as liberal young 
Turks, rather than political academic radicals in 
the sense of calling assumptions of the whole crim­
inological enterprise into question. This disjunct­
ion between the "heretic liberalism" of the young 
Turks and later radicalism in criminology is impor­
tant to note because the tendency is to confusedly 
identify any criticism of conventional orthodoxy 
with radical criticism. Young Turk alternatives, 
such as what has been variously called social con­
struction theory, social control theory, social 
reaction theory, transactionalism, interactionalism
and labelling theory, were basically liberal ideo- 
29
logically and politically supportive of the 
status-quo. Thus in a paradoxical way "heretical
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liberalism" though it questioned some features 
of conventional criminology, accepted the domin­
ant ideological assumptions and political practice 
of conventional criminology. Like positivism 
and structural-functionalism, "heretical liberal­
ism" failed,
...to lay bare the structured inequal­
ities in power and interest which underpin 
the processes whereby laws are created and 
enforced (the processes referred to in indi­
vidualistic fashion by Becker in his dis­
cussion of moral enterprise). 30
Even though "heretical liberalism" in criminology 
is non-radical, it did serve as a transitional 
step for the radical authors considered above.
By offering a non-conformist understanding of 
crime to the authors early in their academic car­
eers, the way was opened for later radical discus­
sions about "the problematic nature of legal 
31
order." Heretical liberalism’s realization 
that crime and deviancy may be stigmatized behav­
iors which are created and fostered on some by 
others, was the initial step in a more radical 
criminology which has since come to define criminal 
law as the arbitrary and formal imposition of 
control by the powerful over the powerless.
Finally, by positing individual freedom as the 
antithesis of social repression, "heretical lib­
92
eralism" contributed to radical criminology's 
utopianist vision of a new society where life 
"instead of being controlled by the rigid mech­
anisms of the state, is to be lived collectively
32
with others, in harmony..."
II. Political Criminology: 1965-1973 
A- Richard Quinney
In the mid-1960*8 Quinney1s work began to 
emphasize the politicality of crime, a studied re­
jection of his earlier emphasis, which was mainly 
content with a non-political investigation of the 
relations between social (occupational) structure 
and crime. Criminal law was a public policy out­
come of unequal political activity in the general 
society. It followed that:
Criminality is not inherent behavior but 
is a property conferred politically upon some 
individuals by others in the enactment, enforce­
ment and administration of the law. 33
Ouinney's political perspective on criminal law
was further an outright rejection of conventional
jurisprudences1s claim that "the rule of law" is
somehow an objective instrument of social control
which justly reflects the social consciousness of
34
the whole community. Conventional jurisprudence, 
following the line of theory began by Roscoe Pound, 
had developed an interest theory of law based on
93
a pluralistic conception of political interaction.
Law in the pluralistic conception is the result of
compromises between interest groups who hold social
values in common and have equal access to political
power in society. Quinney's most representative
work of this period in his career development was
his 1970 Social Reality of Crime. In developing
his perspective on the politicality of crime and
criminal law he suggested, by implication, that
there is an elite segment of interests (ruling
class) which had more power and influence than other 
35
interests. Crime in this elite formulation is 
fundamentally a product of social stratification 
and its attendant conflicts among unequal segments 
in society. Yet parallel to this elite conception 
Quinney posited an explicitly phenomenological 
anthropology which relativized and obsfucated the 
elite argument, forcing Quinney to draw uncritical 
and subjectivist conclusions:
1. It can accept no universal essences. The 
mind is unable to frame a concept of an 
objective reality beyond man's conception 
of it. Thus we have no reason to believe 
in the objective existence of anything. 36
2. Though the content of the actions is shaped 
by the social and cultural location of
the person in society, actions are ulti­
mately the product of each individual. 37
3. Crime begins in the mind. In this sense
94
a conceptual reality of crime is con­
structed. But the consequence of such 
construction is a world of actions and 
events; that is, a phenomenal reality.
The whole developmental complex of con­
ception and phenomena in reference to 
crime, is the construction of the social 
reality of crime. 38
In compounding his confusion Quinney, in another
1970 work, interpreted crime as functionally neces-
39
sary to a well ordered society. Crime maintains
the social order by allowing economic opportunity
(at some risk) for those otherwise handicapped
in terms of access to legitimate economic means of
securing themselves. Criminal behavior is thus
normal order maintenance activity which contributes
to society* s basic welfare and is flnot alien... to
the organization of society.../'nor; does it dis- 
40
rupt society." This structural-functionalist 
approach of Quinney is bewildering and problematic 
when compared to the conflict generating elite 
theory implied in his thesis on the social reality 
of crime. Social order maintenance requires sta­
bility and agreement on values especially when re­
lated to economic production and distribution. In 
employing structural-functionalism, Quinney failed 
to engage in a critique of capitalist economic 
arrangements and thus showed uncritical allegiance 
to the very same economic values he would later
95
come to attack so vehemently. Moreover, because
the functionalist view is based on an essentialist
conception of social reality, it flies squarely in
the face of a phenomenalist anthropology of crime
causation: the individual's mind and the meaning
it attaches to criminal activity is dysfunctional/
existential rather than functional/essential.
B. Anthony Platt
Platt left Berkeley in 1966 to work on
a two-year research fellowship at the University
of Chicago where he was picked as Research Director
on a $100,000 Ford Foundation pilot project designed
to study the delivery of legal services to black
41
youth in Chicago's Southside. The project had
a "technocratic orientation" which focused on
how best to implement the Supreme Court's Gault
decision, i.e. how to make lawyers a "regular part
42
of the juvenile justice system." In retrospect
Platt has lamented that the project was essentially
a fraud in that it existed for "research and not
service to the people" and that,
The program was typically liberal and 
reformist. While in the short-run it appeared 
humanitarian and benevolent it did great in­
justices to the Black community... it channeled 
residents away from political action...it en­
couraged reliance on professionals and experts.
...More significantly, the project served 
important public relations functions for the 
University of Chicago.
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...It was a perfect example of liberal colon­
ialism, of missionary-style politics based on 
guilt and paternalism. A3
In 1968 a rather disillusioned Platt returned to
Berkeley to assist in the preparation of Jerome
Skolnick's Politics of Protest, a report to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence. Platt was primarily responsible for
the chapters on black militancy and the crisis of
the judicial system in its response to urban viol- 
44
ence. Contrary to conventional collective be­
havior theory which conceived of collective be­
havior as irrational, deviant and inappropriate 
45
behavior, Platt sympathetically set black mili­
tancy, in a historical and particularistic context 
of Third-World protest against white Western domin­
ation. Thus rendered, black militancy was better 
thought of as rationally motivated political
behavior, consciously employed to overcome domes-
46
tic white colonialism or social control. Riots 
and violence were political strategies and not 
simply some ambiguous psychological urge to destroy 
indiscriminately. Platt necessarily stopped short 
of proposing that black militancy as violent pol­
itical behavior could be made legitimate in the 
eyes of white authority; in fact the question of 
legitimate black violence to overcome white oppres-
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sion was not discussed although the violence
of white police was criticized. By not posing
this kind of question Platt's analysis of the
courts role in response to black militancy assumed
that not only is white authority legal, but by
extension, legitimate, which obviously it was
not, at least from a revolutionary black perspect- 
47 48
ive. If internal colonialism is a political
contest between oppressed and oppressor, with
both parties considering themselves politically
right (legitimate), then the colonialist judicial
system's ability to administer equal justice is
severely compromised. This point becomes all the
more clear when Platt in classic liberal confusion
proposed that,
...every effort should be made to improve 
the ability of the courts to administer just­
ice efficiently and fairly, with full regard 
to the civil liberties of defendants. 49
Only later did Platt come to recognize some of
the liberal contradictions inherent in the Politics
of Protest.
The book was sanitized of ideological dis­
cussion on the grounds that policy-makers might 
be offended... it was written for progressive 
forces within the government and academia and 
not for the movement it was studying... it was 
reminiscent of my experiences in Chicago...
I don't think I will work for a commission 
again. Too many compromises have to be made.
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C. Ian T a y l o r et al
A shared revulsion against the "correct- 
ionalism, pragmatism and puritanism" of conven­
tional British crimonology was the basis for the
51
1968 coming together of the three authors. At 
this initial meeting, which took place at Cambridge*s 
Institute of Criminology, rhe three men decided to 
form the National Deviancy Conference as a progres­
sive alternative to the Institute. Their concern 
in organizing the Conference was two-fold: 1)
to counter the academic hegemony of established 
criminology and 2) to provide an umbrella organi­
zation for non-academic political activists as a
way of uniting progressive criminological theory
52
with a political praxis.
The first published outcome of their assoc­
iation was the 1971 Images of Deviance, wherein 
a not-so successful attempt was made to move away
from both conventional deviance theory and American
53
symbolic interactionism. The aim was to ascer­
tain among other things nthe political implications 
of studying deviance." They took note that con­
ventional criminologists by focusing on individual 
pathology had not dealt honestly with or made expli- 
city the value orientations of their work and that
99
academic research was strictly limited to funct­
ional use by the official agencies of social con­
trol. The study of deviancy itself was thus prob­
lematic because of the political nature of the 
criminological enterprise. But the "skeptical 
emphasis" of this work undercut its potential 
for radical analysis. Their naive skepticism 
coupled with ethnographic methodology prevented 
them from moving beyond the boundaries of heret­
ical liberalism, which in Stanley Cohen's (another 
radical British criminologist) estimation,
...often implies little more than a plea 
for a more tolerant attitude towards the dev­
iant or reform at the level of specific insti­
tutions ... 54
The 1973 Politics and Deviance, was as its title
indicates, an explicityly political criminology of
deviancy and social control. The authors had moved
from their earlier uncertainty and skepticism into
a historical conception of crime as a specifically
political activity deliberately created by the
55
selection processes of agencies of social control. 
Criminal activity became for them a matter of who 
was defining what as crime: sub-cultural groups, 
as for instance Hippies and the Weatherman, inter­
preted their own activity as normative, as did 
corporations, which though not strictly engaged
100
in illegal activity, were purposefully engaged
in "socially injurious" actions as the normative
56
ethic of business as usual. Since, for example, 
both Hippies and businessmen were from the outside 
engaged in behavior which was offensive to certain 
cherished ideals of what is socially good, the 
authors raised the question as to the ultimately 
biased nature of legal order. That is harmful 
business practices were viewed and treated with 
deferrence by the same legal order that apprehended 
and punished Hippies and Weathermen as cultural 
and political outcasts. By exploring the political 
ramifications of deviancy the authors rendered a 
necessary service in their critique of criminolog­
ical orthodoxy. However, they were still far 
from a radical criminology as discussed in chap­
ter one of this thesis. Liberal criminologists 
have often engaged in politically liberal assess­
ments (even critiques) of the criminal justice 
system. The earlier example herein of Ramsey Clark 
gives evidence of this kind of liberal political 
analysis of crime; the difference between Clark 
and the three authors being the space between 
liberal orthodoxy and liberal heterodoxy. An 
explicitly political analysis of crime is thus 
not the equivalent of a radical political critique
101
which is premised on the wholesale dismantling 
of criminological conventionalism. What the 
authors ultimately did in Politics and Deviance 
was no more than to make explicit the skepticism 
in Images about the politicality of crime.
D . Comment
Two salient and common features are ap­
parent in the career development of the several 
authors during the period discussed above. As 
was the case in the early sixties, all of the 
authors addressed themselves to the search for 
more meaningful approaches to the study of crime 
than that which conventional orthodoxy provided. 
The great difference between the early and later 
period being an accelerated and more explicitly 
self-conscious rejection of conventionality.
By contrast in the early period the authors ac­
cepted, with a certain "existential Angst" the
57
major features of conventionality. In the sec­
ond period one is confronted with the beginnings 
of a boldly explicit, but non-radical, assault 
on the entire criminological establishment. The 
primary aims and objectives of conventionality 
were called into account for being directed toward 
the maintenance of some social interests which 
were in conflict with other interests. The social
102
reality of crime became a question of power
with the objective study of crime being located
in the subjective interaction of the powerful 
/  ✓
vis-a-vis the powerless. In this process of self- 
conscious reflexion the authors became acutely 
aware that crime is essentially political behavior: 
a contest between the punishers and the punished. 
The social climate of mounting demonstrations, 
riots, and war added greatly to this acute sens­
itivity. No longer were criminological niceties 
the main topic of contention at criminological 
gatherings; the politicality of crime and crim­
inology as the servant of powerful political ele-
58
ments in society were the primary agenda items. 
Existential nausea x^ as beginning to turn into 
political struggle within the criminological 
enterprise itself.
Even with the political turmoil in both 
the general society and criminology the several 
authors failed, during this period to develop a 
strictly radical criminology. The transition to 
radical criminology was not complete mainly because 
the goals of even liberal heterodoxy in criminology 
are of social reform rather than social revolution. 
Not yet had the authors created a political- 
economy of crime which would have taken them
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beyond the classic liberal dilemma of wanting to 
engineer incremental change and administrative 
modifications in social systems without an equit­
able redistribution of social rewards and privil­
eges. The rule of law and order so dearly loved 
by liberals would necessarily become the unpre­
dictable rule of the people in a radical context. 
The authors, in not adequately addressing the 
contradictory nature of their liberal heritage, 
failed to understand that the disjunction between 
liberalism and radicalism is,
...the liberal belief that it is possi­
ble to create a well-regulated, stable and 
humanitarian system of criminal justice 
under the present economic and political 
arrangements.. Whilst it is true that crim­
inologists have subjected social-control 
institutions (police, courts, prisons,
etc.) to a variety of criticisms including
inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption
and brutality their reform proposals are
invariably formulated within the framework 
of corporate capitalism and designed to 
shape new adjustments to existing political 
and economic conditions. 59
III. Radical Criminology, 1973 to Present: Is It
Really Marxist?
A . Richard Quinney
For Quinney it was the comprehension of 
the radical implications of a newly found critical 
philosophy (critique of Legal Order, 1973) that 
served as an immediate backdrop for his embracing 
of a particularly ’’curious*’ Marxist conception of
104
criminology. The philosophy of negation or crit­
ical philosophy*  'drawing on the theoretical form­
ulations of Hegal, the younger Marx, the Frankfort
School which included Marcuse and more recently 
60
Habermas——  provided Quinney with a "radically
critical" and dialectical understanding of the
established legal order. Critical philosophy,
because of its dialectical method, was for Quinney,
the alternative to the liberal dilemma which had
prevailed in his earlier work.
That is, the legal order is founded on 
the rationality of science and technology, and 
the dominant mode of thought in understanding 
that order is based on this same ideology.
Little wonder that we had been unable to break 
out of our conventional wisdom. 61
Strangely enough in desiring a less abstract and
more concrete analysis of crime, Quinney rather
62
hastily aligned himself with "underground Marxism". 
This alignment is strange first because Quinney, 
since the early sixties had been highly critical 
of liberal criminology for its insufficiency in 
postulating alternatives to the established legal 
order. For him to pass from critical philosophy 
to an unclear Marxism without hardly a mention 
of the reasons for such a passage borders on the 
incredulous, his academic desire for concreteness 
notwithstanding.
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Quinney's strange passage from "radically 
63critical" philosophy is also problematic because
as he claims, "critical thought must ultimately
64
develop a Marxist perspective" and vice-a-versa. 
The question of why this is So is left open with 
only passing reference to the need of uniting of 
critical theory with a socially concrete praxis.
Why critical theory must develop a Marxist praxis 
rather than say an anarchistic praxis is never men­
tioned. Again, if critical thought is only possible 
as a derivative of Marxism, then are we to under­
stand that orthodox (aboveground) Marxism has devel­
oped in practice a "radically critical" analysis 
of crime which is divorced in function from main­
tenance requirements of the socialist status-quo? 
After arbitrarily making critical philosophy 
strangely synonomous with "underground" Marxist 
theory, Quinney proceeded to develop a "critical 
philosophy of legal order". The goal was to demys­
tify law and the crime control establishment by 
exposing them as the coercive arm of society's 
corporate-capitalistic ruling class. By its terms, 
the negation of official reality as the project of 
critically demystifying legal ideology, was a cor­
rect and necessary onslaught against the prevailing 
liberal ideology. But Marxist praxis by its
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terms requires the actual working of a theory 
which not only aims at a critique of capitalism 
but more importantly a struggle to incorporate 
a socialist existence. In areas of the world 
]/ where socialist existence is the official real­
ity, criminology functions (as it does in cap­
italist society) as an arm of the ruling ele­
ments in a socially differentiated society. In 
this regard it is instructive to glimpse how an 
existing socialist criminology views criminality:
A member of socialist society bears 
a real responsibility actively and crea­
tively to shape all social fundamental 
relationships himself and to develop his 
capacities for so doing. The objective 
foundations of socialist relations justify 
socialist society to expect and demand 
that its members should participate in 
the shaping of these relationships. If 
the individual does not come up to these 
expectations, and if in choosing his soc­
ial options of action he takes his bearings 
not from a mode of behavior possible for 
him but instead chooses an antisocial or 
or even society-endangering social behavior, 
then, on the bhsis of his general responsi­
bility, there arises an individual criminal 
accountability and personal culpability.
This culpability... fails to observe or even 
deliberately disregards the basic demands 
of society, by a social behavior dangerous 
or hostile to essential aspects of the life 
of society; at the same time it also in­
fringes the criminal law. 65
Obviously existing Marxist criminology like its
liberal adversary in capitalistic societies requires
a radical critique not on the basis of its social-
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istic mode of material production but on account 
of its plain-old allegiance to social control forces. 
If Quinney would have done a cross-cultural crim- 
 ^inological analysis of orthodox Marxist criminology, 
before forcing the association of critical philos­
ophy and Marxist praxis, he would have found that:
/ 1. All official versions of social reality
are pervasively one-dimensional no matter 
the particular economic arrangement.
2. All official criminology support the 
official version of social reality.
 ^3. The almost one-hundred year old praxis
of revolutionary-to-administrative Marxism 
has supported the official political 
line of the official party. This is impor-
 ^ tant to note because revolutionary out-
of-power Marxism rapidly converts into 
an a-critical (of itself) administrative 
and conservative Marxism upon the taking 
of power.
4. Marxist praxis has a collective or organ­
izational need (both while in power and
out) to implement a social control appar­
atus to discipline those who express atti­
tudes in conflict with the official version 
of reality.
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5. Both capitalist and orthodox Marxist crim­
inology are asyacademic disciplines^part of 
the same dominate, technical, rationalist 
and scientific world-view, which neither, 
by the terms of their essentially material­
istic and totalistic focus, can extract them­
selves from. This shared Weltanschauug, is 
moreover, a valued cultural feature that seeks 
to discipline and punish (for similar reasons) 
deviants worldwide; even the technical domin­
ance of nature itself forms the basis for what 
Marcuse calls,
...the ever-more-effective domination 
of man by man...Today domination perpet­
uates and extends itself not only through 
technology but as technology and the latter 
provides the great legitimation of the 
expanding political power, which absorbs 
all spheres of culture. 66
v 6. A truly "radically critical" criminological 
analysis would, because of the above reasons 
more probably have combined with a praxis which 
has consistently dealt in a revolutionary manner 
with the m o d e m  phenomenon of rational-technical 
domination. Class domination being only one 
of the many characteristic forms of social dom­
inance in contemporary America.
Class State and Crime, reflects Quinney*s most rec­
ent work in developing a "Marxist" criminology. It
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is basically a restatement of the system of in­
quiry first layed-down in his Critique three 
years earlier. Of minor interest is that the 
descriptive term "underground" has mysteriously 
disappeared and a supposedly mature Marxist posi­
tion took its place.
Progressively the book again praises
critical thinking and then abruptly and arbitrar-
67
ily transforms it into a Marxian framework.
In building a Marxian critique of capitalist
political-economy Quinney*s main concern was to
answer the question of the meaning of crime in
68
the development of capitalism. The answer was 
that "crime control and criminality... are the con­
ditions resulting from the capitalistic appropri-
69
ation of labor. The historic capitalistic ex­
ploitation of labor has continually generated classes
and factions within classes "whose interrelations
70
determine the essence of the mode of production"
up to the present advance state of capitalist
development. The most important interrelatedness
of the classes has been and is class struggle.
The superordinate capitalist class through state
manipulation is responsible for social domination
71
and repression. The subordinate working class 
is the accomodating, resisting class (objects of
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state control). Crime control and crimes of
domination are crimes of the superordinate class;
’’while nearly all crimes among the working class
in capitalist society are actually a means of sur- 
73
vival.” Predatory crimes and personal crimes
(e.g. murder, rape and assault) "are pursued by
those who are already brutalized by the conditions
74
of capitalism.” Wien working class crimes are
consciously directed at the over-throwing of the
dominate class, these crimes become political and
75
as such are revolutionary in character. Since, 
by the logic of dialectical materialism, capital­
ism is in a constant state of flux, so is crime 
and crime control. A Marxist analysis must also 
change to keep pace with ever newer internal con­
tradictions of capitalism which are now resolving 
themselves into a socialist political economy where
the need for a criminal justice system will have
76
gone the way of capitalism. This, in capsulated 
form, was Quinney*s basic argument.
Because Quinney conceives of crime as ab­
solutely a product of capitalist development, it 
is at the level of comprehending the transformations 
in capital— i .e . , the changes in capitalist pro­
duction are reproduced in the social relations of 
society of which crime control and criminality are
Ill
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elements of  that one must enter into criti­
cal dialogue with Quinney. It is necessary to 
argue against Quinney*s dogmatic assertion that 
all crime is inevitably a result of the social
relations of capitalist production (class strug- 
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gle). All personal crimes like for example, 
rape, murder and assault cannot be adequately 
explained as a matter of economic survival; nor 
can all predatory crimes (e.g., robbery, burglary, 
and etc.), when these crimes are committed by per­
sons with fair and equal access to good paying 
and legitimate employment. Even while granting 
ythat the bulk of crimes may be rational responses 
to economic conditions, some amount of criminal 
irrationality is not thereby necessarily precluded. 
For example, racism and sexism are not simply a 
matter of economic exploitation, but have more to 
do with questions of biology, social status and 
culture wherein the American criminal justice sys­
tem has consistently upheld the superiority of
79
j white and male privilege. Racism and sexism,
as irrational forms of social dominance, may be
interrelated with the development of capitalism
80
but not inevitably dependent on it. White ruling 
class and working class crimes against racial minor­
ities and women may be immune to a dogmatic Marxist
112
analysis. Recently several black radical scholars
81
with an Afro-centric ideology have confronted 
white Marxists with historical and contemporary 
evidence of the racism that is an inherent part 
of dialectical materialism or Marxist orthodoxy:
We must pose this question: can an ideol­
ogy tailored exclusively after a Western 
model, designed to serve exclusively prolet- 
Aryan interests and construed in such a way 
as to confirm, approve and extend the basic 
propositions of white supremacy, act as a 
guide to that part of mankind most directly 
subjugated to international Aryan supremacy.
Can an ideology that incorporates subtle 
philosophico-racist principles serve as a 
tool or weapon against racism? Marx and 
Engels* political judgements, theoretical 
conclusions and philosophical analysis... 
were naturally conditioned by their being 
Westerners...whites, not blacks; free men... 
not chattel slaves. It is thus clear that 
their ... evaluation of non-European mankind 
must be categorically challenged. We must 
also challenge the "universalistic" pre­
tensions of certain "general laws" emerging 
from a strictly Aryan socioeconomic and 
cultural mold. Most important of all, we 
must profoundly question the very utility 
of Marxist-Leninism in solving problems for 82 
which, in truth, it has no answers whatsover.
Radical feminists have also engaged in a critique 
of Marxism not too unlike that of Third-World peoples. 
For Marxists, like Quinney, to define a rapist, or 
homosexual or child-molester as a person involved 
in a struggle for economic survival is insidious 
to non-Marxist radical feminists. Even to hold 
as Lenin did that sexism was a secondary contradict­
ion of capitalist development is an insult to con-
113
temporary non-Marxist radical feminists who have
witnessed sixty-two years of orthodox Marxist 
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socialism. The results of the socialist experi­
ment to date shows that female emancipation is 
still "secondary11. That is,
...economic revolution--i.e . change from
captialism, to socialism can also be viewed
in terms of male interest. Under capitalism, 
the majority of men were exploited and con­
trolled by a few men who held wealth and power. 
By changing the economic structure to social­
ism, this particular economic exploitation 
was largely eradicated. Women fought for and 
supported such a revolution...but the Soviet 
revolution remained a male power revolution... 
Soviet women are teachers, doctors, assistants, 
food handlers. And when they come home from 
work they are expected to continue in their 
submissive role to men and do the housework, 
cooking and take primary responsibility for 
child rearing. 84
Perhaps Quinney's greatest naivety in Class State
and Crime is his hope of transcending the criminal
justice system and the intellectual specialization
85
of criminology. He conveniently forgets that, 
by the terms of his interpretation of dialectical 
materialism, class struggle will prevail even under 
a socialist economy (the players switch but the 
game of political domination goes on). Class strug­
gle only ceases after the stage of pure communism 
(anarchism) has been reached. The state as the 
executive agency of the proletariat will ultimately 
control criminal behavior as it does in existing
114
socialist and capitalist societies. What Quinney 
calls "popular justice" is in reality state spon­
sored proletarian justice and nothing more than 
wistful thinking on his part. Moreover, to des­
cribe the socialist justice systems of China and 
Cuba as somehow enlightened models for American
radicals to work toward suggests that Quinney has
86
not really investigated the matter. For example,
the Chinese legal system is ethno-centric and
based therefore on not only the thoughts of Mao
but more importantly also of Confuscious. Confucian
religious thought "eschewed formal legal rules
as inherently inferior to principles of behavior
derived from common consent or custom, and enforced
through community pressure and community based
87
mediation operating largely informally." Cuba,
on the other hand, and after twenty years of
Castroism, "mysteriously" maintains a criminal
court system based on the 1938 Cuban Code; the
Cuban system even comes replete with judges decked
88
out in medieval robes.
Quinney's hope of transcending the special­
ization of criminology, i.e., social theory must 
be "capable of moving across the boundaries of
89
normal science with its normal division of labor," 
is based on the concern that social theory must
115
serve the majority democratic interests of the 
working class. In response to this concern, it 
should be understood that the transition to social­
ism, and even after socialism's entrenchment, soc­
ial theory will most probably serve majority working 
class interests as these are immediately defined 
by the state and mediately defined by the ruling 
party clique. The transition to socialism is not 
the end of class struggle but rather its conscious 
continuance. That is, socialist theory, like bour­
geois theory under capitalism, will serve class 
interests as these are defined by the state which 
in turn will be subject to the conditioning of 
ruling elements in society. Thus there will be 
no compelling reason to discontinue criminological 
investigation given that under socialism crime 
and crime control will still be extant. So will 
the state as the primary agency of social control.
By the terms of dialectical materialism, 
minority interests under socialism will be defined 
as either deviant or criminal. This being so the 
state will resort to the same or worse kinds of 
crime control techniques that now prevail under 
capitalism. Socialist theory, manifested in crim­
inology, will be called upon to provide the state 
with explanations and recommendations. Socialism
116
will require, as it does now in existing social­
ist states,
...on the one hand a higher quality of 
judicial practice— -with particular refer­
ence to tne study of criminal law and crim­
inal procedure and on the other the devel­
opment of a system of administrative and 
social measures designed to overcome crim­
inality and its causes, a task involving 
in particular the participation of socialist 
criminology and other social sciences. 90
Finally, one could buy Quinneyfs transcendent argu­
ment if he were hoping for a post-capitalist revol- 
 ^utionary critique of administrative socialism because 
those in minority opposition (praxis) to socialist 
state control would presumably require a critical 
social theory to confront socialist criminology.
V But this is not Quinney's argument; for him only 
I captialism can provide a causal explanation for 
the existence of crime. This economic reductionism
i
; keeps Quinney from dealing with those forms of 
; social pathology which cannot be so categorized.
It also implies that criminologists become expert 
economists even though socialist criminologists 
may,
...ordinarily have no significant contri­
bution to make as political economists or pol­
itical sociologsists constructing revolutionary 
theory. They can, however, use their training 
to develop critique of existing theories of 
crime causation and corrections. A rare few 
might even be able to creatively utilize inter­
national criminal statistics and the record of
117
various attempts to rehabilitate law violators 
to construct a new socialist approach to 
these problems. 91
B. Anthony Platt
In reaction to conventional literature on 
the subject, Platt, in concert with Lynn Cooper, 
produced the 1974 criminological reader Policing 
America which was a radical criticism of police hist­
ory and represented Platt*s first attempt at locating




The reader, which included articles by 
Eldridge Cleaver, "Domestic Law and International 
Order", Alan Wolfe, "Political Repression and the 
Liberal State", and Karl Klare "Policing the Empire", 
represented a challenge to the conventional view 
of police theory and practice in several respects. 
First, they were concerned to show that policing 
is political and protective of capitalist interests. 
Another way of putting this is, in capitalist soci­
ety police necessarily function mainly to uphold 
in practice conventional definitions of what crime 
is and what to do about crime's disposition.
Second, they connected domestic policing with 
international policing suggesting that police pro­
tection of capitalism in America is paralleled by 
American imperialism abroad, which in turn is pro-
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tected by such agencies as the Office of Public 
Safety and the International Police Academy.
Third, Platt and Cooper, showed that the police 
have historically used violence and a racialist 
ideology against minority races. Finally, the 
reader proposed a radical structural reform of 
police and community interaction in the form of 
community control of the police (Berkeley Referendum, 
1972).
In sum the reader was a meaningful contri­
bution to an emerging radical Interpretation of 
American police history. However, the present author 
is disturbed that the reader sought to reduce police 
history to the history of capitalist development 
in America. An opportunity to interpret the origins 
of the police as originally a product of racism 
was apparently overlooked. If the reader had ap­
proached an interpretation of police history from 
the standpoint of racial conflict, at least in so 
far as the origins of the policing institution is 
concerned, the reader*s conclusion that "the police 
neither inititate nor benefit from the policies 
they implement", probably would not have been pro­
posed. The reader could have proposed an alternative 
consideration which may have more historical accur­
acy, such that:
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1. "The earliest form of modern American police 
lies in the Soutnern slave patrols which pre­
date New York's 1845 accomplishment by almost
94
half a century."
2. Slavery in the 1700's (the period of the begin­
ning of the police) was in the main not slavery 
under capitalism, but rather slavery under 
American feudalism and/or mercantilism. Prop­
erly speaking American capitalism as a full 
blown political-economy may not have begun
until it triumphed over mercantilist economic
95
ideology and praxis in 1828. The point is 
at least in contention among both conventional 
and Marxist economists and historians.
3. Southern whites of all classes did benefit from 
black slavery in material and non-material 
terms, police included.
According to a recent statement by Quinney,
It is debatable, nevertheless, in our study 
of crime in the United States, whether America 
was capitalist from the beginning... or whether 
...capitalist development has occurred in only 
fairly recent times. For the first hundred 
years of nationhood the United States resisted 
large-scale capitalist production. Independent 
commodity production predominated; farmers, 
artisans, small manufacturers and other petty 
producers were the mainstay of the economy.
Only as northern capitalists acquired land 
from the farmers (thus appropriating their 
labor power) and as immigrant labor power was 
imported from Europe did capitalism finally
120
emerge. ..American capitalism emerged when 
labor power. Surplus labor was not in the 
hands of a capitalist ruling class. Workers 
could be exploited. 96
The police may have been first created as
a racist response to black revolutionary political
activity (political crimes) rather than as guardians
of capitalist hegemony over labor. In that case
for Platt and Cooper to conceive of the antebellum
slave police as mere pawns who ’’neither initiated
nor benefitted” from the early domination of blacks
is to deny the range of rational and irrational
advantages that whites of all classes (police
included) have historically accumulated from black
97
subordination. The logic of policing's analysis
is also refuted if American capitalism is thought
98
to have produced the white crime of slavery.
As an extension of the refutation since American 
slavery pre-dates American capitalism the "white 
working class" or proletariat did not, strictly 
speaking, exist (i.e., in the Marxian framework, 
a working class can only exist in relation to a 
capitalist class). Therefore, intra-class strug­
gles, between white "working class" police and 
blacks, probably did not exist during slavery.
Thus feudalistic race struggle, not capitalist 
class struggle, may be a better and more precise
121
measure of the origins of American police.
Probably as an outcome of the inaccuracy 
with regard to racism's role in the earliest devel­
opment of the police, Platt and Cooper's proposal 
of community control of police also missed the mark. 
That is, from the standpoint of the history of race 
relations and from what is generally known about 
the concept of community for the reader to histor­
ically interpret efforts at community control of 
police merely from a class struggle perspective 
is to be historically misinformed abut black inter­
action with the police.
First, because Platt does not historically 
separate out racism from class antagonisms, he 
misses the point that the historical relationship 
between "working class" white police and the black 
public has been negative; especially if compared
99
to police relationships with whites of all classes. 
Even the introduction of monopoly capitalism 
of today has not significantly changed the histor­
ical facts of mutual animosity between the police 
and the black community. "There is no reason to 
suppose", according to Skolnick, "that (police) 
anti-black hostility is a new development...What 
appears to have changed is not police attitudes,
100
but the fact that black people are fighting back."
122
In corroboration of Skolnick, a 1972 study by
Wolfgang, et. al,, strongly indicated that of
all the variables, including race and class,
race most affected police disposition of cases
101
in which blacks are involved.
Secondly, the historically negative qual­
ity of the relationship between blacks and whites 
can be more properly understood as a colonial 
rather than class relationship.
Colonial subjects have their political 
decisions made for them by the colonial 
masters, and those decisions are handed down 
directly or through a process of "indirect 
rule". Politically, decisions which affect 
black lives have always been made by white
people the "white power structure ...when
faced with demands from black people, the 
multi-faction whites unite and present a 
common front. 102
Thirdly, because of the historically verified ten­
dency of whites of all classes to politically unite 
in community solidarity against black aspirations 
for independence, the reader's proposal for the 
community control of the police becomes problematic 
for the following reasons:
1. State power, including the police function has 
been and is exclusively under white control. 
Even in cities where blacks hold high political 
positions, the police remain functionaries of 
white power, however that power is defined.
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Community control of the police would in some 
sense require control of the whole state appar­
atus itself, which in a class analysis only 
white capitalists have ultimate control of (e.g., 
blacks, as corporate capitalists are extremely 
few and can in no way be described as having 
a direct influence on state power).
2. Community control comes with the impliaction
that a given community police force will have
the power to transcend its jurisdictional
103
boundaries in order to be effective. Crim­
inal activity transcends neighborhood and com­
munity localities. If the black community is 
to police the crimes of white colonialism it 
must seek to eliminate white criminality at 
its source: the white community. What is required 
would be a well-equipped military force rather 
than an internal police force. Thus prospects 
for a continuance of inter-community warfare 
would be heightened rather than diminished.
3. Traditional electoral politics will not secure 
black control of the police because:
a. Blacks are a voting minority and as such
are outnumbered by the white majority which
104
acts in solidarity against black demands.
b . White advantage is gained by having the
124
police control the black community. Why 
should the white majority vote against 
its own narrowly defined interests? For 
whites to do so implies loss rather than 
gain.
c. White police themselves are better organ­
ized and have historically had a greater 
effect on local electoral politics than 
have blacks, at least when it comes to
issues in conflict between the police and 
105
blacks.
4. Police are subject to four kinds of influence:
"judicial, public, legislative and organizational" 
106
al". Hence, the black community would not 
only have to control police organizational act­
ivities but further the entire criminal justice 
system in a given locality. This would require 
black sovereignity over a political territory; 
a feat which even white "working class" national
minorities in the Soviet Union and other Marxist
107
dominated lands have failed to accomplish.
5. The term community itself is nebulous. The key 
attribute in virtually all the literature on 
the urban environment emphasizes the theme of 
interdependence that "arises among groups as
108
a consequence of large-scale specialization."
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The notion that the term community has to
do with a relationship where individuals and
families share a commonality of primary values
and sense of communal identity is rapidly 
109
disappearing. Though black opinion may
appear unanimous in its criticism of police,
"nonenforcement and underenforcement of crim-
110
inal laws" and police brutality, black 
opinion is not necessarily in agreement as 
to exactly how police racism can be controlled. 
The majority of blacks may feel a greater 
sense of urban interdependency in contrast 
to a more radical sense of black independence; 
if so, this dissensus over liberation method­
ology may go far in explaining why most blacks
probably did not support the referendum for
111
community control of police in Berkeley.
The 1975 Iron Fist and Velvet Glove, is
11 a
a systematic Marxist analysis of the police, collect­
ively written by members of the Berkeley Center 
for Research on Criminal Justice in which Platt 
played a key role as editor. The "iron fist" refers 
to the reality of police repression while the 
"velvet glove" refers to "a relatively non-coercive 
thoroughly professional police force enjoying a 
high level of legitimacy: an unrealized dream held
126
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by liberal reformers of the Progressive Era.
The major difference between this work and Policing 
is its more elaborate presentation of evidence 
to support both books* central thesis: late, 
capitalism's ever increasing contradictions pro­
duce greater contradictions in social life which 
in turn creates the need for more and more police 
repression to uphold the hegemony of the capital­
ist class. As the author's report:
The class control function is always 
the most essential function that police 
serve in a capitalist society, although 
they serve other functions as well. Since 
the democratic state requires some legit­
imacy, the police must also make some 
attempt to serve popular needs, as long 
as these needs are not inconsistent with 
the class control function. 113
Thus the work challenged a fundamental tenet of 
criminological liberalism: the police exist to 
prevent, control or eliminate criminal activity; 
activity which resulted originally from the comp­
lications of urbanization brought on by the Industrial 
114
Revolution. Platt and his co-worker's contribu­
tion is in their understanding that the police do 
indeed at times serve capitalist interests against 
the interests of society's marginated masses.
However, not only is their unicausal socialist 
approach insufficient as a total explanation of 
police existence or even increasing police repres-
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sion, their approach ultimately fails to say 
anything significantly different from what lib­
erals have said, the difference is in the type 
of ideological analysis, for as has been suggested 
above in reference to Quinney: all official ver­
sions of social reality are pervasively one dimen­
sional no matter the particular economic order. 
Socialism to maintain itself in power must resort 
to some kind of police action and control of dev­
iance .
Moreover, the concrete data of human exis­
tence to this point in our evolution suggest that 
we are social animals who come packaged with the 
will to fashion and control our material (private 
or social property) and immaterial environments 
according to certain dearly held ideological expect­
ations. When those expectations clash with expect­
ations not held by our particular group the tendency 
is to take action which furthers our group*s inter­
ests. That action could be thought of as repressive
115
or protective. If the action is governmental
or institutionalized and is aimed at criminally 
defined deviance within our group it is usually 
called coercive police action.
To move beyond police action in human affair 
(to this author) is to move beyond institution-
128
alized coercion, beyond the state (either cap­
italist or socialist) and juridical relations; 
such a move cannot be made if socialism itself 
is geared to state power and police repression 
of deviance. Thus Platt and his co-worker's crit­
ical analysis of the police is valuable in that 
it represents not only an explicit challenge to
liberalism, but, more, an implicit challenge to
all forms of authoritarian socialism that repeat 
the error of liberalism, i;e., organizing and 
arming police as the enforcers of state power and 
guardians of ruling class interests.
C. Taylor, Walton and Young
In their 1973 The New Criminology: For A Social 
Theory of Deviance, the authors sought without much 
success to construct linkages between subjectivist 
approaches to criminology and "the theories of soc­
ial structure implicit in orthodox /emphasis: mine;
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Marxism." They felt that since liberal positiv­
ism, as a grand social theory, "is wedded to the 
position of taking social reaction for granted" 
what is needed is a grand social theory which could 
account for a social psychology of deviancy in a 
dialectical way rather than in the determinism of 
positive criminology which emphasizes a taken for
129
granted need for social control and correctionalism 
117
with regard to deviancy. Positivism had failed 
to question the social order at all, thus deviants 
and not society were problematic (pathological) 
and required social control. On the other hand 
subjectivist approaches like symbolic interaction- 
ism, phenomenology, social constructionism and 
ethnomethodology were inadequate for four primary 
reasons:
1. Their lack of any real theory at all.
For us, the social reaction literature 
does not contain a theory as such. Rather, 
it represents an attempt to demystify one 
side of a continuous dialectic of human 
activity. But this activity has determin­
ants which cannot be encompassed by any 
approach which relegates the etiological 
questions concerning the causes of deviation 
to an ambiguous location subsidiary to 
social action. 118
2. Their search for an individual meaning of dev­
iancy has lead them away from developing "fully 
social" explanations of deviancy:
The theory must be able, in other words, 
to place the (deviant) act in terms of its 
wider social origins...(it would place the 
deviant act) against the overall social 
context of inequalities of power, wealth 
and authority in the developed industrial 
society. 119
3. Because these approaches tend to become resigned 
when faced with the sheer complexity of "med­
iatory variable", and thus fail to treat deviant
causality, they "end up with a completely inde-
120
terminate picture" of social realities.
4. They are founded on and take liberalism as 
given:
Like thepragmatists (positivists) before 
them, the social reaction theorists, oper­
ating within the confines of liberal ideol­
ogies, fail...to confront the way in which 
authority and interests enforce and main­
tains sets of laws, rules and norms which 
in themselves are part and parcel of the 
creation of deviancy. 121
As an element within the grand social theory 
of Marxism the authors had hoped that subjective crim­
inology would lose its relativism and indeterminancy 
and become instead dialectical; at the same stroke 
it would hopefully become consciously political and 
the results of all this would be a "fully social 
theory of deviancy," Dialectically, deviance theory 
would interpret the deviant actor as proactively, 
rather than reactively, engage in a strategy of social
struggle. This proactivity is consistent with the
122
vision held by "anarchists and deviants" themselves 
and is to be viewed as a conscious "political act... 
where deviance is a property of the act rather than 
a supurious label applied to the amoral or careless 
by agencies of political and social control."
The authors are to be commended for their 
criticism of conventional deviancy theory. Subject-
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ivist criminology's main problem i£ that it tends 
to over-emphasize individual action rather than 
explaining action from a dialectical balance 
which gives credit to both the individual and 
society in the construction of criminal reality.
Yet one remains disturbed with the New Criminology 
for several important reasons.
In chapter III of this work anarchism 
will be distinguished from orthodox Marxism, mean­
while one is disturbed that Taylor et al thoroughly 
confused anarchism with such Marxism, and, in so 
doing, ended up with an unconscious secular anarch­
ist criminology instead of what they originally 
intended. Why the authors failed to distinguish 
these two unique left political ideologies may be 
due to their unfamiliarity with anarchist ideas 
about the social order, or it may be that the authors 
fear the historic ridicule which has been levelled 
against anarchism by theoretical liberalism, con­
servatism and Marxism alike. Paul Q. Hirst, an 
orthodox Marxist, has assailed the authors for
their tendency to romanticize criminals; a "danger-
123
ous political ideology" for authentic Marxism. 
Whatever the cause of their confusion, the follo­
wing critique is to demonstrate that their goal 
of linking subjectivistic criminology with Marxism
132
missed its mark by a wide margin.
The argument that subjectivist criminol­
ogy is merely descriptive and devoid of causality 
and thus lacking the conditions of a theory is 
at most an insipid misreading of the sociology 
of knowledge. A full six years prior to the New 
Criminology, Berger and Luckman sought to hammer 
out a sociology of knowledge which derived from
not only Marx but more importantly Max Weber,
124
George H. Mead and Emile Durkheim. Their soci­
ology of knowledge was very much a theoretical 
project and employed a dialectical method i.e., 
it stood in the middle of orthodox Marxist deter­
minism and the indeterminancy of strict subject­
ivists. Quinney in his Social Reality of Crime 
was quite dependent upon Burger and Luckman for 
theoretical insights and yet his work is also 
dialectical in the sense that it posits a tension
"between coercion by interests and subjective 
125
freedom." Yet the Quinney of 1970 mentions 
Marx in only one sparse footnote.
The debate about causation in criminology 
is as old as the field itself. "Clearly the con­
cepts of cause and effect are related to concepts 
of determinism and free will and these in turn 
to the legal concepts of responsibility and the
133
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reasonable man", and just as clearly causality 
has long had political and moral connotations in 
criminology. Quinney has even noted that,
...causal explanation need not be the 
sole interest of criminologists. The object­
ive of any science is not to formulate and 
verify theories of causation, but to construct 
an order among observables...A science of 
human social behavior is obciously possible 
without the notion of causation. 127
Quinney, while admitting that subjectivist- crimin­
ology has its conservative drawbacks praises this 
kind of criminology for pointing out what should 
be obvious: crime is a dialectical and therefore 
political construction based on the activity that 
exists in the relations between a powerless self 
and powerful others:
The legal order, accordingly is human 
activity. It is an order created for polit­
ical purposes, to assure hegemony of the 
ruling class. 128
Since in its main features subjectivist
criminology is valid as a sociological theory, and
is dialectical even though it emphasizes one side
of the dialectic (the individual), and since it
is in Quinney's terms "political," the question that
begs answering is: why must it also be Marxist?
Taylor et al's response is that it must become truly
Marxist to the extent that it retains a conventional
129
political allegiance. Thus their most severe
134
criticism of subjectivist criminology is not due 
to an alleged lack of theoretical validity but 
it is due to subjectivist criminology's political 
affiliation. Extensively, this is the authors' 
fundamental criticism of all the criminological 
theories dealt with in their work, including pos­
itivism, the "new conflict" theorists, Marx himself,
130
and the old line Marxist, William Bonger.
Would a switch in political allegiance 
to strict Marxism necessarily restore a balance 
to the dialectic between self and society or the 
criminal actor and a crime producing environment 
as Taylor et al claim? Or would such a switch 
only tip the balance over to a pronounced emphasis 
on social causation with the self being relegated 
to the garbage help of conventional ideology? The 
authors' response to these questions suggest that 
they do not really want a switch that maintains 
the dialectic in balance. In fact they do not even 
want to deal with an orthodox Marxism which by its 
terms is patently opposed to their efforts at buil­
ding linkages with subjectivist criminology. What 
the authors really want is what they criticize so
vehemently: a theory of deviancy which emphasizes
131
individual "purpose and integrity" in interpre­
ting criminal action and not the orthodox Marxian
135
economic determinism which as the authors rightly 
describe it tends,
...to subsume the question of humanity 
or the rationality of human action--to the 
larger question of political-economy. Crim­
inal action, in practice, is understood—  
in terms of interests demanded by the struct­
ure of political economy as more or less 
"false conscious" adjustment to society rather 
than as an inarticulate striving to overcome 
it. 132
However to get around orthodox Marxist
determinism with its criticism of the criminal lump-
enproletariat, the authors even more confusedly do
not want the mature Marx of Das Kapital, but the
young humanistic Marx of 1844. Yet to divide Marx
up into so many bits and pieces is a highly dubious
project even though the Marx of 1844 is "openly
133
subjectivistic". Robert C. Tucker, along with
134
a host of others, both critical of and sympathetic 
to the Marxist system, have noted that Marx and 
Engels both interpreted their system as an indivis­
ible movement from Hegelian philosophy to scientific 
socialism:
From their standpoint there were not two 
Marxisms but one. Alternatively, there were 
two in the peculiar and limited sense in which 
the adult may be said to be a different person 
from the child. For them scientific socialism, 
embryonic already in Hegel's Phenomenology, 
was delivered into the world in Marx's manu- 
scripts of 1844. The philosophical terminol­
ogy of the latter was simply the umbilical 
cord binding the new-born child to its philo-
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sophical parent. And mature Marxism was 
the baby grown to adulthood. Consequently, 
it was perfectly proper to speak of the 
mature doctrine in terms applicable to orig­
inal Marxism. 135
The indivisible corpus of Marx*s writing on crimin­
ality per se does not even allow the dialectic nor 
indeed for revision, thus strictly speaking a neo- 
Marxist criminology is an impossibility. Dialect- 
ically, the Marxist system conceives of criminality 
in a decidedly deterministic fasion. There is 
no positive Marxian assessment of the lumpenprole-
tariat or the "criminal classes" as valid contri-
136
butors to social revolution. These "contemptible"
classes are more of an enemy to the proletariat 
than even the capitalists.
As an unorthodox Swedish Marxist sociol­
ogist has noted:
In its propertylessness, poverty and alien­
ation, the lumpenproletariat is akin to the 
working class. Even more than the proletariat, 
the lumpenproletariat has been victimized by 
the power of capital; it lacks even such a 
modest instrument of defense as the labor union. 
Its chief defenses are total apathy and relig­
ious sectarianism, drugged oblivion and per­
sonal violence, psychoses and death. Of the 
numerous hallmarks of pure capitalism, a dis­
oriented, demoralized, and socially estranged 
lumpenproletariat is one of the most distinctive, 
tragic and dangerous things...
For all of his structural and historical 
thinking, Marx was evidently unwilling to see 
the sociological causes of lumpenproletariat 
status or to acknowledge the very small gap 
between proletarian and lumpenproletarian posi­
tions . 137
137
One of the fundamental reasons that 
Marx and Engels felt as they did about the lump­
enproletariat, besides the fact of their active
racism which Franz Fanon and other black radicals 
138
have detected (in America crime and the lumpen­
proletariat are as Wilson would have it usually syn- 
onomous with oppressed minority people, especially 
black youth), was that this class was thought to 
be a-political and reactionary to working class 
struggles. Further, the lumpenproletariat were 
economically unproductive to capitalism's contra­
dictory evolution toward socialism; whereas the 
capitalists were productive actors, in as much
as they produced the conditions for their own even-
139
tual elimination. In no way can the historic
activity of capitalism be viewed as criminal, though 
individual capitalists may become criminals in the 
orthodox Marxian framework. In the dialectic the 
workers need capitalists and vice-a-versa; hence 
to eliminate the capitalists on the grounds of its 
criminality as a class is akin to anarchism but not 
valid Marxism.
To orthodox Marxism the activity of the 
lumpenproletariat is dehumanization in its most acute 
form. This class in its a-political irrationality 
weakens the morals and morale of other classes in
138
society. It especially weakens proletarian mor­
ality. Ethically, the lumpenproletariat repre­
sent nothing other than a parasitic plague, and 
as such, a constant denial of what Engels described 
as "that morality which contains the maximum of
/truth; durable elements" or revolutionary prole-
140
tarian morality. Thus, as Alexander Grey a
Fabian socialist historian has well understood, 
"real" Marxism cannot "appeal to morality and 
justice", no matter the pain and suffering 
of the lumpenclass, because such appeals are repla­
ced by a scientific socialist "understanding and
141
acceptance of historical development."
Moreover, given, the lack of a Marxist 
dialectic on the issue of criminality, (notwith­
standing Anderson's moralistic "appeal" aimed to 
resurrect the lumpenproletariat from its death at 
the hands of orthodox Marxist labelling) Taylor 
et al's attempt to revise something that was not 
there in the first place is an act of bad faith. 
Revision depends on the operation of the dialectic. 
Taylor et al's goal of synthesis takes the dialec­
tical character out of the Marxian approach and 
replaces it with a flat static /idealistic; asser­
tion of the inherent rationality of all human act­
ion. A neo-Marxist interpretation of criminology
139
is impossible and is an act of bad faith, or what
existentialists R. C. Laing and D. G. Cooper call
142
the "idealist remystification" of Marxism.
This bad faith is, to the english socialist phil­
osopher G. D. H. Cole, a way of eliminating Marx 
altogether:
It is no doubt, easy under cover of re­
vising Marxism really to abandon it; and 
this tendency has given all attempts at re­
vision a bad odour among Marxists, and has 
often driven them towards a defensively dog­
matic interpretation of Marx's doctrines.
But, in fact, no Marxist can escape revision­
ism without denying the dialectical principle. 
For to lay down hard and fast dogmas is to 
fall back from the evolutionary dialectic 
into the static categories of formal logic. 143
Essentially, then a Marxist notion of crime would 
have to be based on something very close to Bonger's 
"correctional perspective" which has to do with 
understanding a social phenomenon (this lumpenprol­
etariat) only to the point of being able to rid
144
society of the phenomenon in question. It is
exactly this correctional perspective that Taylor 
et al criticize as being an inauthentic and really 
non-Marxist approach to criminology. But for the 
authors to import New Left idealism into the cate­
gories of scientific socialism is no less inauth­
entic. To dichotomize a Marxist analysis of crime
into an objective world of society and a subjective
145
world of conscious individual "idiosyncracy"
140
is to end up having no real Marxist theory at 
all.
"All I know is that I am not Marxist,"
146
is a statement Marx himself made toward the 
end of his life; a life truly heroic in its intel­
lectual and inspirational abilities. Like any 
heroic figure in world history he left a legacy 
abundant in truth and error. That which is true 
like the bitter historical interaction between 
oppressors and the oppressed, the ever presence 
of alienation, and the vision of dramatic change 
or revolution has long informed the vocabulary
and praxis of all great social prophets, from
147
Ooheleth of Ecclesiastes to Jesus to the more
148
recent example of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Earlier in this work all social and thus 
criminology theory was defined as ideological to 
the extent that theory necessarily mixes truth 
with error. Marxism is no exception. The error 
of orthodox Marxism with respect to criminality 
is that crime is not socially dialectical but 
socially determined. As heirs to the orthodox 
Marxian legacy Taylor et al plus Quinney and Platt 
are failures. Yet in the act of failing the orth­
odox Marxist legacy they are actually engaged in 
a radical transformation of Marxism to something
141
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other than Marxism. These radical criminolo­
gists have set the stage for a transcendence of 
Marx, just as in another prophetic tradition, but 
in a decidedly vulgar direction, most of what now 
passes for orthodox Christianity is a transcendence 
of Christ (i.e., if Christ were living today 
Christians themselves would most probably rush to 
electrocute him for the crime of radically deviating 
from what Christianity has come to mean).
IV. Radical Criminology as New Left Criminology 
The period from 1973 to the present evidences a 
movement of radical criminology towards being that part of 
the New Left which thinks about crime rather than having an 
attachment to any real Marxism. This movement closely paral­
lels developments within academic social science, especially 
sociology. The 19th century genesis of New Left ideology 
is found in the utopian socialists, the Left Hegelians and 
the anarchists "and as such has a close kinship with radical
religion, rational humanism and philosophical idealism^ among 
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other ideas. The New Left is engaged in transcending both
liberalism and Marxism, although admittedly with Marxism
the transcendence is still basically implicit.
The parallels between radical criminology and New
Leftism are inexact but enough of comparison can be made to
151
give credence to the thesis asserted above. Below is a
142
brief comparison of seven themes : which radical criminol­
ogy and New Leftism hold in common (Chapter III will offer 
a more intensive comparison of Marxism and anarchism in 
relation to radical criminology):
A. Existential Confusion
Radical criminology, like New Leftism, is
actively searching for a philosophical (some say
152
spiritual) home. It is populated by intellect­
uals who matured academically during a period in 
which social conflicts threatened to tear America 
apart. Their reaction to the American of the mid- 
v die and late 1960's was to experience a loss of
innocence; a loss of the Lone Ranger, Hoppy, Gene 
153
and Roy. The good guys of television shoot-em-
ups were in reality the bad guys: Sheriff Bull 
Connor, Lyndon Johnson and the Pentagon multiplied 
by an almost infinite factor. The loss of inno­
cence brought on discontentment and alienation. 
Youthful segments of academia began to search for 
alternatives to liberal and conservative theories;
alternatives which would give meaning to their
154academic existence. Western European Marxism,
itself in mortal combat with state capitalism in 
the Soviet Union and national socialist states, 
seemingly offered one such alternative. Radical 
criminology completely glossed over the homegrown
143
radical tradition which pre-dates Marx and has
been part of the American scenario since the
1638 antinominal revolt against orthodox Puritan 
155
morality. Yet radical criminology in its
existential restlessness is, by the necessity of
dialectical analysis, implicitly critical of Marxism
and can thus be described as still groping for
an indigenous philosophy. As radical criminology
becomes more reflexive or critical of itself
this author hopes it will comprehend that the
insurmountable error of Marxism is its one-sided
dialectical epistemology i.e., what another New
Leftist, Jean Paul-Sarte understands as the Marxian
156
attempt to "eliminate all subjectivity," in
exchange for pure objectivity. No valid radical
analysis of crime can long endure such a misguided
political philosophy and praxis .
B. Antiauthoritarianism
Radical criminology, like New Leftism, is
based on negative thinking which involves theorizing
about and building mass movements "toward a negation
of what is through thinking about and practicing
157
what could be." Here it is well to add that the
normative "could" is to be put into practice right 
now rather than waiting for the proletariat and 
its vanguard or the contradictions inherent in the
144
forces of social production to make the "inevitable" 
revolution. Traditional Marxist-Leninist praxis 
which narrowly emphasized instituionalied party 
politics will not do. Institutional authoritar­
ianism in all its guises,must be overcome. Radical 
criminology's quest for "popular justice" and 
participatory democracy (e.g. the Berkeley refer­
endum for community control of the police) are 
based on the notion that:
Built into state efforts at citizen partic­
ipation is a dialectic that supports autono­
mous community action removed from state con­
trol. Developing along-side the criminal just­
ice system is a grass-roots approach that is 
beyond the design of the state. The dialectic 
undoubtedly will advance in coming years. 158
Of course, radical criminology's criticism of the 
advanced capitalist state and its increasingly 
repressive crime control tendencies is anti-author­
itarian. Thus it is unlike orthodox Marxism which 
lacks a political analysis "in relation to the 
nature and role of the state" because "Marx him­
self. ..never attempted a systematic study of the 
159
state."
Presently though radical criminology is 
extremely confused in its analysis of the state's 
role in criminality. Quinney in his Class, State 
and Crime has recently developed the most extensive 
statement on the subject. On the one hand, Quinney
145
views the state as the primary agency for promoting 
late capitalist advancement. In this role the 
state referees diverse capitalistic competition 
in the goal of capital accumulation and self repro­
duction. The state furthers capitalism's advance­
ment by "regulation and control," in which process 
the state itself creates employment which is unpro­
ductive (e.g. CETA, Job Corps, Vista, criminal 
justice workers, etc.) and not in demand by "normal" 
capitalist production requirements . If the state 
defends capitalist interests it must regularly 
offend other interests like those of the lumpen- 
proletariat. This would be a plausible argument 
based on concrete experience.
However, Quinney's New Leftism has almost
obliterated class distinctions. The workers in
advanced capitalism make up 98.57o of the total 
160
population. Managers or the "petty bourgeosie"
are part of this overwhelming majority of workers. 
The 1.5% of the total is the capitalist class 
"who wields state power." Crime has ceased being 
merely activity of the lumpenproletariat as in 
real Marxism. Crime has lost its class basis at 
least implicitly.
Yet for this author it remains that the 
class most immediately affected by detentive repres-
147
The state does not patronize certain 
interests, and is not allied with certain 
classes. Rather, what the state protects 
and sanctions is a set of rules and social 
relationships which are presupposed by 
the class rule of the capitalist class. The 
State does not defend the interests of one 
class, but the common interests of all mem­
bers of a capitalist class society. 162
What are the common interests of the pow­
erful capitalists and powerless lumpenproletariat? 
Love and liberation, morality, the need for a shared 
environment or what? The commonality of interests 
is never defined by Quinney. This theme of common
interest protection sounds like a radical revival
163
of Roscoe Pound's pluralist theory of law.
Should not the state defend the interests of capi­
talists against threats by other classes? Quinney 
again does not provide an answer. Yet he proceeds 
to an acceptance of the decidedly un-Marxist view 
that the state is somehow a protector of outmoded 
social relations which neither capitalist nor wor­
ker, nor for that matter, the usually unemployed
lumpenproletariat adhere to. The state is therefore 
V 164
politically "autonomous" from class interests
as such. The criminal justice apparatus is a crea­
ture of monopoly capitalism's need for modern techno-
rational control in a Marcusian New Leftist instead
165
of orthodox Marxist sense. Is bureaucratic sur­
vival and autonomy a more important interest than
148
crime control in criminal justice agencies? Is
the "steadily growing autonomy of organized int- 
166
erest groups” within capitalist society more 
dangerous, from a radical perspective than capi­
talist class power? Quinney, to both questions, 
seemingly argues, in the affirmative. Hence con­
trary to the orthodox Marxian category of class 
struggle, Quinney*s most extensive radical crim­
inological theory of the state transcends Marx 
and posits a New Left anarchistic political strug­
gle against the increasingly dangerous autonomy 
of the authoritarian and bureaucratic state. The 
politically "autonomous” state itself is thereby 
the villain which a conscious revolutionary class 
composed of the lumpenproletariat and other sur­
plus population must smash.
C. Anti-Racism and Sexism
Radical criminology, like New Leftism, 
likes to think of itself as anti-racist and sexist. 
In comparison with conventional criminology and 
real Marxism it is anti-racist. In fact, it orig­
inally took its point of departure from the ideas 
and practice of black revolutionaries like the
167
early Eldridge Cleaver, George Jackson and etc.
But theoretical anti-racism is not the same as 
practical anti-racism. Practical evidence to
149
substantiate this theme is hard to come by.
What is known, from this author*s personal exper­
ience, is that New Left groups working in the 
area of criminal justice reconstruction are ideolog­
ically and programmatically geared unlike liberalism 
and orthodox Marxism to defeat racism but their 
success has to all appearances been no greater than
168
that of liberals and orthodox Marxists in the area. 
Political prisoners groups, ~ v, pri­
son moratorium activists and groups organized to
fight police brutality to a large extent reproduce
169
the racism endemic to the whole society. The
leadership of these groups is predominantly white, 
intellectual, middle-class and male and lacks any 
real political base within effected black commun­
ities. Black non-Marxist radical groups with an
interest in criminal justice issues are basically
170
anti-white in ideology and have rejected Old
and New left attempts at coalition politics because:
The established white radical schema has 
fostered an axion which says: the Negro can 
never, should never, will never, create a 
definitive theory on social revolution wherein 
he is placed in hegemonic leadership as the 
guiding source of inspiration, ideas, strategy 
tactics and direction even if the coalition 
is interracial. 171
Radical criminology (though Quinney, and
Taylor et al are silent on the subject) has raised
150
"the woman question” in three basic ways. It
has attacked rape as an act of political terror
172
against women. Rape is a sexist crime produced
by the contradictions of capitalism which continue
"to feed the hatred and contempt of certain men
173
toward women." Rape laws are seen as a protec­
tion of males who are charged with rape and as 
such are biased toward the continued male oppres­
sion of powerless females. Secondly, radical crim­
inology has begun to analyze prostitution as very 
much a victim creating rather than a victimless
crime: prostitutes themselves are victims of "moral
174
degradation and physical danger" engendered by
the capitalist produced sexual exploitation of
women. Thirdly, the phenomena of women as police
175
has encouraged some radical criticism. These
three areas of radical criminological investigation
will no doubt grow as more women become involved
in social exchange outside the home. Yet it remains
that the best radical criminology about women may
176
be written by women themselves.
However, the "woman question", like racism, 
cannot be forced into an orthodox Marxian analysis 
merely because Marx and Engels said it could.
The connection between radical feminism and ortho­
dox Marxism cannot be merely theoretical, but must
151
be born of praxis. Recently Sheila Rowbotham, 
a New Left historian, who has engaged in a long 
search for genuine connections between female 
liberation and orthodox Marxism in practice, has 
concluded that:
They are at once incompatible and in 
real need of each other. As a feminist and 
a Marxist I carry their contradictions within 
me and it is tempting to opt for one or the 
other in an effort to produce a tidy resolu­
tion of the commotion generated by the antag­
onism between them. But to do that would 
mean relying on pre-packaged formulas which 
come slickly off the tongue and then melt 
as soon as they are exposed to the light of 
day. 177
Utopian Theory
Radical criminology, like real or orthodox Marxism
and New Leftism, is utopian at least to the extent that it
projects a future society where the abolition of "crime is 
178
possible." Like orthodox Marxism, but unlike New Leftism,
radical criminology tries hard to not "specify a utopia
because socialist society will be constructed only in the
179
course of the creation." Generally though, radical crim­
inology wants a utopianist crime free society in which "imper­
ialism, racism, capitalism and sexism" are replaced by "truly
egalatarian rights to decent food and shelter...human dignity
180
and self-determination." Superficially, radical criminol­
ogy finds it acceptable to hope and dream of utopia. The 
dream of a crime free future society dialectically informs
1/
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present radical criminological praxis and vice-a-versa.
Thus radical criminological praxis, is itself a specific 
program aimed at the realization of specific strategies which 
begin the future here and now. In the concrete reality of 
right now, radical criminology is as its praxis calls for, 
dialectically engaging conventional criminology in a critic­
ally specific dialogue in order to construct the future 
crime free society.
An example of radical criminology's praxis in prep­
aration for the utopian future is Platt's insistence that
"intellectual inquiry should not be carved up into artific-
181
ial domains like pieces of private property." For him
criminology would do best to provide answers to the quest­
ions of political philosophy, i.e., freedom vs. control,
authority vs. legitimacy, estrangement vs. unity, who gov-
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erns, why and how. In its faltering attempts to provide
answers to these kind of questions radical criminology is
now in the process of creating a social theory and practice
appropriate to the utopian vision of a crime free society.
As such it has begun and must continue to go beyond the
183
confines of traditional criminology.
In chapter I of this work, the central understanding 
was that all social theory is ideological and as a consequence 
has a utopian dimension. Radical criminology is no exception; 
it is ideologically relativized thinking. More importantly, 
it is also utopian thinking. Thus the question to be ans-
153
wered is: why does radical criminology try to delude
itself into thinking it has no utopian dimension?
Part of the explanation for radical criminology’s 
delusion with regard to its utopian tendencies lies in its 
confused courtship with real Marxism. To real Marxism, 
theorists of "critical-utopian socialism and communism" 
had a primitive and thus reactionary bent:
The undeveloped state of the class struggle, 
as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists 
of this kind to consider themselves for superior 
to all class antagonisms. They want to improve 
the condition of every member of society, even 
that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually 
appeal to society at large, without distinction 
of class; nay by preference, to the ruling class.
For how can people, when once they understand 
their system, fail to see in it the best possible 
state of society? Hence, they reject all political, 
and especially revolutionary action; they wish 
to attain their ends by peaceful means...by small 
experiments necessarily doomed to failure and by 
force of example, to pave the way for the new 
social Gospel.
Such fantastic pictures of future society... 
correspond with the first instinctive yearnings 
of that class (the proletariat) for a general 
reconstruction of society. 184
Digressing briefly, some of the .Communist Manifesto's 
above criticism of utopian thinking can be applied to Quinney's 
theory of the "autonomous" state, a state which serves only 
socially common and not class interests. One can see Marx 
turning in his grave at the thought of the petty bourgiosie 
being considered as a "fraction" within the proletarieat.
Marx would certainly not have confused administrators of 
the state beaureacracy and presidents (but non-owners) of
154
the multi-nationals with the proletariat or the "contempt­
ible” lumpenproletariat. Alternately, Marx's criticism of 
utopian thinking can be applied to Marx himself. According 
to Bertram Wolfe, the Communist Manifesto relies heavily
on the thought of utopian socialist and anarchists; the
185
very theorists Marx was about criticizing. Four of the
ten transitional measures pronounced in the Manifesto are
borrowings directly from such utopian thinkers as: Saint-
186
Simon (#3 and #5), Fourier (#8) and Robert Owen (#9).
What is really astounding about the Manifesto is 
that the majority of its proposals-including "the abolition 
of the family" and the conversion of the function of the 
state into a mere superintendence of production" (with Engels 
the state function is to be converted to an "administration
of things")-* are, in Marx's own words: "of a purely utopian
187
character" Thus the Communist Manifesto can rightly be
interpreted as a heroic piece of utopian literature.
Moreover, it was from Saint-Simon that Marx's got 
the utopian (not economically scientific) slogan, "From
each according to his capacity, to each according to his per-
188
formance." Even the specifically utopian vision of a com­
munist society (utopian society at its best) offered out by 
Marx in his German Ideology, comes straight from Fourier, 
viz. :
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes 
into being, each man has a particular exclusive
155
sphere of activity, which is forced upon him 
and from which he cannot escape. He is a 
hunter, a fisherman, a shepard, or a critical 
critic, and must remain so if he does not 
want to lose his means of livelihood; while 
in communist society, where nobody has one 
exclusive sphere of activity but each can 
become accomplished in any branch he wishes, 
society regulates the general production and 
thus makes it possible for me to do one thing 
today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle 
in the evening, criticize after dinner, just 
as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, shepard or critic. 189
Marx himself was thus confused about the utopian character 
of his own revolutionary social theory. Radical criminology 
as an announced, inheritor of the Marxian legacy, has neces­
sarily inherited the utopian thought Marx himself would have 
repudiated as being unscientific and unreal.
This real Marxian and radical criminological delu­
sion about, and concealment of their utopian character, is 
further exacerbated by their preference for a scientific kind 
of socialism in contradistinction to utopian socialism and 
communism. Radical criminology wants a praxis informed and
critical inquiry "capable of moving across boundaries of
190
normal science with its normal division of labor." Yet
the "scientific socialism" of Marx lacks scientific veri­
fication. Most of Marx's critical and purely scientific
predictions about the inevitable demise of capitalism have
191
been refuted as being non-scientific. Material condi­
tions themselves both in capitalist and socialist political- 
economy have provided the basic refutation of scientific
156
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socialism. Engels, five years before his death in 1895,
wrote to Joseph Bloch regarding his and Marx's overemphasis 
on the economic (or scientific) analysis of capitalism:
Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for 
the fact that the younger people sometimes lay 
more stress on the economic side than is due it.
We had to emphasize the main principle vis-a-vis 
our adversaries, fLeft-wing communists, i.e., 
utopianists and anarchists: mine} who denied it, 
and we had not always the time, the place or the 
opportunity to allow the other elements involved 
in the interaction to come into their rights... 
Unfortunately, however it happens only too often 
that people think they have fully understood a 
new theory and can apply it without more ado from 
the moment they have mastered its main principles, 
and even those not always correctly. And I cannot 
exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from 
this reproach, for the most amazing rubbish has 
been produced in this quarter too. 193
If Engels were living today he would justifiably 
declare radical criminology to be a form of left-wing com­
munism or New Leftism rather than an authentic Marxist ap­
proach to the study of crime (even though left-wing communism
has its own eclectically utopian economic analysis for this
194
present period of advanced capitalism).
"Paradoxically, (then) the aspect of Marx's thought 
that is most alive and relevant to the concerns of men in 
the contemporary West is the purely utopian aspect, the 
part relating to the post-revolutionary future. Otherwise 
expressing it, his purportedly scientific analysis of cap­
italism was quite utopian, whereas his utopian vision of 
the future world was, if not scientific, at least rather 
prophetic of real possibilities. Marx's concept of commu-
157
nism is more nearly applicable to present-day America, 
for example, than is his concept of capitalism. Capital... 
is an intellectual museum-piece for us now, whereas the six­
teen page manuscript of 1844 on the future as aesthetics,
which he probably wrote in a day and never even saw fit to
195
publish, contains much that is still significant."
Prescriptively, radical criminology like New Leftism 
but unlike real Marxism ought to honestly learn to rejoice 
in its utopian vision:
Given the irrationality /’Marcuses's sense: mine; 
of the neo-capitalist social system, the function 
of utopian thinking is to keep alive counter-images 
of rational social existence. Those who would 
decry the utopianism of the New Left should ask 
themselves who are the true custodians of reason 
in an irrational society: the Utopians who refuse 
to be supine and who attempt to construct humanizing 
social alternatives to the status quo or the "real­
ists" who sheepishly capitulate to the status-quo?
This is not to say that radicalism is synonomous 
with building castles in the air, but tnat where 
reason is systematically violated the most reason­
able course is not to be "realistic", in the same 
sense in which this implies accommodation to a 
maleficient and irrational system. 196
Radical criminology if it is to become a truly dialectical 
social theory ought to appreciate its debt owed to real Marxism 
in the same way Marx owes such a debt to the German idealism 
of G.W.F. Hegel in his effort, at sitting this political phil­
osopher and theologian "right side up." Like New Leftism, 
radical criminology ought to be thrilled at having a utopian 
dream that merits the critical attention of scoffers and 
"realists." The dream of a crime free future where the whole
158
apparatus of repressive criminal justice will be no more,
is relevant to not only capitalist society but the world
in general. In its essentialist form the utopian dream
has informed religious and secular myths since the dawn 
198
of history. Real Marxism has pointed the way beyond
itself, but, in the paradox of evolutionary dialectics utop­
ian and thus unreal Marxism remains to haunt and urge forward 
the confused spirit or Geist of radical criminology. Rad­
ical criminology would do well to transcend real Marxism 
by consciously locating itself within the received legacy 
of unreal utopianist Marxism if it is to become a truly dial­
ectical theory of crime.
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CHAPTER IV
RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: IS ITS HERETICAL MARXISM 
ACTUALLY AN UNCONSCIOUS ANARCHIST THEORY OF CRIME?
The preceeding chapter*s main contention was that 
the guiding force in the late development of radical crimin­
ology is in accord with the heretical deviation of the New 
Left. On the one hand, radical criminology has failed to 
adequately comprehend the hereticism and confusedly claim 
a grounding in and harmony with true Marxism; a Marxism
supposedly derived from the "early" Marx and revised to meet
1
the left theoretical demands of this present "generation."
Yet on the other hand radical criminology is clear about
having, "little surface relation to the traditional Marxist
2
categories and conclusions."
Given its clarity about being unrelated to Marxist
3
dogma (of which Marx himself was responsible for) , and its 
certainty about its Marxist pedigree, radical criminology 
must now be assisted in understanding the character of the 
New Left heresy. Towards that understanding, this chapter 
is concerned to show the following:
A. That the heterodox tradition within Marxist
socialism has historically been libertarian
in focus and thus critical of authoritarian 
4
Marxism.
B. That the libertarian focus of the heterodox
160
tradition has most frequently been described 
by orthodox Marxists and anarchists alike 
as synonomous with anarchistic tendencies.
C. That radical criminology's grounding in her­
etical Marxism, and its libertarian focus 
on crime is actually an unconscious anarch­
ist statement of criminology.
^ D .  That radical criminology should become con­
scious of itself and move towards a delib­
erately anarchist conception of crime; a 
conception which would go far beyond the 
economic reductionism of scientific-social- 
ism or orthodoxy.
^E. That with regard to certain "perennial quest­
ions of political philosophy" (e.g ., justice, 
order, coercion, authority, individual alien­
ation and equality a consciously anarchist 
criminology may possess a more liberative 
analysis, of American society, than the formu­
lations of conventional and/or a strict Marxist 
criminology.
Movement towards the accomplishment of the above 
objectives can be initiated if it is kept in mind that the 
New Left has generally transcended or gone beyond the bounds 
of orthodox Marxism as understood by Marx and Engels them­
selves. The transcendence is best described by a term from
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Hegelian dialectics, viz., aufheben, a term which refers 
to the changing relationships in paradigmatic interactions 
such that in the present case orthodox Marxism, as the par­
adigm with hegemony over left thinking, has been destroyed 
and yet, dialectically, the residual strength of the liber­
tarian elements in Marxism are preserved as part of na new
5
and higher synthesis." The destruction of orthodox Marxism, 
as with its preservation through transcendence has histor­
ically been more of a process of internal left criticism
rather than as a primary result of criticism emanating from
6
bourgeois academic sources.
It is ironic that the American New Left in its ident
ification with Marxism turns out to be more the contemporary
expression of anarchistically inclined "left-wing communism"
than authentically Marxist. The irony dissolves into the
incredible when radical criminologists seek to construct
a Marxist theory of crime by first "explaining away Marx
7
and Engels statements" on the dangerousness of the lumpen­
proletariat and then, after such a distortion, fail to com­
prehend that what has been explained away is the foundation 
for their construction. Without a foundation in authentic­
ity "there can be no Marxist criminology," as Mugford has 
8
warned. Thus it shall be argued that radical criminology
has actually engaged conventional criminology in an unortho-
9
dox, heretical or what Quinney terms "underground Marxist" 
criticism, which in its major features romanticism;
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subjectivism and idealism; individualism and voluntarism; 
antiauthoritarianism; decentralization and egalitarianism; 
rational humanism; utopianism; conflict vs. cooperation;
revolution and lumpen violence; libertarian justice----
represents a radical departure from orthodox Marxism and 
is, similar to, if not synonomous with the interchangeable 
concepts of: left-wing communism, libertarian socialism or 
secular anarchism. These features in radical criminology 
will be laid out and favorably compared to similar features 
in secular anarchism. But before that comparison can be 
made four obstacles must be clear from the argument's path.
Five Obstacles in Associating Heretical Marxism
with Secular Anarchism
Below are five areas of concern which, if left 
unexplained could cause confusion in the present attempt 
to associate the unorthodoxy of radical criminology with 
secular anarchism. Historic linkages between radical crim­
inology's heterodoxy and anarchism are not easy to draw 
because, although radical criminology understands itself 
as being heterodox in relation to orthodox Marxism it has 
not yet understood that anarchism has historically exempli­
fied that heterodox tradition in its concern for a socialism 
with libertarian means and ends. Anarchism, as left commu­
nism or even left Marxism, has had an irregular relationship 
to orthodoxy. Often it assented to and combined with ortho­
doxy and just as often criticized and parted with orthodoxy
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over matters of theory and praxis; yet it has remained loyal,
as orthodoxy has not, to those principles in Marx's writings
/which embody libertarian ends. Thus if the obstacles below
can be overcome the possibility for a clearly anarchistic
\description of radical criminology could be greatly enhanced.
}j^ i/ I. The Myth of Scientific Socialism
The first obstacle emerges from the fact
that Marx and Engels were confused about the sci-
10
entificity of their own system. As root mater­
ialists and "scientific socialists" they did not 
adequately comprehend the metaphysical, unhistorical 
and mystical essence of their paradigm. Scientific 
\f socialism as a science of the class nexus in society 
has thus far failed miserably in at least sixteen 
important categories of prediction about the social 
relations of capitalist political-economy, if New
 ^ Left sociologist C. Wright Mills and others are
11
correct in their critical observations.
As noted in the preceeding chapter a science 
of crime is impossible from an authentic Marxist 
perspective because of the nature of the lumpenpro­
letariat. The lumpenproletariat is devoid of
historical importance in all matters concerning the
12
"objective science of revolution", thereby orthodox 
Marxism only studies criminal activity in order to
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eradicate it and not to romanticize it as is 
the tendency in radical criminology. The social 
dialectic between capitalists and non-criminal 
prpletarians are the categories for scientific 
investigation. Both of these economically pro­
ductive classes can scientifically qualify for 
the designation of "a-class-for-itselfV, or for 
that matter even a "class-in-itself", but the lump­
enproletariat must ever remain as a "repository
for failures from all classes, including the lump-
13
enproletariat itself". In short, socially unpro-
jy ductive segments in society have no scientific
meaning for real Marxism.
Perhaps unknowingly the mythical scientif-
icity of the Marxist paradigm serves to provide
radical criminology with a justification for its
contined academic existence, given the superior
status and appeal of scientific methodology in
14
American academia. Although radical criminology 
does not engage in scientific socialism's utter 
contempt for the lumpenproletariat, it does hold 
its criminological conclusions to be scientifically 
derived from Marx's statements about crime. Accor­
ding to Ouinney, "neo-Marxist social science" is
the most dynamic and significant movement in the
15
social sciences today." However, this author
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suggests that the dynamism and significance of 
\Z Marx's statements about crime are clearly repres­
sive, and that it is other libertarian features 
in the Marxist paradigm that compels radical crim-
i
inologists to assert that what their doing is 
Marxist social science. The libertarian features 
^ o f  the Marxist paradigm cannot be imprisoned by
s
the theory and praxis of economic reductionism----
if these features are to remain liberative. More­
over, these libertarian features have a metaphysical 
and prophetic component that has transcended the 
dead corpus of Marxist orthodoxy. It is thus this 
prophetic component of the Marxist paradigm not, 
nineteenth century Marxist scientism, that has 
called forth the heresy of the New Left. The myth 
of scientific-socialism may therefore best be under­
stood as a justification, A justification that 
radical criminologist's strain under because the 
prophetic connotations of their heretical Marxism
maybe a bit much for an academia concerned with
16
science (and not religion) to absorb..
\J II. The Fetishism of Radical Criminology 
j Given the non-adaptability of orthodox
Marxism as a scientific explanation of crime, the 
reasons why radical criminologists self-identify 
their theories with Marxism is open to question.
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Quinney has said that "Marxism is the one phil­
osophy of our time that takes as its focus the
17
oppression produced by capitalist society."
^Yet Quinney and other criminologists disregarded 
heterodox traditions such as anarchism, syndical­
ism, and council communism in their search for 
the left paradigm best suited to deal with capi­
talist oppression. A second reason for this self- 
/
identification may have to do with the ideological
hegemony the orthodox Marxist paradigm has enjoyed
until recently in left circles. Orthodox Marxism
18
"prevades left thought" in a way resembling the
hegemony of bourgeois mentality in non-left areas
of mental production. Until the New Left emerged
in the 1960's American Marxist scholarship slavishly
devoted itself to an orthodoxy that mystified and
obscured social reality in a rote and mechanical
fashion. It was an orthodoxy that Sartre accused
19
of no longer knowing anything. Other competing 
left ideologies were ridiculed as unscientific left- 
wing childishness (ala Lenin). It was in this cir­
cumstance of ideological dominance by orthodoxy 
that radical criminology emerged, thus its rather 
hurried acceptance of Marx is at least understand­
able .
 ^ Probably the most important single reason
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for the self-identification of radical criminology 
with Marxism lies in the concept of ideological
^ fetishism. For radical criminologists the Marxist
\J
paradigm seemingly represents a body of holy dogma
which, although its scientific validity is highly
questionable, is the object of a profound reverence.
Just as much of conventional criminology fetishizes
the notion of law and order against the concrete
reality of injustice and disorder in, capitalist
society, some radical criminologists in turn, tend
to worship (at the expense of other variables) the
^ idol of class struggle, notwithstanding the fact
that the reduction of all social intercourse to
the categories of class is tantamount to the can-
^cellation of the independent importance of other
sources of social cooperation and/or conflict.
 ^ III. Pejorative Connotations of Secular Anarchism
The academic and popular ”image of anarch-
20
ists has most often been gross caricature.” On 
the irrational side anarchism, as a political ideol­
ogy, has been wrongly confused with "anarchy” or
\}
chaos (the complete absence of order and protection 
in society). Moreover anarchists have been viewed 
(sometimes legitimately) as: dangerous and violence 
'/prone: "foolish idealists” ; assassins and terrorists 
and etc. Marx and Engels compared Bakuninism to
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a fantastic "secular Society of Jesus" and suc­
cessfully sought to expel the Bakuninist heresy
from the International Working Men's Association 
21
in 1873. Lenin regarded the actions of his anarch­
istic opponents as "unscientific petty-bourgeois
revolutionism" against which the Bolsheviks should
22
wage a grim struggle. Rationally, both liberals
and orthodox Marxists have historically "vied with
23
each other in denouncing the forces of anarchy."
The juncture of reasoned polemics between secular 
anarchism and its liberal and orthodox Marxist 
antagonists is over questions of authority, the 
State, domination, justice, individualism and free­
dom. Anarchism has normally gone to extreme lengths 
in defense, especially, of the oppressed individual 
against a repressive majority interest and thereby 
has become subject to the wrath and fury of most 
established political ideologies no matter the 
particular place in the left-right political spec­
trum .
The historic villification of secular 
anarchism by bourgoise elements and orthodox Marxists 
may be understood as having two primary effects 
on the development of radical criminology. First, 
because secular anarchism has never been a "ruling 
ideology, it has failed to attract as much attention
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24
from scholars and historians" as has liberal
ideology and orthodox Marxism. The paucity of 
academic interest in and the apparent political 
impotency of secular anarchism may have served to 
steer radical criminologists away from a serious 
investigation of secular anarchism's historic 
(some 180 years) role in left thinking. Secondly, 
the libertarian orientation of emergent unorthodox 
Marxism is interpreted by radical criminologists 
as having originated in the "early" (and for them 
authentic) Marx. This interpretation is only par­
tially true, at best. The "early" Marx shared a 
libertarian intellectual environment with other 
young German revolutionists whose "subjectivism, 
idealism and individualism" Marx and Engels only 
later criticized as anarchist immaturity on the 
part of the remaining group of Left-Hegelians.
The "early" views of Marx may thus be more properly 
described as anarchistic and existentialist than 
as strictly Marxist. Ih confirmation of the fact 
that the "early" Marx was weaned on anarchist ideas, 
offician Soviet Marxism has recently declared that, 
"the writings of Marx and Engels show that scientific 
communism emerged and took shape...in criticism
of and separation from the set of ideas which con-
25
stituted the body of anarchistic views." From
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this it is obvious that radical criminologists 
in their haste to embrace Marx— -a humanistic
and libertarian "early" Marx------ have at least
misread their "sociology of early Marxism" and 
thereby have failed to grasp the clearly anarchis­
tic nature of that initial period in Marx’s career 
development which later resulted in.the founding 
of scientific socialism or orthodox Marxism.
IV. Historic Kinship of Marxism and Secular 
Anarchism
Though orthodox Marxism and secular anarch-
/
ism remain frequently at odds, they do so as quar­
reling kinfolk rather than as diametrically opposed 
strangers. In the kinship analogy orthodox Marxism 
maybe likened to "Big Brother" who has gained and 
exercised left-ideological hegemony over the little 
brother or anarchism, only to find that little bro­
ther has recently been revived by the contemporary 
^  circumstances of dominance in capitalist and social­
ist societies. Societies wherein orthodox Marxism,
^ in its sacramentalization of class struggle, had 
^ long since abandoned a libertarian concern with 
authoritarianism, hierarchial social organization, 
state repression, participatory democracy, individ­
ual autonomy and etc. Anarchism's function in the 
analogy is to repair the unequal kinship relations
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by resort to criticism and struggle against "Big 
Brother's" orthodoxy so the whole kinship group 
can wage a relevant and successful campaign given 
the changed circumstances of contemporary oppres­
sion .
Hence the parting of company between Marxist 
orthodoxy and secular anarchism, as precipitated 
by the mutual recriminations exchanged between Marx 
and the anarchists Bakunin and Proudhon, in their 
struggle for control of world communism, has never 
been one of absolute estrangement; either in ideol­
ogy or praxis. If radical criminologists were to 
sincerely investigate left history they would find 
that the interaction between anarchists and ortho­
doxy is one where the anarchists have usually func­
tioned as the radical left within the perimeters 
of the socialist universe, such that:
A. An objective interpretation of the theor­
etical criticisms levelled against anarch­
ists by Marx, Engels and Lenin, would 
reveal that these "fathers of scientific 
socialism" most often left anarchism undis­
tinguished, critically speaking, from re­
formism and revisionism. All of these 
strands were usually lumped together as 
similar petty bourgoise, ultra-left devia-
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26
tions from the orthodox line.
B. Also theoretically, such anarchists as
Bakunin, Kropotkin and the contemporary
anarchist historian Daniel Guerin have
respectively described anarchism as:
27
"revolutionary socialism;11 "anarchist 
28
communism" and "libertarian socialism
29
or communism.11 Secular anarchism has 
yf consistently understood itself as the lib­
ertarian strand of socialism, (e.g., Bakunin
has even been characterized as the most
30
Marxist of the anarchists) without which 
the socialist idea would grow authoritative, 
and centralist and become inhumane.
C. In terms of praxis, anarchists and rightest 
socialists were active in the same inter­
national labor organizations until Lenin 
consolidated his orthodox hegemony over 
the left and forced heretical socialists
to resign enmasse from the Communist Inter-
31
national in 1921. Even with this mass
expulsion most secular anarchists maintained
informal relations with Stalinism until
the unsuccessful Spanish Revolution was
crushed by Stalinist duplicity, thus depri-
32
ving "anarchism of its only foothold"
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in the practical politics of the left.
During the period between World War II
and the May 1968 uprising in France, by
the anarchistically inspired New Left,
anarchism became philosophically reflexive.
According to Guerin, anarchism, "without
renouncing the fundamental principles of 
32
socialism," re-read classical anarchist
theory and sought to rediscover "the too-
little known libertarian areas of thinking
in the works of Marx, and Lenin." This
heretical process of "rediscovery" is exactly
the same as that which first engaged Quinney
in his Critique of Legal Order, from a per-
35
spective of a "rediscovered and recreated"
Marxism. The same process was also at work
in the Schwendingers, "libertarian and civil-
35
rights" criminology, Tony Platt*s "social-
36
ist, human rights definition of crime," 
and Taylor, et. al*s diverse theory of dev­
iance put forth as a defense against both
37
capitalist and Marxist orthodoxy.
^D. Lastly, the two variants of the anarchist
position most closely associated with Marxism 
have historically been anarcho-syndicalism 
and anarcho-communism. Political philosophers
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such as Robert Tucker and John P. Clark
have noted that "leftist Marxism merges 
1/  38
into anarcho-syndicalism." Richard T.
DeGeorge in his review of anarchist thought
found that "anarchist communists fall back
on a Marxian type of analysis, though their
views are repudiated by Marxists just as
39
they were repudiated by Marx and Engels." 
Several commentators on the subject have 
claimed, along with Tucker, that "classical 
^Marxism while embracing anarchism as a pol­
itical philosophy, disagreed with anarchism
40
as a socialist ideology." The importance 
of these commentaries lies in the fact that 
the areas of agreement between left Marxism 
and those two variants of anarchism are 
many. Since this is the case even persons 
skilled in the techniques of political phil­
osophy find it hard to make absolute distinct­
ions .
The Association of Anarchism with Technological 
Reversal
It is certainly true that some anarchists, 
most notably the religious and ethical anarchism of 
the Tolstoyan and/or the Thoreauist type, have advo­
cated a dismantling of m o d e m  civilization and a
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return to pre-modern technology. On the other 
y hand, it can be legitimately argued that most theor- 
) ists professing anarchism as a political creed have 
\  been concerned more with how technology could be
used to liberate humanity from its own irrationality 
L 41
and destructiveness. The late anarchist philoso­
pher of beauty, Herbert Read has considered that:
...the more realistic anarchist of today 
has no desire to sacrifice the increased power 
over Nature which modern methods of production 
have developed. And actually he has now real­
ized that the fullest possible development of 
these methods of production promises a greater 
degree of individual freedom than has hither 
to been secured by mankind. 42
Read wrote the above in the early 50's much 
in advance of today's environmental politics and 
without a proper sensitivity toward the destructive­
ness of nuclear power (e.g., Hiroshima preceeded 
his reflections by only a few years). Anarcho-paci- 
fism and Christian anarchism will be discussed in 
this work's Epilogue, but for now the author notes 
that this concept of "power over nature" is some­
thing that liberalism, orthodox Marxism and certain 
types of anarchism have historically shared. It 
is a shared feature which radical criminology must 
j become critical of, if it is to understand that 
within the domination of nature may lie the key to 
the domination of humanity. Towards this understan-
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ding the unorthodox Marxism of Marcuse, Jurgen
Habermas and William Leiss has understood that
in a repressive society technology is used in a
repressive way; and in such a society mastery of
nature works "to perpetuate and intensify human
domination and irrationality," Wat is essential
is to articulate the specific objectives of mastery
over nature in relation to human freedom rather
43
than human power."
Radical criminology should not only attack
44
the emergent "technocratic solution to social order" 
as manifested in the activities of agencies like 
LEAA, it should also understand with Marcuse that 
technological progress can contribute to the fate­
ful continuity between capitalism and authoritarian
^ socialism unless deliberate steps are taken to coun-
45
teract such a development," Thus environmental 
destruction, as repressive society's supreme "power 
i/over nature", carries within itself the strong poten­
tial for total human (not merely class) destruction. 
And, as such, "power over nature" ought to be under­
stood as representing the apex of modern criminal 
j irrationality. Technological reversal of some kind 
or other may, then be interpreted as a contemporary 
statement of rationality on the part of criminological 
theorists concerned with the salvation of the whole
177
human race.
What is Anarchist Theory?
So far the heresy of unorthodox Marxism has been 
interpreted as resembling an anarchist deviation; a deviation 
which has historically been repudiated by classical Marxist
theorists. It was suggested that five (5) obstacles i.e.,
myth of scientific socialism, the fetish of radical criminol­
ogy, the villification of anarchism and the historic kinship 
of anarchism and Marxism and finally, technological reversal 
 may have played a part in radical criminology's uncon­
sciousness of its own fundamentally anarchist heresy.
Now the question of what, exactly, is anarchist theory 
must be addressed. In addressing this question a dual task 
shall be used. First, a brief overview of major classical 
and contemporary expressions in anarchist theorizing will be 
considered. Secondly, a variant of anarchist thinking, one 
which strongly resembles heretical Marxism will be defined, 
analyzed and designated for use in a later comparison with 
the major anarchist features of radical criminology.
I . Brief Overview of Major Classical and Contemporary 
Expressions of Anarchism
A. William Godwin (1760-1836)
Classical secular anarchism originated in
the writings of the English non-conformist William
Godwin. Godwin's most important work was his
rationalist treatise, an Enquiry Concerning Political
178
Justice, in which he considered that inequality 
of property and political government were the 
prime reasons for the existence of social injust­
ices and crime. Godwin felt that human nature 
is, by definition good, but that political and 
economic institutions have corrupted humanity.
Hence, he argued for the "dissolution of political 
government" and cooperative economic arrangements.
In an early statement of importance to 
radical criminology (e.g. labelling theory) he 
advanced the notion that State "constraint, employed 
against delinquents ... is calculated... to excite 
a still greater disapprobation." In place of the 
state and its punishment apparatus Godwin would 
substitute a reasoned public opinion to which a 
delinquent, under the transformed social conditions 
of an anarchistic society, would be expected to 
yield. However, if the delinquent did not yield 
to public reason he or she would not suffer "per­
sonal molestation" as is normal under political 
governments. As for positive law, Godwin noted 
that "general justice and mutual interest" are 
more binding than legislative "signatures and seals." 
Finally, Godwin was skeptical of political revolu­
tion which merely substituted one form of state 
tyrrany and violence for another, thus, his moral
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sentiments were with non-violent evolutionary 
46
change.
B. Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862)
Thoreau's civil-libertarian position, based 
on an intense belief in individualism and a passion 
to actively resist state intrusions into social life/ 
superbly, qualifies him as a philosophical and prac­
tical anarchist. For him the only power which an 
individual has is "his integrity" of conscience.
As a result of his arrest in 1846 for non-payment 
of a Baystate poll-tax, Thoreau wrote Civil Disobediance, 
a treatise which added to classical liberalism the 
anarchist motto that the best government was not that 
government which governed least, but rather "the best 
government was no government at all."
Of interest to radical criminology, besides 
Thoreau's voluntary renunciation of work and prop­
erty obstacles to true self-development, is his 
criticism of state repression. The state forces 
obediance to law not conscience, hence obediance 
to such a state is dehumanizing because people tend 
to foreswear exercise of their judgement and their 
morality, rendering themselves to a level comparable 
"with wood, earth and stones." To counteract state 
repression Thoreau asserted the prior right of revo­
lution. A "peaceable revolution" or non-violent
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action in which the state's only alternatives are
to either annihilate or imprison "all just men."
Thus Thoreau, like Godwin, developed an anarchism
based on the dictates of humanity's enlightened
desire to liberate itself from state tyranny in
social life. However, unlike Godwin, Thoreau's
anarchism's was a theory of extreme individualism,
47
whereas Godwin's was a collectivist expression.
iX/ C. Continental Secular Anarchism
The leading contributors to the development
of European anarchism were: the anarcho-syndicalist,
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865); the libertarian
socialist revolutionary, Michael Bakunin (1814-
1876) ; and the anarcho-communist, Peter Kropotkin
| (1842-1921). Another minor contributor was the
Left-Hegelian, Max Stirner (1806-1856) . Marx
identified Stimer's extremely egoistic anarchism,
combined with his Hegelian idealism, as the "common 
48
source" of European philosophical anarchism and 
in turn Stirnerism may be the origin of the anarch­
ist heresy that now informs radical criminology's 
heretical Marxism. Proudhon's, Bakunin's and 
Kropotkin's theories of anarchism are below anal­
yzed together because of their historic condemnation 
of strict Marxism. While there are similarities,
49
each, as will be shown is a unique theory of anarchism.
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1. Similarities 
^  a. Romanticism:
Each theory contains an element of passion
/
for and an emotional interest in the political and 
economic emancipation of the European working clas­
ses. Bakunin was the most romantic of the three 
and "the revolutionary passion that he displayed
in his writings and career was his foremost contri-
50
bution to the development of anarchism." Kropotkin,
as a scientist "placed high value on scientific
51
validation of his social theories." Yet he was 
not above a romantic concern for the establishment 
of a human environment where "communal solidarity 
and cooperation" would abound.
^  b. Subjectivism and Idealism:
^  By subjectivism and idealism this author
makes reference to two features of classical anarch­
ist epistemology. First classical anarchism placed 
a pronounced emphasis on the dictates of human rea­
son and conscience in experience over and against 
an epistemology of realism which holds that extern­
ality exists independent from sense perception or 
mind. Secondly, that because of this emphasis on 
the uperiority of reason and conscience in human 
interaction classical anarchism was united in an 
idealistic belief that the ordinary individual pos-
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sessed the personal power to think and act in
a way that required little external prodding.
As Kropotkin wrote "rarely has appeal been made
to the good instincts of the masses only as a
last resort, to save the sinking ship in times
of revolution but never has such an appeal been
made in vain; the heroism, the self-devotion of
52
the toiler has never failed." Bakunin went so
far as to advocate the spreading of sophisticated
53
scientific knowledge among the masses.
* c. Individualism and Voluntarism:
Given the elevation of human reason and 
^ conscience, the individual person, either in isola­
tion or in a collectivity, is usually thought of 
as free to determine his or her choice of action. 
jHuman destiny does not depend on God (Bakunin) nor:
"the inexorable working of social laws through 
54
history" (as in philosophical determinism and
fatalism). At the same time that classical anarch­
ism elevates freedom of choice it is aware that 
external agencies, such as the state and existing 
economic arrangements, force individuals into re­
stricted fields of choice. Thus human misery, 
immorality and criminality are attributed to exter­
nal conditions that humanity is forced to live 
under. It is for this reason that most forms of
183
anarchism are opposed to social coercion (although
here Bakuninist theory, especially in its emphasis




The term anarchy refers, in the sense of 
y ! etymology to an absence of rule. Given that polit- 
| ical rule is the most apparent form of rule, most 
of the advocates of classical secular anarchism
I
I interpreted the authority of political administration 
or government as that power in society which was 
most repressive to the freedom of European peasants 
and working classes. Moreover, to classical anarch­
ism political rule in governments was unacceptable, 
not because of a particular kind of rule (e.g. mon-
[/
archy, oligarchy, democracy, republicanism, and
56
etc.) but "because they were governments." Thus
the state, as the concrete expression of political
*^rule was a fundamental subject of classical secular
anarchism's attack. Extensions of this criticism
[I of the state were applied to other non-governmental,
but coercive functions in society, such as custom,
religion, philosophical dogmas, and repressive moral 
57
codes. In this regard Bakunin passionately ex­
plained that, "if there is a state there is neces­
sarily domination and consequently slavery. A
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state without slavery, open or disguised, is
inconceivable— that is why we are enemies of 
58
the state.*'
e. Decentralization and egalitarianism:
Clearly classical secular anarchism did 
not deny (contrary to its bourgoisie and orthodox 
Marxist critics) that an anarchist society must 
 ^employ some kind of decision-making mechanism that 
would provide human intercourse with the minimum 
of coherence and orderliness. For Kropotkin human 
reason and instinct, if left uncoerced by external 
design, could create and maintain "a certain stan­
dard of public morals...in spite of judges, police-
59
y men and rural guards" Kropotkin's anarchist commune 
would make decisions geared to influencing the soc­
ial intercourse of its members. Bakunin admired 
^ American federalism and advocated a "universal
60
world federation directed from the bottom up."
As has been shown, Proudhon pushed for voluntary 
trade unionists control of society. Thus, nothing 
in classical anarchism precludes "a minimum insti­
tutional presence at all levels of social organi- 
61
zation."
However, classical anarchism was opposed 
to centralization, hierarchy instrumentalism, corn­
el pulsion and elitism in social organization. In
185
substitution for centralization and the "evils 
of bureaucracy'1 classical anarchism posited decen­
tralized control by local "organic" institutions
62
of a cooperate character." For hierarchial strat- 
\/ ification classical anarchism would substitute an 
egalitarian levelling; for political instrumental­
ism and formalism, natural spontaneity; for compul­
sion, either cooperation, moral persuasion or non- 
S violent resistance; and finally for elitist decision­
making, unanimty (if at all possible) and a populist
belief in the decision-making abilities of the com- 
63
com person.
f . Rational humanism:
Proudhon and Bakunin exemplified classical
y
secular anarchism's rational humanism, i.e., the 
rejection of all supernatural religious authority 
and its replacement with a profound faith in humanity. 
But there was another sense in which classical anarch­
ism was a humanist credo. Perhaps borrowing from 
the Kantian ethical category of humanity and as "end- 
in-itself" classical anarchism never quite fell into 
what philosopher Alfred North Whitehead referred 
to as "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" or 
the reification of class analysis. That is, al­
though classical anarchism was critical of other 
classes and romanticized the working classes, its
186
analysis (unlike strict Marxism) did not advocate 
the dehumanization of these other classes in order 
to install the working class in power in the event 
of a successful revolution. Doubtlessly, this rat­
ional humanist feature of classical anarchism also 
resulted from its concern for the "dignity of man" 
(humanity) and its aversion to coercion and the 
historic despoticism incident to political rule.
Even the most violent and passionate of the three 
leading figures in classical anarchism could pro­
pound that "respect for man is the supreme law of 
Humanity and that the great, the real object of'hist­
ory, its only legitimate object, is the humanization
and emancipation... of each individual living in soci- 
65
ety."
 ^ g. Utopianism:
Marx criticized classical anarchism for its
adherence to the utopian doctrines of St. Simon,
66
Fourier and others. But among the great classical
anarchist, Proudhon and Kropotkin's stand out as
67
"pragmatic libertarians." The distinctive charac­
teristic of classical anarchism was its call for 
the immediate and eminently practical institutional­
ization of a movement in the direction of antiauthor-
65
itarianism and libertarian disestablishment; not
187
its impracticality. In his Conquest of Bread, 
Kropotkin identified anarcho-communism as the syn­
thesis of "two ideals that have been pursued [.and 
incorporated into social existence; minej throughout 
the ages---economic and political liberty.” Pro­
posing solutions to the great questions of economic 
and political liberation, from the bottom up (egal-
/
itarian) rather than from the top down (authoritar­
ian) , is what gave classical anarchism its reputation
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as an impractically naive doctrine.
2. Differences
From the above discussion of similarities, the 
over-arching theme that seemed to unite the theme 
that seemed to unite the theories of classical 
j I / European anarchism was their emphasis on the "liber­
tarian potential as the primary constituent of human 
'! nature." Following are some differences in referents 
and styles which made each theory unique,
a. Conflict vs. Cooperation: 
j The anarcho-syndicalism of Proudhon takes
the work place and the work ethic as its analytic 
point of departure. Because of this, anarcho- 
syndicalist, or "mutualist" are concerned with a 
heavy economic analysis (often undistinguishable 
from a strict Marxist class analysis). Concepts 
such as: the general strike, economic boycotts and
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worker's self-management were of extreme import 
to the conflict perspective of anarcho-syndicalism.
^  1/ In contrast the anarcho-communism of Kropotkin
took the commune or total community as its primary 
point of departure. Although Kropotkin was not 
above a class analysis, his theory of mutual-aid 
was an organic conception of how greater human coop­
eration, as against human conflict, could be the 
| methodology for achieving the new society. Anarcho- 
communism analyzes the total reality of living in 
communities and; thus is not limited to any singularly
i
 idefined methodology. Anarcho-syndicalism even today
/ remains a theory of social conflict, while anarcho- 
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ff communism remains one of social cooperation. Both
of these theories differ from Bakunin's emphasis 
on the nature of the lumpenproletariat and the use 
^ of revolutionary violence: they both advocated non­
violent direct action.
b . Revolution and Lumpen Violence:
In Bakunin's theory there is a kind of 
Dionsyian spirit to do violence upon the political 
oppressor. It was Bakunin's experience as a member 
of the lumpenproletariat (fifteen years in prison) 
that probably informed his theory of revolution.
He was the archetypical man in revolt against all 
manner of authority. For him "the urge to destruction
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73
is also a creative urge.” The lumpen class, 
being the most alienated and powerless class in 
society, was originally romanticized by him as 
the class most likely to be in the vanguard of in­
surgency. It was the bandits who were the "first 
rebels, the first revolutionaries," the first, there­
fore, to begin the Dionsyian festival of socialist 
revolution.
II. Contemporary Expressions of Anarchism
Contemporary anarchist theory is a continuation 
of the insights developed in the nineteenth-century 
classical anarchism. All of the original features 
of anarchism can be found in the works of contemporary 
writers. The philsophical idealism of anarchism 
had an eloquent spokesperson in the late Herbert 
Read. Murray Bookchin’s "post-scarcity" theory of 
anarchism is a modern equivalent of Kropotkin*s 
theory of mutual-aid. Noam Chomsky*s and Daniel 
Guerin*s anarcho-syndicalism echoes Proudhon. The 
libertarian influence of Thoreau upon those contemp­
orary social activists employing a strategy of non­
violent resistance is well known. Bakunin’s revo­
lutionary passion for the evolvation of the most 
rejected elements in society has been represented 
in the theoretical conclusions of such left Marxists
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as "Che” Guevara, Franz Fanon, Angela Davis and 
Huey P. Newton. In 1978 the prestigious American 
Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, under 
the chairpersonship of the anarchist legal philos­
opher Robert Paul Wolff, felt "by popular choice’'
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the need to inquire into the nature of anarchism.
Thus anarchism has survived historical onslaughts 
from liberalism and orthodox Marxism and is now exper 
iencing "one of its periodic waves of popularity." 
Below is a brief inquiry into contemporary libertar­
ian notions of justice, the aim of which is to pre­
pare the way for a favorable comparison between it 
and radical criminology.
III. Contemporary Notions of Libertarian Justice 
Five fundamental principles seem to inform 
contemporary anarchism's theory of the state in rela­
tion to its criminal justice system. These princi­
ples can be applied to both private capitalism and 
the state-capitalism of orthodox socialist economy.
A
A. The authority and coerciveness inherent 
in the nature of state defined criminal 
law represents a radical departure from 
the human instincts of natural justice or 
equity.
v/
B. The state creates and uses criminal sanct­
ions to protect the property interests
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(either private or social property), 
of a ruling class against the egalitarian 
economic and political interests of sub­
ordinate classes.
^C. State enforcement of unjust criminal laws 
produces a greater criminality on the part 
of courts, legislators, police and prisons 
than does that crime emanating from lumpen 
sources. Thus the state is deemed criminal 
and anti-libertarian.
D. Since it is the state and its criminal
sanctions which are criminally repressive 
to natural justice, the resort to rebellion 
by subordinate classes is a legitimate 
strategy in the overcoming of alienation 
and in the historic quest for liberty and 
human rights.
^E. In the movement toward a communistic soci­
ety the state and its criminal justice 
apparatus must be deliberately dismantled 
by a total cultural revolution; rather than 
being left to "whither away" by its own 
devices.
In support of the above principles and in
the interest of brevity, the author, in 
75
footnote cites the sources from which
192
the fundamental principles of liber­
tarian justice were derived.
A Comparison of Secular Anarchism to the Major 
Theoretical Features of Radical Criminology
The theoretical foundations of secular anarchism
has been described above. It is the contention of this section:
that the unorthodox Marxism of radical criminology is, at least,
an unconscious criminological statement of the anarchist heresy
orthodox Marxism has historically repudiated.
^ 1. Romanticism:
Radical criminology has not adequately responded
76
to orthodox charges that it is a "romanticization of crime."
According to Taylor et al radical criminology incorporates
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both an "anti-utiliatarian" and political focus. This comb­
ination of anti-utilitarian romanticism and political advocacy 
of the non-utilitarian values of social groups places radical 
criminology in a position left of orthodox Marxism. Further, 
Taylor et al make the erroneous assumption that romanticism 
and politics are somehow mutually exclusive phenomena. As 
Jwas shown above it is romanticism that may give pragmatic 
politics a vision and passion for the achievement of libertar­
ian and humanist ends.
_ 2. Subjectivism and Idealism:
Although, as was shown in Chapter III herein, 
radical criminology has recently developed a political-economy 
of crime, it yet retains a strong tendency toward subjectivism
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and idealism. Quinney's employment of "a radically critical
philosophy" (which is Left-Hegelian in origin) is in his
words an attempt "to destroy the illusion of objectivism
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(of a realityapart from consciousness)". Taylor et al's
advocacy of a criminological fusion between the social inter-
actionist philosophy of George Herbert Mead and a Marxist
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analysis of capitalist economy is rather like the typical
anarchist attempt to critically capture the libertarian
80
dimensions in both liberalism and Marxism.
The radical search for a political-eoonomy of crime
suggests to this author that radical criminologists are
unaware of the subjective connotations of what it means to
engage in political thinking. It is one's politics (not the
dismal "science of economics") that depends on some specific
metaphysical ideal. Political theory, unlike economics, is
thus basically an art. Unorthodox Marxist, Wilson Carey
Williams, a political theorist, has criticized political
"science" as dangerous to development of left political thin- 
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king. Ralph Miliband and Lucio Colletti, both unorthodox
Marxist theorists have respectively noticed that there is
no strictly Marxist tradition of political studies or if
there is one it is based on the liberal political philosophy
of J. J. Rousseau to which Marx merely added "the economic
82
bases for the withering away of the state." Yet Rousseau 
and Hegel shared the eighteenth century neo-Platonist emph­
asis on community and what they both "contributed to socialism,
194
utopian or other, was that all rights, including those
of property, are rights within the community and not against 
83
it."
3. Individualism and Voluntarism:
The Schwendingers proposed a criminology which
84
would "make man, not institutions, the measure of all things." 
Geoff Pearson expressed the point more forthrightly in asser­
ting that his vision of "utopian criminology" would help
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people "to live as they choose." Taylor et al argued against
a strict Marxist determinism and for an unorthodox Marxian
criminology which would allow for individual "purpose and 
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integrity." What all of these radical criminologists are 
suggesting is that criminal activity is not individually but 
socially pathological. It is the diseased social structure of 
late capitalism that is the great culprit in the production 
of criminality. The structural reaction to crime in terms 
of the capitalist state*s repressiveness "threatens the abil-
87
ity of isolated individuals to pursue and realize interests."
Thus deviancy has become the normal method of expressing human




Radical criminology rejects the authoritarian im­
plications of orthodox Marxist methodology in several important 
ways. First, radical criminology insists upon the freedom 
to "choose" its constituencies and opposes orthodoxy’s intol-
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/  o?
erance toward theoretical diversity. In other words rad­
ical criminology is about something other than an analysis 
of the organized working class. Second, radical criminology 
when it uses a class analysis supplements or inflates its 
view of the working dlass by resort to a "surplus population"; 
a population which includes, not only unproductive labor,
but students, state workers, welfare recipients, housewives
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and elite managers of multinational corporations. Third, 
radical criminology addresses itself to the elevation of the 
lumpenproletariat, a class orthodoxy could not stomach.
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Fourth, radical criminology rejects economic determinism, 
though it is unclear that it does because of its penchant 
for political-economy. Lastly, radical criminology, accepts, 
the conclusions of conventional criminology in so far as 
these can be reworked into a political-economy of crime.
An example of this process of reworking to fit the radical 
mold is Taylor et al's reading of Durkheim in way that his 
theory, along with that of Marx's, could be equally associ­
ated with the "abolition of crime."
 ^5. Decentralization and Egalitarianism:
According to the socialist Michael Harrington, 
whom Quinney quotes approvingly, "participatory socialism 
requires the elimination of bureaucracies and all hierarchial 
forms... and.,.entails a sense of egalitarian cooperation...
and guarantees invididual rights...human rights and individ-
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ual liberties." This participatory socialism is counter­
196
posed to state socialism and state capitalism and is
93
Quinney’s vision of human liberation. The concept of
^  94 v egalitarianism also informs the work of the Schwendingers,
95 96
Platt, Taylor, et al and most of the members of or con­
tributors to the radical journal Crime and Social Justice.
6. Rational Humanism and Utopianism:
Radical criminology has repeatedly reported on 
its association with the philosophical humanism of the ,,early"
Marx. Taylor et al make it abundantly clear that their new
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criminology "stands or falls" on Marxism humanism. Quinney 
transfers the concept of alienation, which is central to
Marxist humanism, from the workplace and commodity exchange
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to "all other areas of life." The human rights criminology 
of Platt and the Schwendingers testifies to the esteem and 
vision of the man who called upon philosophers to change the 
world and not merely interpret it. This rational humanism 
is also the most anarchist tendency in radical criminology.
It is a tendency which forces radical criminology to critically 
go beyond the scientific confines of conventional academic
criminology; it is a tendency that culminates in the precept
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that "man is the supreme being for man" and as such it gives
radical criminology a prophetic quality that can only be des-
100
cribed as at one with secular religion.
Throughout this thesis the utopianism of radical 
criminology has been described. One should merely note here, 
along with Pearson: "£that a utopian} ... criminology will
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contribute to the construction of utopias, rather than
101
the confinement of dystopias."
7. Conflict vs. Cooperation:
There are two levels in which the concepts 
of conflict and cooperation are operative in radical crimin­
ology. Theoretically, radical criminology employs the con­
flict vocabulary in its polemics directed against conventional
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social order paradigms in criminology. Other reasons for
radical criminology^ use of such a vocabulary are: its dis­
ruptive perspective of social change; its interpretation of 
society as a contested struggle between opposing interests; 
its utopianism; its Marxist understanding of disalienation; 
its support of out-of-power social groups and, lastly its 
overt politicization of criminological theory by the devel­
opment of a leftist praxis which requires a dual struggle
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both inside and outside of academia. To date most American
radical criminologists have remained non-violent exponents
of direct action first against their own in-house repressors
(e.g., Berkeley School of Criminology closing) and second
in community struggles such as the Berkeley community-control
of police issue, prison struggles and other issues.
On the other hand, criminologists employ an obviously
cooperative praxis in their dealings with one another, with
students and with groups their theory supports. They have
organized "anarchistic" collectives among themselves to pur-
104
sue criminological "writing as a political practice";
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they have organized into national and regional groups to
educate themselves and others about left ideology; developed
105
a "people*s pedagogy" and etc. In true anarcho-utopian 
fashion they are now living the future that they aspire to. 
Compared to the politics and styles of Old-Left academics 
(e.g., hierarchial party organization, democratic centralism, 
Stalinist dogma, no communal living and purges) radical crim­
inologists may be more libertarian and egalitarian.
8. Revolution and Lumpen Violence:
Academic radical criminology at least tacitly 
supports lumpen violence as a strategy against state repres­
sion. This kind of strategy is termed, by Quinney, as
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"politically conscious acts of rebellion." Conventional
criminology and criminal law terms these acts as political
107crimes against which the state should move with all force.
On this question greater attention must be given to the works
of non-academic "radical criminologists", for as Krisberg
has noted the roots of radical criminology can be found in
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the "writings of participants in political struggles."
Two such participants were/are the revolutionaries Huey P. 
Newton and Angela Davis. Both were accused of politically 
violent crimes against the state and both were imprisoned 
as a result. Newton's debt to Bakunin is illustrated in 
his concept of "revolutionary suicide." Justifying revolu­
tionary violence as a strategy for Third World liberation 
groups, Newton asserts:
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Revolutionary suicide does not mean that 
I and my comrades have a death wish; it means 
just the opposite. We have such a strong desire 
to live with hope and human dignity that exis­
tence without them is impossible. When reaction­
ary forces crush us, we must move against these 
forces even at the risk of death. We will have 
to be driven out with a stick. 109
For her part the unorthodox Marxist-Leninist Davis has been, 
since her release from prison the organizing genius in the 
development of the National Alliance Against Racist and 
Political Repression; a group composed of church, labor, 
professional, civic and revolutionary organizations and indi­
viduals. The Alliance's pronounced emphasis is on racism 
and repression of political prisoners (not class struggle), 
most of whom have been accused of violent political crimes
by the state. In the Alliance there is a definite penchant
towards "propaganda by the deed". For example, the current 
struggles for the release of Rev. Ben Chavis, David Rice 
and Poindexter, has been exalted (and I think legitimately) 
to an international cause ce'lebre. In asserting her rela­
tionship to the unorthodox "Marxism" of Bakunin, Davis noted 
that:
Too many Marxists £some of whom are presently
members of the CPUSA: mine^ have been inclined
to over value the second part of Marx's observ­
ation* that the lumpenproletariat is capable
of the basest banditry and the dirtiest corrupt­
ion while minimizing or indeed totally disre­
garding his first remark, applauding the lumpen 
for their heroic deeds and exalted sacrifices. 110
9. Libertarian Notions of Justice:
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Most radical criminologists are unaware that
their theories of justice are based on what the Schwendingers
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refer to as "modem libertarian standards." While ortho­
dox Marxism is contemptuous of the term "justice" because 
of its supposed juridical support of capitalist economy, 
unorthodox Marxism is concerned for a justice that, as Quinney 
holds, "satisfies the needs of the entire working class"
(i.e., the whole surplus population which in Quinney's anal­
ysis, as stated above, includes almost everyone except out­
right capitalists). In other words unorthodox Marxism is 
a firm believer in that kind of justice which does not seek 
the legal justification of the capitalist class. Quinney 
has called this new understanding of justice "popular justice" 
or "socialist justice" and suggests that it is based on a 
new understanding of morality (another concept that orthodoxy 
ridicules). To this author*s mind what all this confused 
double-talk of Quinney is really trying to describe is a 
J libertarian concern for justice for the broad masses of 
American people.
This assessment is based on Quinney's notion of
the masses "natural desire for a complete unalienated poli- 
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j tics," which slightly restated would mean a natural instinct 
for a popular justice. A justice without the state, and its 
^ juridical features. Justice without the criminal justice sys­
tem and an academy without criminology. The negation of the
114
criminal justice system and its transcendence is exactly
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where Quinney*s criminology is directed. In its! direction
Quinney*s theory is libertarian because it is a vision of
socialism that "affords to all individuals the freedom to
exercise human rights and civil liberties that are not mere
//115
abstractions but have concrete day-to-day meaning.
t/ / Towards A Deliberate Anarchist Criminology 
With the above favorable comparison of present rad­
ical criminology to the anarchist position in mind, the task 
is to now indicate what the salient features of a deliberate 
anarchist criminology would be. The most important concern 
of this section is to show thad radical criminology has, 
within its present formulations, the capacity to carry through 
a libertarian revolution in criminology. But that capacity 
must be consciously put in motion if radical criminology *s
development is not to regress into a new orthodoxy. Hence
! f
| this section also speculatively explores ways in which an 
anarchist criminology must critically and continually dis­
tinguish itself from traditional Marxist methods of analysis, 
if those methods are theoretically repressive and lead away 
from a criminology with libertarian ends.
I. Libertarianism vs. Correctionalism
Taylor et al in their New Criminology have 
cautioned that any approach to radical criminology 
must meet three essential criteria:
A. The radical approach must avoid correct­
ionalism or "the identification of
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deviance with pathology.”
B. The radical approach must be a political-
117
economy of the state crime.
C. The radical approach must be commited to
the abolition of crime and by virtue of
this commitment critically advocate the
creation of a new society in which "the
facts of human diversity...are not sub-
118
ject to the power to criminalize."
On the basis of Taylor's first criterion, 
most radical criminologists have thus far avoided 
correctionalism; yet on the strength of their con­
tinued confused identification with traditional 
Marxist analysis, one can, with certainty predict, 
that if the authoritarian Marxist variety of social­
ism were to take power in American, correctionalism 
would be the "new criminology's primary pursuit. 
Historical events have demonstrated conclusively 
that authoritarian Marxist socialism requires a 
bureaucratic and ideological apparatus (criminal 
justice system and criminology to centralize the 
social response to and increase its hegemony over 
all kinds of deviancy). However, even prior to 
the capturing of state power orthodox Marxist theory 
contains the seeds of a correctionalist perspective 
on crime, as shown in this work of Bonger and Marx's
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contempt for the lumpenproletariat.
It is submitted that the reason radical 
criminology has thus far avoided correctionalism 
is because of its emphasis on unrestricted liberty 
in "heteropraxis.11 The coercive implications of 
correctionalism sparks an instinctual, if not rat­
ional, reaction in all who are anarchistically 
inclined. Thus, Taylor*s anti-correctionist cri­
teria is best understood as an anarchist posture. 
However a caveat must be enjoined on this point: 
in order to not defeat its revolutionary ideals, 
radical criminology must maintain the anti-correct- 
ionist perspective. That is, if the opportunity 
for fundamental social change is realized the rad­
ical approach must remain faithful to a non-coercive 
credo unlike established Marxism which has become 
repressive. This caveat being settled the first 
feature of an anarchist criminology would be its 
libertarian anti-correctionalism.
II. Metaphysical Dialectics vs. Strict Political-
Economy
Radical criminology has recently begun to 
meet the second criterion by fashioning a sort of 
political-economy of crime. It is here that auth­
entic Marxism might have had the greatest relevance 
for the investigations of criminology for the Marxist
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model is capable of analyzing capitalism as an 
historically specific class-determined social form­
ation. Viewed as the "early" Marx himself prophet­
ically viewed it radical political-economy is prop­
erly the dialectical critique of ''everything exis- 
120
ting" and thus not merely capitalist social 
relations. Yet Marx himself in his scientific 
socialism and many of those who call themselves 
"Marxists" restrict the universal implications of 
that dictum by limiting political-economy to a crit­
ique of capitalism's historic development, liberal 
politics, social order, i.e., "various theories of
politics, sociology and finally conventional econ- 
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omics." Of course, radical criminology employs
the concept to criticize crime and deviancy in 
capitalist society. By a dialectical critique of 
"everything existing" this author understands it 
to include: religion, metaphysics, aesthetics, 
organic and inorganic matter, and of course author­
itarian Marxism among other infinitely possible 
topics for criticism. It is understood that it 
may be absurd for radical criminology to consider 
studying everything before it offers conclusions 
on anything about that which it is uniquely situ­
ated to study, i.e,, crime and deviancy. But 
moving "criminology out of its own imprisonment
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in artificially segregated specifics" is what 
the emergent radical paradigm is supposedly about 
anyway. What is irrational and absurd to one ideol­
ogy may be the height of rationality to another.
Thus requesting that present radical analysis move 
beyond its narrow investigation of crime vis-a-vis 
capitalism to broader analysis would not be absurd.
The foregoing request is all the more ur­
gent because, as has been shown in Chapter III of 
this thesis, the Marxist dialectic does not operate 
dialectically with respect to crime. Radical crim­
inologists have had to forge a fiction or leap of 
faith to create a "Marxist" political-economy of 
crime. In the process they have shown that it is 
not the "scientificity" of dialectical criticism 
or political-economy that attracts but rather the 
mystique of the device of political-economy. In 
spite of C. Wright Mill's criticism below this
author does not feel that the dialectical method
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or an analysis of political-economy is so elastic 
that it is meaningless, on the contrary its meaning 
is in its esoteric materialist mysteries which only 
the faithful need understand in order to bring the 
faith to those willing to hear:
We may also understand that if not for 
Marx, for many "Marxists" mere reference to 
"dialectical" serves to let one out of the
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determinist trap. But for self-appointed 
’’insiders'* it is all too often an intel­
lectually cheap way to mysterious insights, 
a substitute for the hard work of learning.
Perhaps their insistence upon this language 
is due mainly to their having become disciples 
before having read much else. For us, the 
"dialectical method" is either a mess of 
platitutdes, a way of double talk, a preten­
tious obscurantism or all three. The
essential error of the "dialectician" is 
the know-it-all confusion of logic with meta­
physics; if the rules of dialectics were 
the most general laws of motion: all phys­
ical scientists would use them every day.
CMaybe not if the conclusions about scien­
tific revolutions in Thomas Kuhn*s works 
are correct: minej. On the other hand, if 
dialectics is the "science of thinking", 
then we are dealing with the subject matter 
of psychology, and not with logic or method 
at all. As guide to thinking, "dialectics" 
can be more burdensome than helpful, for 
if everything is connected, dialectically, 
with everything else, then you must know 
"everything" in order to know anything, and.^, 
causal sequences become difficult to trace. ^
There is little need to tarry long over Mill*s
criticism for all social theories have an ontological
element (metaphysical view of ultimate reality) and
all social theories, as ideologies, are relativistic,
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even the unorthodox-Marxism of Mills. Construct­
ively, Mills has indicated the mysterious qualities 
'J j of dialectical criticism and what is important is 
I that radical political-economy, either in its usual 
/ or in its mystical sense, ought to be extended beyond 
| its captivity of being merely a critique of capital- 
\ ism to:
^  A. Critically compare capitalist social rela-
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tions with all existing socialist social 
relations in order to determine how crime 
is produced, handled and how it could be 
abolished in a manner that is liberative 
rather than repressive.
B. Incorporate concepts derived from: ecology;
ethology; sexology; philosophical humanism;
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aesthetics; occultism; theology and anth­
ropology .
C. Apply dialectical criticism to the "production 
of radical criminology" itself (e.g. Quinney).
D. Improve present radical analysis by better
127
scholarship. These proposals for an
extension of radical methodology to cover 
most of human existence and experience are 
presented in the awareness that crime and 
deviancy are universal social phenomena 
which require so much more speculation than 
the poverty of a naked "class analysis." 
Conventional criminology with its many pol­
itical and economic drawbacks has been recep­
tive to ideas from multiple sources. Radi­
cal analysis must not short-change itself 
by a narrowing of its scope to the restrict­
ive mysteries of class. If it is to remain 
critical and revolutionary even the words
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‘'political-economy’1 may have to, from 
time-to-time re-emerge, as say, anthro-
sexology, racial ecology and etc., -----
anarchist criminology would require as 
much. As the secular anarchist philosopher 
of science, Paul K. Feyerbend has put it:
There is no idea, however ancient 
and absurd that is not capable of 
improving our knowledge. The whole 
history of thought is absorbed into 
science and used for improving every 
single theory. Nor is political inter­
ference rejected. It maybe needed to 
overcome the chauvinism of science that 
resists alternatives to the status-quo.^28
Therefore the second essential feature of 
^  an anarchist criminology would be method­
ological freedom and flexibility.
III. Utopianism and Philosophical Idealism as 
the Basis of Praxis
A close restatement of the New Criminology’s 
third essential criterion for a radical criminology 
results in the advocacy of a new society where indi­
vidual and social variegation are not to be selected 
out as criminal activity by some powerful social 
agency(s). Simply, what this criterion envisions 
is a new social order where: a) human freedom pre­
vails over dominance and where crime is no more, 
b) the former social power to control freedom is 
drastically short-circuited if not completely abol-
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ished. As a general statement of a desired aspect 
of the future this utopian vision presents this 
author with no particular difficulty. However, 
there are difficulties that come with the notion 
of praxis or the actual means to achieve such an 
end; it is with praxis that critical scrutiny must 
be brought to bare.
On the question of praxis (i.e., the uni­
fication of theory and practice) there are two 
competing Marxian views: the orthodox and authentic 
one fashioned by Marx and the other a Hegelian 
philosophic construct introduced by Georg Lukas 
and elaborated upon by Antonio Gramsci and more 
recently by Herbert Marcuse. Briefly, for Marx, 
it was the industrial proletariat, and not alien­
ated intellectuals or the non-productive lumpenprol- 
etariat, that "embodies the unity of theory and 
practice," such that the historical development 
and revolutionary potential of this class,
...cannot be treated adequately from the 
theoretical side alone, as a question that 
some general theoretical or philosophical 
scheme might definitively resolve, but must 
be viewed also from the side of practice, 
taking account of the changes in theory 
that may be required by the development 
of social life in new forms, and by giving 
due importance to empirical investigation 
of praxis itself, that is of the socially 
and historically situated interconnection 
of theory and practice. 129
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In contrast to Marx, Lukas developed a 
conception of praxis in which truth was not to be 
arrived at by mere resort to the activities of 
the working-class, because this class is ’’not pre­
dominantly revolutionary” in the Marxist sense of 
history, rather truth is known through ’’rational
insight and thereby is the work of intellectuals,
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of Marxist thinkers.” It was this same anarch­
istic "Marxist” who held that all of Marx’s social
theories could be banished but Marxian dialectics
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would survive the onslaught. Gramsci’s main
point was to banish Marxist sociology and replace
it with a neo-Hegelian/Marxist philosophy which
from time-to-time could employ "social statistics”
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for illumination. Marcuse, and the Frankfort
School of critical philosophy, In association with
the left existentialism of Sartre, extended the
idea of the critical thinker as the fashioner of
and judge of the "irrationality of existing society'
and constructed a philosophy of praxis based on
134
individual spontaneity, which is in fact anarch­
ist in pedigree (though the "early” Marx himself 
opened up dialectics to the potential of transcen­
ding orthodox Marxism).
New Left radical criminology, springing ^  




tionaries of the sixties) and not the working 
classes, specially not the false working class 
of Quinney (i.e., the elite managers of multi­
nationals) , and from the minds of alienated intel­
lectuals , necessarily conceives of praxis in terms 
decidedly different than Marx. For example, Quinney 
in his confused notion of what constitutes the
135
working class, goes well beyond the "positivistic"
proletariat based praxis by his opposition to
the liberal policy sciences which "provide a social
136
engineering model of change" ; but Quinney says
nothing of the present social engineering features
137
of socialist criminology as in say East Germany.
Yet, again Quinney in his confusion apparently 
wants a socialist praxis which is sometimes (but 
other times not) aimed at state-socialism which 
to date, like the capitalist state, has only forced 
its dominion, over nature^ general .humanity, and 
particularly the working class.
Therefore, the third essential feature 
of an anarchist criminology is that its praxis should 
be decided by individuals in isolation or in groups, 
and thus the praxis should be voluntary or spontan­
eous and not contrived by resort to the specious 
interests of particular classes in society. With 
this in mind segments of anarchistic criminology
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may voluntarily decide to push exclusively for 
libertarian interests of certain classes in pres­
ent capitalist society or no class interests at 
all. In a new society anarchist criminology would 
cease to exist from want of a subject field of
study. Extending Quinney somewhat, "to move beyond
138
criminal justice is to move beyond" (both capi­
talism and authoritarian socialism), by right now 
employing the kind of social praxis which allows 
for such a utopian and idealist move.
IV. Roraanticization of the Lumpenproletariat
It occurs to this author that the orthodox 
Marxist criticism of the lumpenproletariat as "the 
dangerous class" can be as well applied to the wor­
king and capitalists classes. For example, to the 
ethnic minority lumpenproletariat imprisoned in 
America*s ghettoes, the white working-class police
represents an immediate danger to Black political 
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liberty. Obviously the capitalist class has a
dangerousness about it that threatens the criminal
140
destruction of the entire planet. As the least
powerful and dangerous of all classes in society, 
orthodox Marxism*s contempt for this class borders 
on "scientific" insanity. It is for this over­
arching reason that a truly anarchist criminology 
would do well to extend the now hesitant romantic
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association of radical criminology to lumpen
141
elements in society.
Above it was noted that anarchist crim-ft
^ inology is not mandated to necessarily engage in 
a class analysis. Here it is suggested that moral 
V credibility would rationally persuade anarchist 
criminologists to do so. Besides an obvious rele­
vance to normal criminological interest, the lumpen- 
i/class is the most rejected and repressed class in 
American society. The prisons and jails of America 
are full of the members of this class as.are the 
racially isolated urban and rural slums. Moreover, 
the accelerated incidence of crime among non-minority
sectors has served to enlarge the contemporary ranks
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of this class. The social unorthodpxy and dev­
iancy of counter-cultural groups, can be the radicalized 
sectors of labor, feminist, homosexual and other
counter-cultural groups expected to enlarge this
143
class even more. Capitalist state repression
!/
is, via the criminal justice apparatus, primarily 
focused on the social elimination of this class. 
Internationally, the U. S . is continuing its expor­
tation of repressive techniques to "authoritarian 
regimes abroad"; these techniques are right now 
being used to subdue and demoralize lumpen-elements
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144
in their struggles for national liberation.
^ I t  is not economic reductionism but human morality 
and decency that ought to fire the anarchist imag­
ination to aggressively advocate the lumpen cause.
Thus anarchist criminology must in no way
r 'j
be sensitive to conventional criminological and Marxist
criticisms of its romanticism. In a positive sense
romanticism denotes the imaginative, emotive and
visionary exaltation of freedom for the common per- 
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son, the downtrodden, or the "wretched of the 
earth" as the unorthodox Marxist theoretician Franz 
Fanon phrased.it. Even to view the lumpenproletar­
iat as heroic is not an act of New Left immaturity 
but rather a strategic device in ideological polem­
ics. In this regard one wonders (knowingly) why, 
when the liberals exalt the utilitarian and instru­
mentalist values of the bourgoisie or when orthodox 
Marxism exalts the manifest destiny of the prole­
tariat, these exaltations are considered as the 
zenith of "realism." Yet when anarchists engage 
in the same process it is villified as romanticism. 
Rejecting this criticism the fourth essential fea­
ture of an anarchist criminology would be its delib­
erate romanticization of the lumpenproletariat.
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Four Questions Concerning Ultimate Human Realities.- 
An Anarchist Criminological Response
Though a general idea of the praxis of anarchist 
criminology has been derived from the immediate discussion 
one feels obligated to explore this question in more depth.
On the way to concluding this chapter the four ultimate ques­
tions about human realities set forth in the introduction 
to this thesis can now be of assistance in a final delineation 
of the horizons between an orthodox Marxist and anarchist 
approach to a new crime free society.
^ ^ • What is the Most Rational Approach to a
Crime Free Society, Given the Human Tendency 
Toward Dominance and Power Over Others?
From what has been shown herein, one of 
the strengths of secular anarchism is that its rat­
ional humanism holds nature and humanity in high 
regard. To anarchism the domination of nature is 
the prerequisite for the domination of man and woman. 
It is not that anarchism is not concerned with the 
using of nature for constructive human purposes but 
instead it posits an ecologically (e.g., Bookchin) 
balanced view of humanity's interrelatedness to 
nature, unlike advanced capitalism and existing soc­
ialism. Anarchist theory is in accord with the evi­
dences of ethology, palelontology and anthropology 
in their respective conclusions that human-kind are 
not innately given to intra-species dominance;
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destructive aggression; predation; or hierarch-
146
ially institutionalized warfare. The human
tendency toward dominance over others is a social
convention, just as much as is the same tendency
to destroy nature guides most m o d e m  societies
rather than preservation and orthodox balance.
"VGiven the innateness of cooperation and mutual-aid
in human affairs it cannot be maintained, as is
the custom of authentic Marxism, that economic
scarcity sets the stage for class struggle in
primitive communistic society and thus all history
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is more or less class struggle.
The most rational approach to a crime
free society would have to be based on the premises 
/  148
of life-affirming values, and thus a social
praxis which, prior to the completed revolution,
"renounces methods of punishing, hating or killing
149
any fellow human being." The most rational
criminology would conform with most of Miller's 
extreme left positions outlined in Chapter II of 
this thesis. The exceptions to conformity with 
Miller left idealizations would revolve around the 
issue of violence vs. non-violence. An imminently 
rational criminology may not include the sanction
of armed revolution, "elimination of members of the
150
oppressor police force," or the theoretical just*
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ification of common criminal brutality and coer­
cion no matter how ideologically understandable 
such criminality may be. Yet the most reasonable 
approach must not hold the lumpenproletariat in 
historic and everyday contempt as does authentic 
Marxism. Again this approach must not particular- 
! ize crime as the activity of only the ruling classes 
in society, rather it should view crime as a mani­
festation (sometimes destructive, often times con­
structive) general to all classes. Finally, the
^  most reasonable approach should not wed itself nto
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a perspective of economic oppression solely,” 
but instead perceive of dominance and the exercise 
of superior power in social organization as non- 
essential and non-innate phenomena which can be 
changed (change is not necessarily inevitable as 
in orthodox Marxism) if the "will to power” is 
supplanted by the "will to justice" in human affairs. 
In sum, a rational criminology must employ a new 
kind of revolutionary praxis if it is to realize 
its ends.
II. Can Individual and Social Alienation, the
Basic Foundations for the Existence of
Crime Ever be Overcome?
Quinney, as does Taylor et al, has consid­
ered that the course of capitalist development sig-
218
nifies an increased occurence of alienation which,
in consequence, gives rise to various psycho-social
152
disorders including the bulk of criminal activity. 
Crime is one result of or a social reaction to the 
alienating conditions of capitalist production.
An overcoming of alientation heralds the simultan­
eous overcoming of crime, hence radical criminology's 
advocacy of socialism to replace capitalist modes 
of production: "a Marxist analysis of crime... assumes
that there is a social order in which crime is not 
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inevitable." However, contradicting the idea
of crime's non-evitability, Quinney inconsistently
views both the transition to socialism and later
to communism as not the culmination of alienation
or crime because "the transformation of human nature
154
and social order never ceases." Here one may
inquire that if alienation, and in turn crime, 
may never cease even under communism, why should 
radical criminology advocate a new socialist arrange­
ment of society in the first place? If even commu­
nism holds "the danger of retrogression to capital-
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ist relations," what is the ultimate reason for 
assuming that a new social order can be crime free. 
Unlike Marx, Quinney, confusedly and contradicting 
himself grossly, apparently does not see the post­
socialist transition to communism as one in which
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the question of social estrangement (the ground 
for crime's existence) will finally be resolved.
On the other hand neither he or other unorthodox 
Marxist criminologists show an awareness of alien­
ation and crime as antecedent to capitalism because 
to "...understand crime we must understand the
development of the political-economy of capitalist 
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society" ; as if capitalist society invented 
alienation and crime.
In the libertarian works of the "early" 
Marx, as in those of Hegel and the classical anarch­
ists, the concept of alienation is philosophically
157
the disjunction between existence and essence, 
or the awareness that the actual state of human 
existence is not what it ought to be for humanity 
lives estranged from its essential nature. The 
reasons for this state of ontological separation 
may vary, but most left radicals believe that human­
ity's existence can be reconciled with its essence. 
This belief in eventual reconciliation may be des­
cribed as prophetic hope. In prophetic Marxism 
the origin of alienation is found in the primitive 
division of labor and the emergence of private 
^ property. Rather than labor being an expression 
of the labourer's creativity, labor and its prod­
ucts develop, especially under capitalism, an
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existence which came to be alien from the lab­
ourer. Not only does this labor, now appropriated 
by the capitalist in his or her greed to control 
surplus value, come to separate itself from the 
labourer, it assumes a dominance over the lab­
ourer rendering the labourer a slave to his or 
^ her labor. Moreover, the labourer becomes alien­
ated from other labourers and finally alienated 
from his or her essential self.
Since Marx defined alienation as concretely 
connected with economic interaction, to overcome 
such alienation meant to advocate communism as 
"the definitive resolution of the antagonism between 
man and nature and between man and man. It is the
true solution of the conflict between existence 
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and essence." Thus to Marx, in contrast to
^ Quinney's confusion and contradiction, alienation
can be overcome in the final transition to communism.
Further, Marx understood that alienation and its
"false-consciousness" pre-dated capitalism and
he maintained that the division of labor (which
socialism does not negate and which can happen
under any economic arrangement) has as much bearing
on the presence of alienation as does the institution
159
of private property. Finally, ultimate disalien-
^ ation for Marx is located in the abolition of labor,
221
l/the wage-system and money, these to be replaced
by freely willed (voluntary creative activity)
where an individuals labor becomes akin to what
160
anarchists have termed art and/or play.
J If the Marxian prophecy of alienation’s
demise under communism resembles the anarchist 
position it is because Marx and the anarcho-commu­
nists share the same utopian perception of communism. 
Both view communism as the ideal arena where the 
potential for human perfectability and freedom can 
be realized. Anarchism in its guise of, what Bakunin 
called, revolutionary socialism or Lenin refered 
to as left-wing communism necessarily shares the 
^ Marxian prophecy of a new social order liberated 
from alienation. However, it must be remembered 
that Marxism, as a prophetic or utopianist system, 
because of Marx's own denial, is not to be understood 
in the same light as scientific socialism; the former 
being heretodox and the latter orthodox Marxism.
Therefore, notwithstanding Quinney's con­
fusion, radical criminology by following unortho- 
\A/ dox Marxism is anarchistic with respect to its
vision of transcending alienation the basic founda­
tion for the existence of crime.
III. Are Injustice and Inequality, in the Forms
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of Class Antagonisms, Racism, Sexism or 
Plain-Old Socially Differentiated Political 
Domination Essential or Unnecessary Features 
of Human Existence?
From the immediately above it has been 
suggested that: 1) alienation is a non-essential 
rather than an inherent feature of human existence,
2) alienation has its origin in economic factors 
and 3) alienation understood as dominated labour 
can be overcome by the abolition of labor which re­
sults from the establishment of communism. Radical 
criminology presently assents to this prophetic 
Marxian view with the addition that crime, as a pro­
duct of alienated class interaction, can also be 
overcome by the transition to communism. Neverthe­
less alienation understood only as a class related 
phenomena remains problematic. To restrict alien­
ation to class antagonisms is to exclude other kinds 
of injustices and inequalities which result from 
differing forms of alienation. Such restriction 
implies that these other forms of alienation such 
as racism, sexism and political domination will 
somehow disappear along with class divisions just
because of a change in economic arrangements from
161
private to social property.
While racism, sexism and political domin-
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ation are, like class antagonisms, non-essential 
characteristics of social intercourse (i.e., they 
can be overcome by a change in social relations 
as envisioned in communism) an anarchist approach 
to criminology would hold that without a strict 
attention to their specific elimination crime and 
deviancy will remain. The eradication of these 
forms of alienation requires a commitment to revol­
utionary transformation at least comparable to, 
if not greater than the commitment to overcome 
economic exploitation. An anarchist criminology 
j~would agree with Herman and Julie Schwendinger in 
their suggestion that radical criminology should 
proceed on the basis of "modem libertarian stan-
it
dards" and define crime in terms of the abrogation
of human rights which include, not only economic
inequality, but racism, sexism, imperialism among




That racism, in the sense of white domin­
ation of blacks, was originally "generated by cap- 
163
italism," or was first caused by a fifteenth
century European psychological reaction to biblical
164
color imagery" are the viewpoints of Marxism
and liberalism respectively. Both viewpoints are
224
historically inaccurate. European racism may
have developed along with capitalist expansion
in the fifteenth century and it may have had
a theological mystification but the ideology of
white supremacy is much older than its late
European version. Even earlier than the white
Islamic invasion of black Africa (Makuria) in 
165
643 A.D. , white Semitic hordes from the West
Orient began to migrate, settle, inter-marry
with and eventually dominate black Africa (parts
of the present Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt) as
early as 2000 B.C., or some nine hundred years
after the ’’Golden Age” of black civilization begun
1^66
by "the Ethiopian leader, Menes in 3100 B.C.
Thus the ideology of racial supremacy preceeded
"biblical color imagery" and was obviously prior
to the rise of European capitalism; indeed black
Egyptian racism, according to African historian
Cheikh-Anta Diop, set the stage for Hebrew slavery
which in turn gave rise to the development of
the Hebrew Bible's negative racial assessment of 
167
blacks.
Certainly the Marxian view of racism as 
epiphenomenally related to class exploitation 
"points a sure finger at one of the factors involved 
in prejudice, viz, rationalized self-interest of
225
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the capitalist class.” However, American rac­
ism has historically been more a matter of irrat­
ional tendencies toward racial and cultural super­
iority than it has economic self-interestedness.
For example, "slavery was not exclusively an econ­
omic institution,” rather it was an institution 
that meant a whole way of life for the aristocratic 
(not capitalist or bourgeois) Southern ruling elite; 
even when it became apparent that economic progress
meant a transformation from slaveocracy to capital- 
169
ism.
Nor is the racism of today an "integral part
170
of capitalism” (as Quinney erringly suggests) 
for the advances in the technology of late capital­
ism threaten blacks, not with economic exploitation, 
but more desperately, with social annihilation if
the thesis of the unorthodox Marxist economist
171
Sidney Willhelm has any validity. Moreover,
^  the Marxian view of racism seemingly absolves the 
white-working class of racism while putting the blame 
on white capitalists; yet white working class atti­
tudes of racial superiority result from the reali­
zation that blacks of all classes occupy a lower
172
social status. Finally, it is this same white
proletariat that acts as defenders of racial super­
iority by virtue of its role as policepersons, guards
226
and enforcers of contemporary racism.
B . Sexism
Sexual injustices and stratification are 
^related to the sexual division of labor (sexual 
inequality), and like racial antagonisms, did not 
begin with capitalist relations of production. On
/
the contrary, the bio-social concept of male suprem­
acy or patriarchy preceeded private property arrange­
ments and evolved through primitive, slave and
feudal economic organization and is even now pre-
173
dominate in socialist societies. Yet the labour
division of the sexes did not lead directly to pat-
riarchial domination for matriarchy in the form of
the maternal clan preceeded the father-family;
"women then were not simply the procreators of new
life, the biological mothers; they were the prime
producers of the necessities of life, the "social 
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mothers."
From this awareness Marx's notion that econ­
omic production is "the driving force of history" 
must take on the addition of sexual interaction as 
a comparable if not greater driving force. Thus 
radical criminology ought to view liberation from 
alienating sexual activity as at least equally 
important for a revolution aimed at the establish­
ment of communism. Communism could then be defined
227
as not only the utopian arena where labour is 
abolished, but more a society where inter-racial 
comradeship and a liberated eros serve as replace-
173-
ments for sexual repression.
C . Political Domination
Quinney restricts the concept of political 
domination to mean class animosities under capital­
ism. The capitalist class, by influencing the state's 
crime control apparatus, commits crimes of political 
domination. Whereas, the working class, "in the 
realization of the alienation suffered under capi­
talism" either accomodates itself to capitalist
domination or engages in criminal (political) resis-
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tance against such domination. Thus in his
scheme Quinney interprets political activity and 
crime as being determined by the course of econ­
omic exploitation in capitalist society.
In assessing Quinney's position on polit­
ical domination one cannot deny that capitalism 
(or any other form of economic exploitation) has 
a dehumanizing or alienating effect on the less- 
powerful classes in society, although with the 
prophetic Marx capitalist relations also dehuman­
ize the more powerful capitalist class as well.
Nor can one reason that there is no interdependence 
between economics and politics. Thus one could
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have agreed with Quinney if his scheme proposed 
crime as sometimes an economic and sometimes a 
political reaction by all classes to the alienation 
produced by either political or economic domination 
on the part of some ruling segment(s) in society: 
economic power and political power may interact, 
sometimes in a manner difficult of distinction. 
However, an interdependence of economics and poli­
tics is not Quinney's proposal. What he proposes 
is a conception of political dominance which is 
linearly dependent upon economic dominance and it 
is here that his scheme must be rejected by an 
anarchistic model of criminology.
The rejection is concerned that Quinney
confusedly views politics as but an appendage of
economics when the reverse is more nearly the case,
even though as political scientist Robert Dahl notes
in ordinary conversation "the distinction between
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the two concepts is often blurred." Though comp­
limentary as "arts necessary to efficient human act- 
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tion" politics in theory and praxis always pre- 
ceeds (logically and temporally) economic activity. 
The subjective or objective decision to act with 
or against the desires, interests or needs (these 
can be singularities or combinations of ecological, 
economic, artistic, military, psychological, sexual
229
or spiritual interests) of others is first and 
fundamentally a political decision with political 
consequences if actually carried through. Decis­
ion-making and the power to act are thus not lim­
ited to naked economic expression, although they
can be, and will often exhibit levels of economic
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motivation among other kinds of motivations.
On this basis the decision to act in crim­
inal or deviant manner should be interpreted first 
as a political reaction to the political dominance 
such as found in the administrations, rules, sanct­
ions, proscriptions and brute force embodied in 
corporate liberalism*s "rule of law"or in state 
communism*s "dictatorship of the proletariat." In 
this view lumpenproletariat crime is political since 
it is first a response to political dominance and 
only economic when it becomes conscious of economic 
alienation as produced by ruling segments of any 
given society. The person(s) of any class who 
become involved in criminal infractions first decides 
to and actually does act against a set of political 
sanctions created by the state. The ends of such 
an act may be economic (theft), sexual (rape) or 
even political (espionage) but the decision and 
action is first political and arouses political 
consequences as determined by the state which in
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turn may be concerned with the securing of not 
only economic interests but others as well. 
Whatever interests the state determines as in 
jeopardy, the action of the state is aimed at the 
denial of the political liberty of those involved 
in criminal activity. The denial may entail econ­
omic deprivation, physical abuse, psychological 
repression, status change and death, or it may be 
nothing more than police harrassment, an economic 
fine or censorship. These possible state actions 
against the criminal and deviant are a priori pol­
itical and ought not be restrively construed as 
necessitated by economic exploitation.
Furthermore, though criminal action and
state reaction are relational in the sense that
all political action is a correspondence between 
entities A and B the relation is one of inher­
ent inequality and coercion. The criminal is sub­
ordinated to the superordinate political dominance 
of coercive state power even though most criminal 
action is not coercive. State action by virtue 
of its coercive nature exhibits the most alienating 
kind of dominating power coercion and influ­
ence was fatal, as it is now to economic elites
in parts of Africa and South America who find, 
often to their destruction, that they may not
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determine the actions of military regimes who 
hold state coercive power.
Thus the simple Marxian view that econom­
ics determines politics is misleading. As C. Wright 
Mills has explained "such a simple view of economic 
determinism must be elaborated by political determ­
inism and military determinism; that the higher 
agents of each of these three domains now often 
have a noticeable degree of autonomy; and that only 
in the often intricate ways of coalition do they
make up and carry through the most important decis- 
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ions.n
IV. The "Withering Away of the State"
Normally the commentators on the subject 
have assumed that the greatest distinction between 
anarchism and orthodox Marxism revolves around Engel's 
concept of the gradual elimination of or the "with­
ering away of the state." According to Lenin its 
not the state itself but the kind of state that is 
in debate he suggests:
Marxism differs from anarchism in that it 
recognized the need for a state for the purpose 
of the transition to socialism but not a state 
of the type of the usual parliamentary bourgeois- 
democratic republic but a state like the Paris 
Commune of 1871 and the Soviets of Workers 
Deputies of 1905 and 1917. 181
But subsequent history and Marxist-Leninism, 
"plus Stalinism" have shown that the anarchist crit-
232
icism of the state was well founded. As Bakunin 
predicted a modern "workers” state that con­
solidates all power in the name of the people
182
would be as evil as the capitalist state."
Even Lenin's comparison of the Paris Commune with
a hypothetical state was erroneous because the
Commune never established itself as a state, but
rather as an economic cooperative; moreover, the
government of France at that time did not accept
183
its status as a sovereign entity into itself.
Above it was asserted that political dom­
ination is prior to economic influence. Here the 
author asserts that political domination is more 
entrenched although the m o d e m  state and its crim­
inal justice apparatus can be overcome by a total 
 ^ cultural revolution using the cooperative model 
of anarcho-communism (Kropotkin) rather than the 
conflict model of anarcho-syndicalism (Proudhon) 
and traditional Marxism. The assertion is based 
on the fundamental awareness that planetary sur­
vival is at stake and not merely the survival of 
the oppressed. We are at a period in human evolu­
tion where the wrong set of moves by either the 
oppressing or oppressed classes of the earth can 
end in sure human and maybe even biological destruc­
tion .
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First it must be understood that the
state and thus its formal juridical relations
are relatively recent developments in European 
184
history. Thus the state is not a necessary
feature for human survival. Secondly, utopian 
proposals for new communities and life-styles sat­
urate the literature and the most promising of 
these need to be acted upon. Thirdly, some sort 
of technological reversal is in order if humanity
is to reassume power over itself. Fourthly, an
185
economic theory of "enough" in contrast to the 
political-economies of capitalism and orthodox soc­
ialism is in order. Quinney's suggestion of popular 
justice ought to be acted upon as long as it is 
modified by the deliberate anarcho-communist idea 
that disallows coercive punishment in any form. 
Lastly utilitarianism, instrumentalist and elitist 
social values should be countered with the idea 
of mutual-aid.
Only if, we as a species begin now to 
move, as some of us are, toward these kinds of 
ends can humanity have a possibility for survival.
It is in this spirit of hope against hope that the 
main part of the thesis closes.
234
EPILOGUE: CHRISTIAN ANARCHISM IN 
RELATION TO RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
This concluding section of the thesis proposes a 
unique argument. It is concerned to show that much of American 
radical criminology is, in reality, an unconscious secular 
statement of Christian anarchist political theology. The 
argument is based on two major assumptions that will be ex­
plored in detail. First it will be shown that the centuries 
old Christian libertarian ideal of a "world without law" 
has had a profound influence on left-wing social thinking 
in general and it now informs the work of leading American 
radical criminolpgists the exploration will show how the 
libertarian ideal in Christianity originated and developed 
up until the movement toward modern secularization began 
in the Enlightenment.
Second the argument assumes, on good authority, 
that some portion of the American social sciences, specific­
ally sociology and criminology, have historically promoted 
rational humanism or "the religion of humanity" as the secular 
equivalent for the "transcendent" insights of theology. It 
shall be argued that this secular "religion of humanity" 
has its own orthodox and heterodox divisions over dogma 
and authority; these divisions are also politically disting­
uishable as left vs. right ideological manifestations. 
Conventional criminology can be seen as synonomous with 
right-wing humanist orthodoxy, while radical criminology
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would be synonomous with left wing humanist heterodoxy,
Radical feminist theologian Rosemary R. Reuther, 
in her notice that theologians are now becoming the general­
ist par excellence by investigating the whole range of the 
human sciences in order to "address the human situation in 
its existence *up 'til now'," has offered the following 
insight as to the paradox of secularization in the social 
sciences that today seems to be as "religious" as traditional 
theology was yesterday:
If the "sacral," as an interpretation of the 
sphere of theology, abstracted the transcendent 
horizon of human life into a special "religious" 
world where it lost its real human context, so 
the "secular" was merely the reverse of this one­
sidedness, in the removal of a transcendent dimen­
sion of human life and the reduction of life to 
the purely imminent and one-dimensional... today 
we find a criticism of this secularist viewpoint 
among those who reflect on a variety of human 
activities. With the formation of an avante garde 
in various fields; i.e., "radical historians, 
"radical sociologists," "radical psychiatrists," 
"radical educators," "radical economists," and 
even "radical technologists," we are beginning 
to see the sciences of all human activities 
starting to recover a sense of their own trans­
cendent horizon and the need to pose prophetic 
and iconoclastic questions about the normative 
status of the status quo. Theology today then 
integrates itself with this transcendent and 
prophetic horizon of all the sciences and modes 
of reflection upon human existence. 1
A Conventional Criticism of the Religious Dimension
of Radical Criminology
Earlier this year conventional criminologist Carl B. 
Klocars, writing in the staid journal Criminology criticized
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American radical criminology (as represented in the works
of Chambliss, Quinney, Platt and the Schwendingers) for
having the "character of religious prophesy" and as such
2
illegitimate as an academic endeavor. The grounds for 
radical criminology1s dismissal as religious prophecy had 
to do with what Klocars determined to be radical theory's 
"untrustworthiness" in comparing its conclusions to the act­
ual conditions of crime in extant socialist societies; its 
monotonous habit of attributing all manner of crime to the 
organization of capitalist society; its scholarly irrespon­
sibility in taking leaps of faith where the evidence suggests 
(at least to Klocars) a "liberally pragmatic" attitude to 
theory construction; the elevation of Marx to the status of 
sainthood; passionately moralizing from "moral grounds" far 
removed from extant social reality; having the audacity to 
attempt the conversion of academic "nonbelievers" who, being 
"disenchanted" are free from the realm of religious illusion.
The present author is inclined to agree with Klokar's 
criticism of radical criminology, especially since in Chapter 
IV above it was asserted that radical criminology is a heresy 
in relation to Marxist orthodoxy and that radical theory 
relies instead on secular anarchist formulations that incor­
porate an attitude that can best be described as religious 
and thus prophetic.
Toward a Positive Assessment of Radical Criminology's
Religious Dimension
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Here the objective is to offer, in contrast to 
Klocar's negative criticism, a positive and detailed exam­
ination of the religious facet of radical criminology from 
the standpoint of a political theology of Christian anarch­
ism. In marking out the terrain for such an examination 
the author is not unmindful of three difficulties; 1) the 
unpopular and minority status of religious thinking in secu­
lar institutions such as American academia, 2) the tendency 
of some theologians and religionists to proselytize such 
"nonbelievers" as Klocars, to the nonbelievers chagrin,
3) the like tendency of the religiously inclined to ration­
alize the professed atheism or agnoticism of revolutionary
theorists like say Marx or Bakunin, into the category of
3
"anonymous Christianity"; i.e., the athiest theorist was 
an unidentified or anonymous Christian after all. To diffi­
culties two and three the author will shy away from, not 
because of a lack of wanting to convert, but because that 
is not presently the purpose at hand.
Specifically what will be examined is the concretely 
religious facet of secular anarchism in radical criminological 
theory. The examination's purpose is to first explain how 
this religious facet originated and developed, mainly from 
heterodox Christian anarchist traditions, and then was trans­
formed almost in toto to the secular political theory of 
anarchism. Second, the examination will offer a sympathetic 
apology (e.g., defense) for the religious dimension in
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radical criminology. Third, the author will attempt to
uncover the religious dimension in conventional criminology
in order to lay the religio-philosophical ground for a
dialogue and possible reconciliation between radical and
conventional versions of criminology.
Lack of Historical and Theological Inquiry into 
the Nature of Christian Anarchism
Anarchist tendencies within Christianity have received
little attention from either religious historians or theolog- 
4
ians. Even left-political and liberationist theologians
in their reviews of historical Christianity have often left
anarchist ;tendencies undistinguished from other kinds of left
5
Christian radicalism. Understandingly most secular anarch­
ists, as atheists, were/are probably loathe to describe their 
theories as having been derived, in large measure, from theis- 
tic insights developed in the two thousand year history of 
Christian anarchism. Yet in their own secular religiousness 
secular anarchists have been the equals of Christian anarchists, 
such that one can only surmise that the ultimate separation 
of secular anarchism from Christian anarchism revolves around 
the question of: who will be God, humanity or the supernat­
ural Christian diety? Christian anarchism's historic strug­
gle with a more potent Christian orthodoxy may also have 
served to steer revolutionary social thinkers (concerned as 
these thinkers were/are with social issues that transcend 
in-house religious squabbles) away from a critical distinct­
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ion of the two variants of Christianity. Finally, for 
their part acknowledged nineteenth century Christian anarch­
ist theorists auch as Leo Tolstoy and the Americans William 
Ellery Channing, William Lloyd Garrison and Adin Ballou 
seem to have failed to properly assess historical church 
documents that were uniquely anarchist in nature.
The lack of historical and/or theological inquiry 
into the roots and subject matter of Christian anarchism has 
had the net effect of rupturing the intellectual continuity 
of a stream of anarchist thought that first emerged in the 
Sayings of Jesus and gospel of grace of New Testament apocal­
ypticism. From this starting point a left-wing Christian
frame of reference applied radical thinking to the Pauline 
6
Episteles; suffered untold persecution and martyrdom at the
hands of Roman power; appeared in the Patristic Age in the
7
anarchist polemics of Tertullian and Lactantius; became 
variously heterodox, monastic and grotesquely mystical (lump­
en gnosticism) under Constantianian inspired orthodox imper­
ialism; grew revolutionary as the anti-authoritarian heresy
9
of the "Free Spirit" in the twelfth century became a revol-
10
utionary schism in the Taborite anarcho-communism of 1419; 
struggled against the Lutheran Reformation’s new Protestant 
orthodoxy and the power of the German Princes, e.g., the
11
violence of Thomas Munster and nonviolence of other Anabaptists;
was instrumental in the founding of the "peace sects" (e.g.,
12
Quakers, Shakers, Mennonites, Bretheran and etc.) and was
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given an Enlightenment form that helped spark the French
Revolution by the priest Jean Meslier in his Testament
13
for oppressed French peasants.
The religious activities of the “peace sects" made 
significant contributions to the religious and civil liber­
tarian tradition in America. It was the efforts of Christian 
anarchists (along with those equal efforts of like minded
non-Christian radicals) that contributed to: the ending of 
14 15
slavery; the political emancipation of women; the non-
16 17
violent strategies of the labor and civil rights movements;
18
the recent anti-war movement; the present anti-nuclear 
19
struggle, and lastly the human rights struggle for the
abolition of prisons and freedom for political prisoners 
20
in America
It should be clear, that far from Klocar's negative 
criticism, religious prophecy has been all but an "illustion"; 
and if radical criminology has an anarchist derived religious 
dimension, that that dimension is not only a "leap of faith" 
but a way of actual existence as effective as any other way 
of being.
Historical and Thematic Overview of Christian Anarchism 
This section explores some major themes in the devel­
opment of Christian anarchism. Its purposes are to compare 
the anarchist tendencies in historical Christianity to the 
more orthodox expressions of that faith, and by such a compar­
ison attempt an assessment of how this heterodox form of
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Christianity may hold within itself an explanation for 
the presence of a religious dimension in radical criminol­
ogy. The reader is cautioned on two counts; first the 
present author will be exploring a tendency in leftist 
Christian radicalism which few religious historians or 
theologians have bothered to distinguish as anarchism; 
second, as the exploration develops no claim is being made 
that anarchist Christianity is "authentic" in relation to 
orthodoxy, nor that anarchist Christianity has never been 
repressive, or always been separated out from orthodox 
Christianity.
The authoritative sources of support for the argu­
ment of this section are varied but consists of information 
culled from the recent works of declared Christian-Marxist 
theologians, New Left theologians, Jewish and Pan-Africanist 
theologians and philologists, feminist theologians, church 
and occult historians, a Jewish anthropologist, and works 
on the history of pacifism and non-violence.
Some of the themes of Christian anarchism, those 
which have in one way or another informed generation after 
generation of left-wing Christians, may have originated in 
the sayings of Jesus or. the New Testament period and are 
as follows:
I . Ethical Radicalism and Charismatic 
Itinerancy:21
This theme is manifested in "ethos of
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homelessness” in the call to disciple-ship 
(praxis); the breakup of family relationships 
by the abolition of the family; criticism of 
wealth and denunciation of private property hol­
ding . The charismatic itineracy of early follo­
wers of Jesus emerged from their socio-economic 
condition of poverty and their eschatological 
expectation that the end was near. Thus only 
itinerate preaching about the coming end held 
determinative importance in relation to fixed 
locations, family and property.
• Lumpen Religion of Liberation to the 
Oppressed Masses:
This theme is repeatedly emphasized in
Jesus' affirmation of the alienated, poor, infirm,
prisoners and the generally oppressed in "their
22
acceptability before God.” For these lumpen
elements at the bottom of Palestinian society
"the good news” was the news that their liberation
from socio-economic, political and spiritual
oppression was at hand. On the other hand to
the rich the good news was that cataclysmic
23
"economic reversal" was coming and that spirit­
ual preparation for such a reversal meant a renun­
ciation of property and/or of sharing wealth with 
the rejected masses in society.
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III. Non-Violent Praxis:
Pacifism, an abhorrence of coercion,
and non-violence as the methods of dealing with
human evil, (I.e., oppressive political power and
social force*), were most often given preference
24
over revolutionary violence , although revolution­
ary violence was frequently justified in later 
eras. Martyrdom and other forms of invited repres­
sion and suffering were early exalted as the epitomy
25
of social action against evil (e.g., a sort of 
reversed "propaganda by the deed" where the will 
to martyrdom often evoked a comparative will to 
violence on the part of oppressors).
IV. Faith in God's Judgement over Existing 
Systems of Punitive Justice:
Closely allied with the prevalence of non­
violence as the ground for social praxis was the
26
understanding that "Divine methods of justice"
are to be practiced by the diety not humanity.
Social oppression is to be overcome with acts of
love and goodness even towards one's enemies. This
did not mean cooperation with or support of social
evil; it meant to struggle passionately against
evils in the hope of establishing love of others
rather than power over others as the operative prin-
2 7
ciple in human intercourse. It meant that God
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reserves the right to punish for crimes against 
humanity, not Christians, and especially not 
Christians attached to existing systems of pun­
itive justice. The kind of love advocated was
agape or self-sacrificial and hopefully rederapt- 
28
ive love.
V. Conception of Law, State Coercion and 
Natural Rights:
Because primitive Christian eschatology
interpreted social praxis in terms of the coming
climax of history and because of the social marg-
inality and alienation of the great masses to
which primitive Christianity was especially aimed
at, the legal claims of Caesar (e.g., the state)
were originally considered at most secondary to
the claims of God. That is in the final analysis
God must be obeyed rather than man-made positive 
29
law. Such obediance was grounded in the primitive
Christian concern for the freedom of religious con-
30
science, both as a ''human and natural right" and
as obligated by a deity which promised end-of-history
justice. Freedom from legal coercion was desirable
in order for the congregant to be free to worship
and live the Way; "liberty was a condition for
31
access to and practice of religious truth." All 
attempts at reconciliation through religious agen-
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cies were required before one had a ground for
32
recourse to the state.
Thus an absolute rejection of positive
law and the state did not emerge. The Sayings
of Jesus did recognize legal processes as strictly
a last resort but not in matters uniquely spir- 
33
itual. Some institutional presence was admitted 
as having validity. It is against this non-absol­
utist understanding that the Pauline apology for 
civil government, subjection to higher powers 
and etc., must be reckoned with. Of course, Paul 
may have had a conception of law much more exten­
sive than that which emerged from the Sayings of 
Jesus. Radical theologian Jose Miranda suggested 
that "by law Paul understands not only the whole 
of law as law but also law as the normative quin­
tessence of the entire cultural and social struc­
ture which we call human civilization and Paul
34
calls aion or kosmos" . Accordingly, Paul divided
history into two parts: the old age of law and
the new (Christian) age of faith, and thereby,
Paul wants a world without law Las the 
case in a clear anarchist view: minej.
Exegesis which avoids this fact makes an 
understanding of the Pauline message impos­
sible. Neither Kropotkin nor Bakunin nor 
Marx nor Engels made assertions against 
the law more powerful and subversive than 
those which Paul makes. 35
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V I . Apocalyptic Eschatology:
Here feminist theologian Rosemary Ruether 
offers a definition of eschatology to which this 
author assents as that radicalism closely corres­
ponding to the Sayings Tradition:
The apocalyptic view of redemption is 
basically social and outer-directed. One does 
not look inward to the salvation of some per­
sonal essence; one looks outwards at history 
and society, at injustice, oppression...It is 
historical realm that is to be grappled with 
and radically reversed... Salvation can only 
come when the present situation is totally 
overthrown and a new order is founded on oppo­
site principles of life...There must be a great 
cosmic showdown between God and the powers and 
principalities of "this world", an overthrow 
once and for all and the creation of a new order 
in which God's justice and righteousness will 
be vindicated and prevail. 36
One would only add that social struggle 
in a non-violent fashion is implicit in this view, 
thus social and personal withdrawal and escape from 
changing the world is ruled out here.
VII. Utopian Withdrawal and the Possibility 
of a New Order in the Mowl
Left-wing Christianity, when it began to 
realize that the revolutionary overthrow of the exis­
ting order may have had a heavenly postponement, 
turned inward toward metaphysical rather than hist­
orical redemption. It did this by withdrawing from 
active social struggle and repaired to the deserts 
to build ideal communal alternatives to the evils
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37
manifested in "fallen and antidivine" social
and political structures. Obviously, this was
done in actuality after the Sayings Tradition
but it may have been influenced by Qumran or Essenic 
38
communism and/or the acts of Old Testament prophets
like Elijah (e.g., back to the Sinai desert, the source
39
of Israel’s faith). Material denial and a pro­
found mysticism were characteristic traits of this 
kind of inward Christian radicalism. In brief,
then anarchist Christian withdraw was "counter- 
40
cultural" and, though a negation of the existing
social order, was instrumental in offering out
ideal models of how faith could be immediately
lived if faith was left to its own devices out
of the range of normal social control.
VIII. Antinomianism Relative to Authority, 
and Equality
The Pauline division of history into 
law superceeded by faith in God's justice and/or 
gift of grace provided left-wing Christianity with 
the awareness that law, of whatever variety, is of 
no use or obligation because grace is the only nec­
essary condition for salvation from evil. Such 
an awareness is properly termed antinomianism and 
makes reference to an inward experience of truth, 
communicated directly by spirit; thus experiences
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of truth mediated by agents like priests or
clerics was considered unnecessary and were thus
41
an obstacle in truth’s way. Salvation was by 
faith alone. Outward acts were neutral for sal­
vation purposes, because grace was free and uncon­
ditional. Therefore the antinomian position per­
ceived "that law and salvation have nothing in
42
common; the law condemns but the gospel saves."
The antinomian position is "a romantic
43
view of Christian life" in contrast to an ortho­
dox Christian realism that theoretically posits 
a dialectic between law and faith but ends up 
by practically subjecting faith to the sovereignty 
of law, in the process cancelling the dialectic. 
Ideally antinomianism attached itself to no such 
dialectic but remained absolute, being free to 
pursue faith wherever it lead. Often faith, but 
not necessarily praxis, lead antinomianism to the 
following:
A. Antiauthoritarianism
Though there is no necessary cause-effect 
relationship that makes Christian anarchism’s gos­
pel of grace alone an enemy of authority, the notions 
of antinomianism and antiauthoritarianism do seem 
(to this author) to be related throughout left-wing 
Christian history. It may be that direct illumin-
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ation by the spirit can be positively associated
with "a challenging of the final revelation through
Christ, at least as this had become monopolized
44
by the institutional [orthodox: mine; Church/'
Christian orthodoxy, dogma and hierarchy were
attacked as new legalisms which were obstacles
in the path of the reception of free grace.
This anarchist challenging of orthodox
authority in spiritual matters did lead to early
schisms such as the heresy of Montanism, in which
the illumined Montanus thought himself the incarnate
45
"Spirit of Truth" revealed in the Fourth Gospel.
One probably result of the Montanist heresy was
that orthodoxy, around A.D. 150, moved to deprive
the Christian apocalypses of canonical authority,
except for the Book of Revelation and that only
46
because of a mistake as to who its author was. 
Christian left-wing history from the primitive 
era— ---up through the Patristic Age, Medieval 
Era, the Reformation, Enlightenment, right up to 
and including the Puritan seige of America (e.g., 
the antinomian heresy, 1636-1638, that pitted the 
libertine Anne Hutchinson against the orthodox
legalist John Cotton)------ exhibits heterodox
movements that prominently featured a struggle 
against not only the authority of Christian ortho-
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doxy but also that of the state and its laws.
B. Egalitarianism:
47
The Sayings of Jesus and Greek Stoicism 
coupled with the gospel of free grace lent left- 
wing Christianity its ’’class reading” of the 
message for the new age. Grace was for the dis­
possessed many, not merely a propertied few. Grace 
was for all who hungered and thirsted for knowledge; 
thus wealth and social class often acted to keep 
such an appetite from developing. Hence, Christian 
anarchism initially developed an attention to the 
libertarian aspirations of the powerless classes, 
although ruling classes were invited to come join
and reverse themselves economically by being spir-
48
itually reborn. Comparatively the "interclass- 
49
ism” that serves as a theoretical principle of
orthodoxy has often practically identified itself
with the wealth, power and appetite of ruling
classes. Especially since the merger of church
and state power under Constantine, orthodoxy (even
in the more modern period of disestablishment) has
remained closely allied with the ruling elements 
50
in society. In contrast, radical religious egal­
itarianism, premised on a pre-existent perfect 
State of Nature mythology, is well illustrated 
below in a sermon delivered during the English
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Peasant Revolt of 1381:
And if we are all descended from...Adam 
and Eve, how can the lords say or prove 
that they are more lords than we are - save 
that they make us dig and till the ground 
so that they can squander what we produce? 
...They have beautiful residences and manors, 
while we have the trouble and the work, 
always in the fields under rain and snow.
But it is from us and our labor that everything 
comes with which they maintain their pomp.
Good folk, things cannot go well in 
England nor ever shall until all things are 
in common and their is neither villain nor 
noble, but all of us are of one condition.?*-
IX. Anti-Semitism, Orthodox Imperialism 
and Heterodox Libertarianism
Orthodox Christian doctrine promulgated 
by the Church Universal and subsequently reaffirmed 
by various Protestant movements has, since the 
Constantinian establishment of the state church 
in been mainly intolerable toward religious differ­
ences both externally and internally.
As to external intolerance, Christian
anti-Semitism did not begin in New Testament period
52
as is often assumed. On the contrary, primitive
Christianity was an apocalyptic and unorthodox
Judiac sect composed initially of Palestinian Jews
53
known as Nazarenes. As a Jewish sect early Christianity 
enjoyed the privileges and obligations of Jewish law. 
Jewish law during this early period made no distinc­
tion between religious, social or political rights
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and obligations. Relationships among the 
Nazarenes and other Jewish sects were on balance 
quite amiable until, according to Jewish hist­
orian Solomon Grayzel, three developments hap­
pened that may have been instrumental in the 
later emergence of Christian anti-Semitism: 1) 
Hellenist Jews from diaspora began to outnumber 
Palestinian Jews as adherents to the Nazarene 
understanding of Judiasm, 2) Hellenist Jews being 
for the most part more financially secure, urban 
and more educated than their Palestinian counter­
parts behaved arrogantly and insulting with respect 
to Temple custom and ritual and were viciously 
forced out of Jerusalem by orthodox elements within 
the Temple leadership; one notes here the tradition 
of Stephen and his stoning, 3) Paul, himself a 
Hellenist Jew, advocated an extremely extended 
view of the Nazarene understanding of Judiasm, 
wherein Palestinian Jews were to observe Judiac 
laws plus Nazarene-Christian ideals and where, in 
contrast, non-Palestinian Jews (now deprived of 
the legal right to Temple relations) were only
to observe Nazarene-Christian ideals such as bapt-
55
ism, love of one another and etc.
This Pauline bifurcation of the Jewish 
Christians was, upon a positive interpretation,
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not anti-Palestinian Christian Jewry, although
his criticisms and ideological struggles with
orthodox Judiasm may be classified as an excellent
example of the tradition of rabbinic criticism
56
and imaginative exegesis. The bifurcation was
pro-Palestinian Christian Jewry because Paul used
money and supplies secured from upper-class Hellenist
Jewish-Christians to organize a "poverty program"
57
for Jewish-Christians in Palestine. The bifur­
cation was positively strategic also in the sense 
that the Christian freedom from Jewish law enjoyed 
by Hellenist Jews was parlayed into an inticement 
that could attract pagans who admired Judiasm but 
were loathe to observe strict Jewish law.
Probably against the original intent of 
the Pauline bifurcation, the vast increase of 
pagan-Christians brought on a movement toward 
an outright Christian heresy in relation to ortho­
dox Judiansm that culminated in an event which
pressed the "exclusion of all Christians from Jewish
58
life in general." The event was the Bar Kochba 
Revolt in the period AD 132-135. Jewish-Christians 
conspired with Roman power in crushing the revol­
ution and the banning of all Christians was the 
’result. However, from the early days of primitive 
Christianity up to this schismatic event Christian
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idealism had been primarily informed by two diver­
gent streams of consciousness. First Jewish Wisdom-
59
based morality and an apocalypticism not radi­
cally different from the morality and apocalypti­
cism of other sects of Judiasm. Secondly, Greek 
Stoicism, Neo-Platonist rationalism and Gnostic 
mysticism, all three of these Hellenist thought 
patterns being radically distinct from Palestinian 
Jewish mentality (though Hellenist Jews obviously
incorporated both, as the Sybilline Books revealed
60
this may be due to the influence of Philo). The 
class and political basis of both streams of con­
sciousness were respectively lumpen-revolutionary,
61
and bourgiosie/status-quo; although in subsequent 
Christian history the streams tended to merge and 
part again in an uneven and erratic manner. By 
the time of Constantine a profoundly Hellenist 
Christianity had emerged as the orthodoxy in com­
parison to a Jewish derived apocalyptism, and in 
its official imperial establishment became that 
orthodox Church Universal among whose first official 
acts was to initiate a deliberate policy of anti- 
Semitism, i.e., "everything possible was to be




Moreover, Hellenist Christian imperial­
ism, having already deprived apoclyptic writing 
of its canonical authority (A.D. 150), now moved 
beyond its policy of anti-Semitism toward orthodox 
Judiasm and consolidated its position against a 
still formidable Judiac-Christian apocalyptism.
In this struggle of a relatively poor and apocaly- 
pitic "Church of Martyrs" against a wealthy and 
rationalist "Church of Bishops" the apocalyptic 
stream became heterodx/dissenting and struggled 
for left-wing religious libertarianism in a relig­
ious environment soon to be almost completely 
imprisoned by right-wing orthodoxy. The left-wing 
stream, was allowed to continue but in a signifi­
cantly different form and was even elevated as the
63
"highest of Christian goals" (outside the goals 
of real power, wealth and status). The new form 
for left-wing radicalism was medieval monasticism 
and ascetisism as the prophetic way of life; it was 
in this form that prophetic Christianity would bas­
ically remain until the "newly awakened" mass con­
sciousness of the eleventh century began gathering 
to here the gospel of grace from itinerant lay
64
preachers rather than officially authorized priests. 
The first grand result of the new lay consciousness 
was the series of left-wing Anabaptist Revolts and
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only later the more orthodox Lutheran Reformation,
from there the m o d e m  formal diversity of Christianity
65
became a reality.
X. Sexism and Christian Cosmological Dualism
The Sayings of Jesus and "Peter and Paul
taught, in a mutually complimentary way that all
Christians together, each according to the grace
he or she has received is responsible for building
66
up the church." The Sayings Tradition illustrate 
that Jesus* attitude toward women was one where he 
put into praxis a gospel of grace that was pro­
female equality and anti-male domination, while 
it exalted the essential humanity of all. Jesus
as an unorthodox rabbi taught against the female 
62
blood taboo; held conversations with Palestinian
68
and even hated foreign women; called for female
69
students or disciple-ship; rejected the Pharisitic
70
view of women as "evil sexual creatures"; demon­
strated the intellectual capacity of women by teaching 
them religious truth, social philsophy and Torah 
(law); respected women*s humanity and faculty 
for grace by singling them out for public praise 
and social deferrence while reproaching orthodox 
Jewish leaders for not following suit; and lastly




Thus the Sayings and social praxis of
Jesus broke with orthodox Jewish views that were
paternalistic and pro-female subordination. In
a critical review of such orthodox Jewish views,
covering the Torah, Mishnah and Talmud, Jewish
feminist theologian Judith Hauptman presented the
following daily rabbinic prayer as a summation of
orthodox Jewish paternalism:*' Blessed be God, King
73
of the universe, for not making me a woman."
On the other hand Jesus* teaching on the divine 
liberation of women, via the gospel of grace, may 
hark back to an ancient stream of popular Israelite 
religion, one that Jewish anthropologist Raphael 
Patai associates with lumpen class Judiasm*s hist­
oric (prior to Jesus) "undercurrent of female 
divinity answering the need for mother, lover,
74
queen; intercessor even for a divine family.*'
God in the popular Israelite mind was often thought
of as woman and was manifested in such Hebrew
she-Gods as Asherah, Astarte, the Ivory Cherubims,
Skekhina, Lilith and "wisdom personified as a fem- 
75
inine being".
Paul employed a tri-level approach to the 
"woman question." First he continued the orthodox 
rabbinical attitude toward women, although he tem­
pered it with the apocalyptic gospel of grace for
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both sexes on an equal basis. Second, as a skilled 
organizer and because of his concern for the sur­
vivability of the new faith, he advocated the kind 
of church structure that would be most compatible
with traditional patriarchic social attitudes about
76
woman's proper sphere in relation to man. Third, 
his probable familiarity with the works of the 
Jewish Neo-Platonist Philo, coupled with an edu­
cation gained in Hellenist diaspora gives his view 
of woman an abstractness which borders on the dic­
tum of women having "equality in the abstract 
77
only", i.e., in Christ "there is neither male 
78
nor female." The question Paul failed to ade­
quately answer was: what about the concrete rather 
than spiritual inequality of females? It is those 
objectionable passages against women in either the 
deutero-Pauline or authentic Pauline writings that 
have been used for two-thousand years to subject
women to an unequal role both within the Christian
79
and non-Christian communities.
Late first century Christian gnosticism 
(from the Greek gnosis meaning knowledge) rein­
forced and radically extended the dualism already 
present in Paul's thinking with respect to the 
spiritual equality of women on one hand, and the 
concrete social subordination of women on the other.
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In gnostic cosmology man was viewed as a fully
“rational spirit'* whereas woman was a sensual
creature, dependent upon man for leadership in
all matters pertaining to the development of gno- 
80
sis. To become fully spiritual women must become
81
transformed into men, thus redemption for women 
came to mean a denial of their bodily forms and 
natural sexual functions. In an extensive analysis 
of the effects of Christian gnosticism on male 
and female spiritual symbolism Reuther has explained 
that in Christian gnosticism,
The male alone was made in the image of 
God, modeled in his inward being after the 
intellectual Logos or mind of God (which was 
also the theological identity of Christ).
The female was said to lack this full image 
of God in herself, and to possess it only 
when taken together with the male “who is 
her head"...women were seen, literally as 
“sexual objects," either to be used instru- 
mentally, as a “baby making body" or else 
to be shunned as the incarnation of tempting, 
debasing “sensuality." 82
This Christian gnostic soul-body, ration-
ality-sensuality, spirit matter and male-female
dualism came to be the "moral, epistemological and 
83
ontological" basis of subsequent orthodox Christianity 
The first term in the dualistic equation was often 
symbolic of superiority, i.e., male over female 
or spirit over matter. Further the first term 
in the equation almost invariably made reference
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to a freedom from or overcoming of that which 
restricts, i.e., rational males should be free 
from female irrationality, just as much as spirit 
has always strived to free itself from matter's 
imprisonment. Lastly, this Christian gnostic dual­
ism, given positive reinforcement by Cartesian 
epistemology, presently seems to reappear as 
the dicotomous and unequal existence of religion 
in relation to science in modern culture. That 
is, as the feminine principle, religion (or its 
equivalencies: faith, moral sentiment, romanticism, 
utopianism, politics, subjectivity and irrational­
ity) is subordinated to the masculine principle 
of science (or its equivalencies: experimental
datum positive law, pragmatism, realism, value-
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neutrality, objectivity and rationality).
In Anglo-America history the drive to 
overcome a dualistic Christian orthodoxy with 
respect to women received its greatest initial 
thrust in the feminist works of left-wing religious 
sectarians like the Englishwoman Mary Wollstonecraft 
Godwin (wife of William Godwin, the founder of 
secular anarchism and himself an ex-Calvinist min­
ister) , Sarah and Angelina Grimke both Quakers, 
Lucretia Mott a Quaker and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
author of the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments
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(1848) and the first Woman's Bible, the Quaker 
feminist leader Susan B. Anthony and finally, the
85
black Baptist feminist-abolitionist Sojourner Truth.
XI. Racism and the Institution of Slavery
In the early acts of primitive Christianity,
Phillip's baptism of the black ambassador from
Ethiopia illustrated that the gospel of grace was
to transcend racial divisions and that grace was
a gift that could be enjoyed equally by all. Either
Matthew,Thomas or Frumentius carried the gospel
to Axum (Ethiopia) and established Christianity 
86
there. Paul carried the gospel to Europe and
his thought that "there cannot be Greek and Jew,
circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian,
*87
slave, freeman, but in Christ is all, and in all 
conveyed the same message that grace, at least 
theoretically, was trans-racial. According to 
classical philologist Frank M. Snowden, Jr., an 
Ethiopian-Scythian formula informed Greco-Roman 
thought on the "race question" and the essential 
unity of mankind, such that Paul and other early 
Christian thinkers were familiar with the poetical
88
works of the Greek Menander and the Roman Simylus.
On the surface, the Ethiopian-Scythian 
formula of racial equality was not strictly a doct­
rine of white racial superiority, for it did focus
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classical Christian color symbolism in a direction 
toward spiritual equality for all. However, as 
was the case with the woman question, classical 
Christian color symbolism moved, in. a direction, toward 
spiritual equality for all. However, as was the 
case with the woman question, classical Christianity 
employed a dualistic cosmology on questions of 
race: ultimately whiteness was good and blackness 
bad, thus blackness must be overcome by a trans­
formation to spiritual purity or whiteness. Black­
ness as a disease or handicap that Christianity 
could alleviate came to be a paternalistic and 
subtle way of maintaining racist attitudes in early 
church practice. For example, one early tradition
has it that ’’Thomas through baptism whitens 
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Ethiopians.” For their part the church Fathers
interpreted ”sin as blackness that must be washed
90
away” (Jerome) ; ’’Christ came into the world to
91
make blacks radiantly white” (Gregory) . Perhaps 
Origen's comments on Solomon’s "black but comely** 
concubine will better highlight the confused rac­
ial paternalism of the early church:
Moreover we ask in what way is she black 
and in what way fair without whiteness. She 
has repented of her sins; conversion has 
bestowed beauty upon her head and hence she 
is sung beautiful. But because she is not 
yet cleansed of all the uncleannes of her
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sins nor washed unto salvation. She is said 
to be black but she does not remain in her 
black color she becomes white...if, more­
over, you do not repent take heed lest your 
soul be called MblackM and disgraceful and
lest you be stained by a double foulness----
"black" on account of your past sins; dis­
graceful because you continue the same 
faults. 91
The institution of slavery must be under­
stood against the background of social customs in 
antiquity. Orthodox Judiasm had affirmed human 
bondage although the Israelites themselves had first 
emerged as God’s chosen people or liberated slaves 
from Egyptian domination. Under the Torah Jewish 
slaves held by Jewish masters could not become 
permanent slaves, but were to be freed upon payment 
of the debt for which he or she was sold; in the 
seventh year of Jubilee all Jewish slaves were to
be freed irregardless of the debt repayment sched- 
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ule. Non-Jewish slaves held by Jewish masters
did not come under Torah except that they like
94
Jewish slaves were to be treated kindly; thus 
the liberation of non-Jewish slaves was dependent 
upon the master’s will and moral sensitivity.
Grecian justification of and practice of slavery 
is well known and receives excellent appraisal in 
Plato's Laws and Aristotle's second book of Politics 
and in his Nicomachaen Ethics; while, slavery in 
the Roman Republic and Empire was regarded as an
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’’economic necessity" by the Roman ruling classes.
In comparison to orthodox Judiasm and 
Greco-Roman thought, the Saying, of Jesus, in espec­
ially his call for "the release of captives" (Luke 
4:18 RSV) was a radical departure from the laws and 
conventional thinking of his time. Yet neither Jesus
"nor any of the apostles directly attacked the insti-
96
tution of slavery as such." If the teaching of
Jesus on the release of captives, like those on women,
had been maintained the very roots of racism and
97
slavery would have been "decisively undercut."
As it was later generations of orthodox Christians
hardly felt obliged to denounce the institution
of slavery. It was not until the emergence of New
World slavery in the Americas that anti-slavery as
a politico-religious program emerged in the works
and activity of the thirteenth century Franciscan
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Bartolome de Las Casas. In North American left-
wing Christianity, though theoretically opposed
to slavery on grounds that human property holding
was a form of violence, actually practiced slave-
holding until a group of Pennsylvania "Mennonites
who had become Quakers "addressed a protest against
99
slavery to the London Yearly Meeting in 1688.
After this address some of the Friends began to 
advocate that slavery was not only a form of violence,
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but "wrong in itself as an abrogation of human 
100
rights," and by 1780 no Quakers in the United 
States held slaves. It was left-wing Christianity 
in the United States that played a primary role 
in setting up such early secular abolitionist 
organizations as the New England Non-Resistance 
Society (1838) and the League of Universal Brother­
hood (1846) . It was also the anti-slavery activ­
ities of such radical leaders as the Christian 
anarchists Adin Ballou, William Lloyd Garrison 
and the early Fredrick Douglass that helped cause
the great denominational splits over slavery
101
issue just prior to the Civil War.
The Political Reality of Christian Anarchism 
From the above historical and thematic discussion 
of Christian anarchism exploration should now move toward an 
explanation of the political reality of Christian anarchism.
In pursuing such an explanation some of the insights of polit­
ical theology will be employed. The reasons for using the 
approach of political theology are: 1) if left unorganized
the mass of information about the historic anarchist ten­
dencies in Christianity would remain on the level of relig­
ious discourse without apparent relation to the "concrete" 
world of anarchist experience, 2) for the purpose of an illus­
tration of the relationship between Christian anarchism arid
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and the religious dimension of radical American criminology 
(i.e., between anarchist religion and anarchist criminology 
respectively), one would do best to use the mediating agency 
of politics. That is, anarchist/theist Christianity shares 
a common radical political environment with a secular and 
anarchist/atheist criminology. Specifically both share a 
radical environment with respect to the essential unity of 
humanity, criticism of the State, law, and punishment, an 
elevation of oppressed segments of society, criticism of 
the existing social order and the transformation of society 
by way of a libertarian revolution. In short, both points 
of view spring from basically the same ideological terrain 
with regard to the existing social order and both are con­
cerned with the theoretical pre-conditions for the existence 
of a "new heavens (anarchist religion) and new earth) 
(anarchist religion and anarchist criminology).
I . What is a Political Theology of Anarchism?
First the question as to the meaning of 
the term political theology must be dealt with.
Recent usage of the term in New Left religious 
thinking refers to a hermeneutic conception or 
understanding of the unity of "kerygma and praxis", 
(e.g., in non-theological terms theory and practice), 
where the gospel of grace is understood as a spir­
itual and political message of salvation. As such 
it is not to be confused with traditional and
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orthodox theologies which have normally been
employed to defend existing political and social
orders. For example, Clement of Alexandria's
convenient defense of wealth and property in his
102
second century The Rich Han's Salvation is not 
political theology in the sense of left theologi­
cal thinking. Nor should political theology be
103
confused with Luther's "two kingdoms" theory 
(derived from Augustine) that radically split the 
temporal and spiritual dimensions of social exist­
ence and ended in a dualistic theological justifi­
cation of German Princes in their programs against 
104
Jews and heretical Christians. Nor is political
theology the all too typical theologies of glory,
triumphalism or religious imperialism based on
theological "delusions of grandeur" in a world
already full of theological and non-religious ideol-
105
ogical delusions.
Moreover, in agreement with libertarian 
socialist theologian Dorothee Soelle, "there are 
no specifically Christian solutions to world prob­
lems for which a political theology would have to
106
develop the theory." Thus as Soelle continues, 
"political does not mean that theology should now
107
exchange its content for that of political science."
Positively, New Left theological thinking
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in reference to political theology is about 
the rescue of "kerygma and praxis" from the 
private and individual interior world that ortho­
dox Christianity has constructed over the centur- 
108
ies. Primitive Christianity advocated a gospel
of grace that was "deprivitized"; became public
through the charismatic apocalyptism of itinerate
preachers; and was made political in its habit of
taking-sides with the oppressed lumpen elements in
society over and against the oppressiveness of bour
109
giosie elements. In this sense the gospel of
grace was a political gospel first directed toward 
the wholistic liberation of the oppressed masses 
(i.e., spiritual and political liberation). Yet 
simultaneously, and on par with lumpen liberation, 
the gospel of grace via its ideal of human recon­
ciliation with other humans, and only then with
God, directed itself toward the ultimate liberation 
110
of all. For ultimately all were viewed as oppres­
sed and alienated in terms of being estranged from 
an authentic personhood and God. Strategically, 
the liberation of the "least of these" pointed
the way toward the salvation of the great, if the
111
great would become as "suffering servants" and 
reverse themselves in normal economic and political 
terms. Hence, the gospel of grace had a class
269
basis but was simultaneously a gospel which 
ultimately aimed at the transcendence of class 
(not unlike Marxism and secular anarchism which 
claims the same transcendence for communism).
Here one is not unmindful of the differ­
ences between current European or Western polit­
ical theologies which although radical are not 
thoroughly grounded in a lumpen class theological
analysis as are some liberation theologies of
112
the Third World.
The present author opts for a middle 
ground in this intrafamily theological argument. 
That is, a dialectic must be maintained between 
the vision of the liberation of all and the lib­
eration of the many of the lumpen class. To 
fail to maintain such a dialectic ends in a certain 
paranoia about who is evil and who is perfect; a 
self-righteousness that re-enslaves rather than 
liberates critical consciousness. As Reuther 
notes in this regard "liberation, ...cannot be 
divorced from a sense of self-judgement and an
identification with the community which is jud- 
113
ged." Those who are oppressed cannot seek to 
overcome their oppression by oppressing others, 
or as Reuther put it, "one cannot dehumanize 
the oppressors without ultimately dehumanizing
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oneself, and aborting the possibilities of the
liberation movement into an exchange of roles
114
of oppressor and oppressed.
II. Specifics of a Political Theology of 
Anarchism
The following four points are an explan­
ation of what, in a pbsi'tlva political theology of 
anarchism would be about. It would be kind of left 
theological thinking that is:
A. Teleologically concerned with projecting 
the libertarian ideals of Christianity to 
horizons unlimited. Unlimited because the 
physical and immaterial reality of existence 
seem unlimited to human comprehension though 
at the same moment the limits to human con­
sciousness suggest a certain mystery that 
also cannot be comprehended. One believes, 
for example that black holes in space have 
a beyondness about them that is at once 
finite (the descriptive outline of the black 
hole itself) but unlimited once one under­
stands that beyond black holes may be more 
black holes. The same can be said of God; 
beyond God there lies God, but the human 
impression is that God acts upon the relig­
ious and thus finite consciousness. Accor-
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ding to Sir Julian Huxley, Father Teilhard*s
"point Omega" has at least had the effect
of making scientists, and theologians think
in teleological terms about the unity of
115
spirit and matter. Both have qualities
116
which often defies comprehension. A
political theology of anarchism is called 
to move in the direction of the unlimited 
even though finiteness shares in the deter­
mination of each evolutionary step. Quinney 
seconds this kind of thinking in his belief 
that "even with the eventual transition to 
communism the transformation of human nature 
and social order never ceases."
B. Theologically aware that even the judgement 
of God is a God, not a human act. The task 
of human activity, from an anarchist theol­
ogical viewpoint, is one of faith in the 
ability of agape to point the way toward 
that which is freedom and steer a course 
away from unfreedom. Reinhold Niebuhr, him­
self an advocate of neo-orthodoxy and a 
staunch opponent of anarcho-pacifism has 
insisted upon "the relevance of this ideal 
of love to the moral experience of mankind 
on every conceivable level...it is not
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magically superimposed upon life by a
revelation which has no relation to total
117
human experience."
Yet agape is an abnormal and puzzling kind 
of love if compared to the sensual dynamism 
of eros; it moves down instead of up. It 
finds the best in the least, wisdom in that 
which is foolish and power in the powerless. 
According to Max Scheler's scheme for the 
sociology of knowledge, agape has the char­
acter of enough not more, deficiency rather 
than sufficiency, suffering and denial, 
instead of power and plentitude. It reverses 
the order of things in such a puzzling man­
ner that the "nobler stoops to the vulgar, 
the healthy to the sick, rich to poor...
the good and saintly to the bad and common,
118
the Messiah to the sinners and publicans." 
Kropotkin's communistic notion of "mutual- 
aid" is a form of agape in the sense that 
this system departs from benevolence, altru­
ism and paternalism, but rather demanded a 
feeling of mutuality which would smooth out 
and repair social brokeness without resort 
to coercion.
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In its puzzling journey agape negates
"the official religion of the officially
119
optimistic society," just as much as 
it negates all kinds of realism. It is 
a theology of the cross that "lightens 
our darkness" by its abnormality.
C. Politically concerned with the unlimited
extension of human freedom while critically 
conscious of the finite social obstacles 
to such freedom. Christian anarchism would 
insist that social relations exhibit a lively 
movement toward freedom from domination and 
coercion in human affairs. The particular 
nomenclature of domination does not matter 
thus religious, intellectual, racial, sex­
ual, economic, scientific and political 
domination must be ruled out in favor of 
human freedom in practice.
Furthermore, since agape points the way 
toward freedom, the gospel of grace holds
that "if we aim at love we shall establish
120
justice by the way." Justice here is 
understood as a "by-product" of love in 
that justice depends on mutual confidence 
and cooperation. Retribution does not est-
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ablish justice, nor does a benevolent 
or paternalistic rehabilitation ideal.
One does not legally kill to establish 
justice, nor does one imprison another 
for the same purpose. Revolutions which 
seek to establish justice by brute force 
become reactionary and must take steps 
to maintain the power won by reliance upon 
further force. Another way of putting 
this is that the powerless in order to 
establish justice, must avoid becoming 
the powerful. It is the powerful who must 
reverse themselves via agape and become 
full of love rather than full of power if 
liberation is to become a reality.
Thus existing states and their criminal
justice apparatuses must be replaced with
the kind of libertarian social system that
121
incorporates a "will to justice" and
122
not a "will to power." To do this means
to employ the kinds of strategy which "resists 
evil" by resorting to love. It may be that 
Gandhi*s program of Satyagraha (clinging to 
truth) has validity after all. Satyagraha 
is the politics of moral suasion that invites
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suffering upon oneself the motive of 
which is to convert the opponent by making 
the opponent a friend. The program can 
take on a myriad of forms from direct 
non-violent resistance to a form of non­
cooperation which is geared to defeat an 
evil deed but not the good in the person 
who does such a dded, for the Satyagrahi
cooperates with the evil-doer in what 
123
is good.
D. Distinctively, a political theology of 
anarchism would be that kind of New Left 
theological thinking that would be preem­
inently concerned with questions of polit­
ical authority, domination, the State and 
its overthrow, law and social justice.
In contrast to Christian-Marxist theologies, 
Christian anarchism would not ground itself 
in a strict Marxian economic analysis of 
history which pits the oppressed working 
class against the oppressive capitalist 
class, although it could use a class anal­
ysis when that is appropriate. A "small 
is beautiful"^ Buddhist economics might 
be more appropriate especially in this age 
of plantary depletion of natural resources.
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Moreover, Christian anarchism would not 
relegate the woman*s question or the quest­
ion of minorities to some vague category 
of secondary importance. Again it would 
not view classes other than the lumpen prol­
etariat as evil; nor would it view the lumpen 
proletariat as dangerous or in fact evil 
with respect to the prospects for human 
liberation. Christian anarchism would not 
be about a normal struggle for power in 
order to use the power won in liberation 
struggles to destroy others. It would, 
lastly, reject the ideological pretensions
of other theologies while remaining critical
124
of its own alienated existence.
With the above insights in mind a political 
theology of anarchism would have little 
more that could be thought of as a unique 
contribution to such secular anarchist theor­
ies as anarcho-communism. Chapter IV de­
tailed out the differences in classical 
anarchist thought, here it is felt that 
Kropotkin*s anarcho-communism comes very 
close to Christian anarchism*s ideal of 
a libertarian revolution to be brought into
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being through mutuality and non-violence.
The next step is to ascertain how it was 
that the Christian libertarian ideal came 
to be secularized.
The Religious Reality of Secular Anarchism 
That secular anarchism has many of its antecedents 
in the centuries old libertarian ideal of Christianity is con­
sidered below. The consideration ought not be construed as 
assming a rigidly linear causality between Christian and 
secular anarchism. To assume such would be dishonest and deny 
contradictory evidence which suggests that the libertarian
ideal has been part of Western political philosophy and praxis
125
at least since Socrates as against Plato. The uniqueness
of the Christian contribution to libertarian thinking and 
praxis has been the left-wing Christian concern to reject pow­
er, domination, privilege and violence while advocating the 
liberty of humanity in individual and social terms. Grecian 
libertarian ideals were based on the primacy and privilege
of elite community elements over and against individual and
126
social anarchy.
The aim then is to interpret the libertarian ideal of 
Christianity as highly influential though not necessary deter­
minative, in the development of secular anarchist theory 
and practice.
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I . Secularization of the Libertarian 
Ideal of Christianity
Strictly put the secularization of 
Christian ideals, in the sense of a rejection of 
Christianity per se, but a reincorporation of val­
ued Christian ideals into religio-secular systems 
may have begun in the New Testament period. Indeed 
the movement of Christian heterodoxy has always 
come perilously close to a rejection of Christianity 
per se, though heterodoxy has always managed to 
retain its religiousness. Here secularization is 
taken to mean that antiecclesiastical process of
desacralization and dechristianization which was
127
begun in the Enlightenment. It was in this 
post-Christendom period of the eighteeenth century 
that left-wing radicalism rejected Christianity
128
per se and yet retained Christian apocalyptism. 
Atheism and rational humanism emerged as the secu­
lar equivalent to a now superceeded theism and 
irrational supernaturalism in secular left-wing 
thinking. Christian apocalypticism reappeared 
as a mystical faith in the imminent workings of 
the forces of history. The Kingdom of God was
transformed into the concretized doctrine of human
129
progress toward perfectability. The "inward 
journey" of Christian mysticism, acesticism and 
voluntary social isolationism returned in movements
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toward communalistic utopianism. Revolutionary 
activity lost its "otherworldly" character, while 
transferring heavenly spiritual goals to earthly 
"rational" objectives. Finally, the Christian ideal 
of liberty from political authority and domination 
was given new birth by the ex-Calvinist pastor Godwin 
and later given a formal secular name by Proudhon.
The reborn libertarian ideal of ancient Christianity 
was, in this author's estimation,secular anarchism.
One strain of secular anarchism, that of 
anarchists like Kropotkin and the later Emma Goldman 
(who as a result of visits with Tolstoy became con­
vinced that non-violence was the best methodology 
for revolution), elevated non-violence to an equal 
position with the revolutionary violence advocated 
by Bakunin and his disciples. At least this was 
the case with European anarchism. On the other 
hand, Anglo-American secular anarchism from the 
most part accepted Godwin's and Thoreau's views 
on the need for non-violence as the best revolu­
tionary strategy: Also in the American social
milieu secular anarchism was given a big send-off 
by the activities of pre-Civil War Christian anarch­
ists who were instrumental in organizing various 
secular peace, feminist, labor (I.W.W.) and aboli­
tionist associations.
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A clear evaluation of the above process 
of secularization suggests that secularism has
been the flip-side of orthodox Christianity. Sort 
of like Marx turning Hegel's heavenly system up­
side down or "right-side up". The secularist and 
athiest exist mainly in relation to the ecclesiastic 
(clergyman or woman) and theist. What is interes­
ting about that relation is that the religious ele­
ment has not vanished from left-radical secularity 
but merely taken on a character outside the domain 
of orthodox Christian reference. The religious 
element was secularized as the transcendent move­
ment of history (i.e., the spirit of historical 
progress). Mysteriously, history is inevitably 
calling humanity to move forward to a state of 
perfection. Reuther has even proposed that liberal 
and conservative secularism "gave rise to an ideol­
ogical viewpoint and ideological sciences that de-
i
nied the existence of a transcendent horizon of
life whereby the oppressive status-quo could be
130
judged and transcended." But though her suggest­
ion is well-intended it forgets that secular left- 
radicalism maintained that transcendent element 
and used it to prophetically criticize both religious 
and secular ideology. Moreover secular anarchism 
went one step farther than strict Marxist secularism 
and employed prophecy (judgement in its criticism of 
Marxist duplicity with regard to the question of 
human liberty.
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II. Left-Radicalism as Secularized Religious 
Activity
A. Marxism
As is well known Marx repudiated religion
on three major grounds. First following the Left-
Hegelian Ludwig Feurerbach he viewed the God thesis
as a fantastic mental projection of humanity alienated 
131
from itself. Second he ascertained religion
to be reactionary to the progress of proletarian
revolution. That is, religion was ’’the opium of
the people" a phenomena of false consciousness.
Third religion was a class tool employed by ruling
classes to check the advance of progressive forces.
Thus for Marx, "the criticism of religion is...the
132
premise of all criticism."
What is not well known is that Marx, Engels 
and latter Marxists such as Edward Bernstein, Karl 
Klausky and Ernest Bloch regarded Christian radical­
ism, as historically represented in the Anabaptist
and the Cromwellian (radical sectarisns) revolutions,
133
as esteemed "forerunners" of Marxism. It is inter­
esting that these Marxists would "appreciately" seek 
their origin in Christianity. So interesting that 
one is convinced that Marx's criticism of religion was 
directed at a Christian orthodoxy which in fact 
was. historically used as a class weapon in sup-
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port of the economic and political status-quo.
More importantly though orthodox in-
power Marxism as the flip-side of orthodox
Christianity has all the trappings necessary
for religious fulfillment; and although the
orthodox Marxist will not admit it "Marxism
is a creed to be clung to when the intellect
134
questions and rejects." Bertram Wolfe,
a leading left-liberal critic of orthodox Marxism
has isolated some of the cultic practices of
in-power Marxism; he writes:
It is a deeply emotional faith, with 
true believers, orthodoxy, dogma and its 
.inevitable show of heresy, dedication, 
confession, schism, anathema, ex-communi- 
cation, even imprisonment and execution 
and erasure of one's name, where the 
faith and the secular arm are one. 135
In discussing the religious essence of
Marxism philosopher Robert C. Tucker has isolated
six major structural characteristics of Marxist
theory that can be favorably related to 
136
Christianity: 1) the atheism of Marxist
theory signified "only a negation of the 
transmundane God" which was superceeded by 
humanity as "the supreme being", 2) Marxism's 
all-inclusive view of reality" that attempts 
to provide an answer for everything existing 
whether animate or inanimate, 3) its material-
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ist conception of history moves from primitive 
communism (paradise) lost to future communism 
(paradise) regained, and even has an apocalyptic 
"closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of 
human society", (i.e., judgement day brought 
on by the final revolution, 4) its concept of 
redemption of humanity through a program of 
revolutionary regeneration, 5) its unity of 
theory and practice, which calls for the believer 
to participate in a prophetic implementation 
of the faith. Faith divorced from works are 
dead to the Marxist system, 6) its moralistic 
zeal which demands "this worldly" punishment’ 
for social oppressors. To Tucker's inventory 
one should note that Marxism may have more 
affinity with Jewish apocalyptism and messian- 
ism that it does with Judiac-Christian apoca­
lyptism. The fatal difference being that 
Jewish apocalyptism as practiced by first 
century Zealots included hate for one's oppres­
sors and a will to power and violence that 
was contrary to the anarcho-pacifist element 
in New Testament Judiac-Christian apocalyptism.
B . Secular Anarchism
As has been asserted throughout this 
thesis anarchism is unorthodox in relation to
284
orthodox Marxism. It is left-communism when 
it identifies itself as Marxism and when 
orthodox Marxism criticizes it as such. When 
viewed as a secular religion it retains the 
same unorthodox and left position vis-a-vis 
Marxist orthodoxy. Thus the six structural 
points that Tucker used to criticize Marxism 
as religion may be applied in toto to anarchism. 
However, Wolfe's criticism's of in-power 
Marxism's cultic practices cannot be applied 
to anarchism for the simple fact that anarch­
ism or left-communism has yet to be institu­
tionalized, just as Christian anarchism has 
not been institutionalized. Further, the power 
hungry anarchism of the Bakuninist variety 
may, like in-power Marxism, be more influenced 
by Jewish apocalyptism and Grecian libertar­
ianism.
Peculiarly, anarchism by its nature 
must always remain a heresy with respect to 
religious domination or domination of any kind. 
It is this libertarian nature of anarchism that 
has given it the bad reputation it has had at 
least since the times of Jesus. The practice 
of anarchism seems so impractical and outland- 
ishly simplistic that it just does not seem
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to make sense to ears in need of elaborate 
analyses and minds geared to conquer the 
world. One is reminded here of a face to 
face criticism Lenin levelled at Kropotkin, 
upon Lenin's consolidation of power in the 
Soviet Union. Said Lenin, "you can't make a 
revolution wearing white gloves...we have made 
mistakes... But we have preferred to make mis­
takes and thus to act." Of Kropotkin's coop­
erative method of revolution. Lenin said,
"these are children's playthings, idle chatter, 
having no realist soil underneath, no force, 
no means..." Kropotkin's probably response
was that "the choice of such means perverts
137
and dooms the ends." Thus secular anarch­
ism as religion just may be that kind of rad­
ical religious talk "which can be understood 
138
by children," but not by hard-headed realists.
Religious Dimension of Radical Criminology 
The discussion following is divided into two parts. 
First American radical criminology's critique of the religious 
foundations of legal order will be interpreted as a religio-
secular attack on Christian orthodoxy's traditional support
of State power by virtue of its moralisms with regard to devi- 
ancy and criminality. Second the religious dimension of radi­
cal criminology will be interpreted as a criminological version
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of the left-wing "religion of humanity" and will be under­
stood as being in anarchist opposition to orthodox versions 
of precisely the same kind of religion of man, whether liberal 
or Marxist.
I . Orthodox Christian Foundations of 
American Legal Order
It is interesting that radical criminology's
criticism's of the Christian underpinnings of legal
order is directed against the orthodox Christian
habit of pressing for the State's application of
Old Testament morality and legalism to deviant and
criminal social conduct. For example, Quinney notes
that "our contemporary reaction to crime has been
139
shaped by the Puritan concept of crime." More­
over, Quinney asserts that from the beginning of 
the American experience
The legal authority of the state was relig­
iously supported. The implications for the 
further development of American law were that 
law (and government in general) existed to reg­
ulate imperfect man, that the welfare of the 
whole is more important than that of the indi­
vidual. For the Puritans crime was an act 
against God...The criminal, following Puritan 
theological doctrine, belonged to a category 
to oppose society. 140
Adding to Quinney's assessment, religious
historian George Lee Haskins has shown that most
provisions in the Puritan code were annotated by
141
chapter and verse from the Old Testament. Even
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English common law was based on Old Testament 
legality "because of the tendency of Protestant 
theologians to equate natural law with Mosaic law.*1 
Radical criminology's critical assessment 
of the American penal system is also directed 
against orthodox Christian notions of punishment. 
According to criminologist David J. Rothman 
Christian values contributed greatly to the "inven­
tion of the penitentiary" in America; an indigenous 
invention that has not drastically changed since 
the antebellum debate between advocates of the
Auburn (New York) and Pennsylvania models of penal
142
organization and discipline. The values of
"separation, obediance, and labor became the trin­
ity around which officials organized the peniten- 
143
tiary." If prisoners were to repent and be 
saved from their "evil ways", they must be exposed 
to a reborn monastic (reform) discipline that 
separated them from a sinful environment. The 
new penitentiary methodology was geared to save 
Christianity and the American republic from demonic 
human forces. Rothman quotes prison chaplain 
and advocate of the new penal methodology, the 
Reverend James B. Finley, who obviously felt that 
the question of penal organization was an issue 
of "the triumph of good over evil, of order over
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chaos,"
Could we all be put on prison fare, for 
the space of two or three generations, the 
world would ultimately be better for it.
Indeed should society change places with the 
prisoners, so far as habits are concerned, 
taking to itself the /Christian values/ regu­
larity, and temperance, and sobriety of a 
good prison... then the goals of peace, right 
and Christianity would be furthered...As it 
is taking this world and the next together... 
the prisoner has the advantage. 143
Thus radical criminology has understood 
the influential relation that orthodox Christianity 
has had on the development of American legal order. 
However, radical criminology has not, to date, become 
aware that just as much as Christian orthodoxy has 
supported legal order, unorthodox Christianity has 
traditionally set itself against legal order. 
Puritanism also incorporated the libertarian ideals 
of first religious toleration, then civil liberties 
and later the prison abolition movement, as the exam­
ple of Roger Williams and others well illustrate.
145
Williams held a rather limited anarchist view 
of legal order. He felt that Puritan magistrates 
’’had no right to enforce any of the first four com­
mandments"; moreover, his reading of the Bible, by 
"a dangerously metaphorical method of typology" 
enabled him to emphasize the New Testament gospel
146
of grace over the legalisms of the Old Testament.
It was the same "dangerously metaphorical"
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reading of the Bible that spawned Anne Hutchinson*s
Puritan heresy of insisting ’'upon the priority
of persoan conscience as something that super-
147
ceeds the law.” Such a reading led William
Lloyd Garrison to conclude in his Declaration of
Sentiments (1838) that,*we cannot sue any man at
law to compel him by force to restore anything
which he may have wrongfully taken from us or others;
but if he had seized our coat, we shall surrender
,,148
our cloak rather than subject him to punishment.
Again at the first (1870) meeting of the Congress 
of the American Prison Association, radical sect­
arian voices led by Judge Carter of Ohio protested 
that "any system of imprisonment or punishment was 
degradation, and could not reform a man"; these 
early prison abolitionists (in contrast to reformers)
wanted to "abolish all prison walls and release all
149
confined within them."
By analogy radical criminology's libertarian 
stance toward crime and punishment was not influenced 
by orthodox Christianity's support of American legal 
order. On the contrary, left-wing Christianity, 
beginning with William's and Hutchinson's heretical 
Puritanism, may have shaped radical criminology's 
contemporary concept of crime (ala Quinney, above).
If this holds up then radical theorizing about crime
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is a dechristianized secular restatement of unor­
thodox Christianity's historic rejection of legal 
order. Radical criminology as the criminological 
manifestation of the "religion of humanity" may 
then be interpreted as a left religio-secular crit­
ique of orthodox Christianity's influence on the 
development of American criminal law and penology.
II. The Radical Criminological Version of 
the Religion of Humanity
Unorthodox Marxist sociologist Alvin Gouldner 
in his massive The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology 
attacks the Christian "piety" of Parsonian funct­
ionalism and in so doing admitted quite openly that
150
Marxist sociology in America is "a religion of man."
He contrasted this religion of man with Talcott 
Parson’s structural-functionalism and concluded that 
Parsonian sociology, for several years the leading 
liberal brand of sociology, was pietistic "religion 
of society" that was conformist and supportive of 
the established social order. Admitting the "scien­
tific demerits" of Marxist sociology Gouldner lashed 
out in profound anger at liberal social thinkers 
"who profess to a respect for religion (but then) 
should act so triumphant when they uncover a relig­
ious side to Marxism."
R.adical criminology as a sub-field of soc-
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iology and in its guise as left-wing Marxism car­
ries a religious zeal for the liberation of humanity.
In its epistemology and cosmology there is "little
151
difference between human nature and the devine."
152
"God is man" to.quote Engels. In confirmation
of this fact Quinney in late article has held that
"our criminology ^radical type: mine;is a cultural
production. It is part of the structure that shares
the function of such productions as philosophy,
153
religion and art." To affirm the religious
character of his cultural criminology Quinney quotes 
the libertarian socialist theologian Paul Tillich 
who calls forth our "liberative memories" and wit­
nesses thus
The most intimate motions within the depths 
of our souls are not completely our own. For 
they belong also to our friends, to mankind, 
to the universe, and to the Ground of all 
being, the aim of our life. 154
It is a pity that Quinney did not continue
the line of thought he touched upon in his cultural
criminology. As it was he theorized that "art as
a way of seeing, feeling and perceiving is prophetic
155
in its form and content." If he would have
read Tillich a little farther he would have found 
that the theologian used aesthetics to give meaning 
to the idea of God as the Unconditional. Specific­
ally in art, the theologian found that, religion
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is the highest cultural value. It is religion 
even more so than art that sees, feels and per­
ceives in a prophetic way.
As a secular and academic system of proph­
ecy radical criminology must be expected to take 
uncertain "leaps of faith." S. K. Kierkegaard did 
and it resulted in a new and distinctively Protestant 
synthesis that was set in opposition to the estab­
lished Lutheran Church and the Christian state of 
157
his day. Given radical criminology’s all but
admitted religiousness, Klocar's criticism of it 
as academic prophecy is a redundant though potent 
way of gaining academic "brownie points" with his 
fellow "liberally pragmatic" criminologists. His 
criticism is a kind of intellectual posturing that 
attunes itself to a surface "discovery" of an issue 
that has been debated in academic departments of 
religion and philosophy at least since Ernest Bloch’s 
atheistic de-theology. Moreover, his negative crit­
icism of religion in sociology/criminology suggests 
that he is unconscious of the religious quality 
of conventional criminology, as will be shown in 
the next section of this thesis.
VJhat remains here is to remember (Chapter 
IV) that radical criminology as left Marxism is 
in anarchist opposition to all kinds of Marxist
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orthodoxy. Radical criminology may be thought 
of as the secular embodiment of the libertarian 
ideals of Christianity. Like anarchist Christianity 
in relation to Christian orthodoxy, radical crim­
inology goes orthodox Marxism one step further by 
faithfully following the spirit of that which was 
anarchist in Marx's thought. Also like anarchist 
Christianity in relation to orthodox theology, 
radical criminology is dead to the laws and dogmas 
of Marxist orthodoxy. Its religion of humanity 
has the prophetic potential to go beyond the repres­
sive categories of class struggle to the higher 
"ground of all being" (ala Tillich, above). Its 
next step just maybe a de-theology of criminology,
if Quinney's work on art and culture is a valid 
158
lead.
Sociological Criminology as the Liberal and 
Orthodox Religion of Humanity
The history of sociological criminology in America 
suggests that religious feeling and prophecy is not foreign 
to a liberal reading. Sociological criminology became "cen­
tered in the United States" in the first two decades of the
159
twentieth century. Social thinkers of the liberal stripe
were looking for the social causes of crime in an urbanized 
and industrialized America which had overcome its backwardness 
and "come of age." Radzinowicz felt that attempts to explain
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the social causation of crime mixed well with sociology
because sociology "accords with the fundamentally optimistic
American outlook on life in general, into which the thesis
that crime is a product of remedial social forces would fit
more naturally than insistence on the part played by endog-
160
enous forces." The upshot of this was that in the offic­
ially optimistic society crime had to be viewed as an individ­
ual problem that could be corrected by benevolent social 
forces, if properly investigated by method of sociology.
The doctrine of optimism, (i.e., the American soc­
ial experience was the best possible arrangement of human 
society) was triumphalistic but not complete because of the 
lingering existence of crime and other social evils. Lib­
eral social philosophy of the period provided the new social 
investigation of crime with a set of operative values such
as: "pragmatism, institutionalism, behaviorism, legal realism,
161
economic and historical determinism." Nor was the new
sociological criminology above social moralisra (social
homilectics) as one of its early academic advocates, C. R.
Henderson, made clear thusly, "in the new social science,
the investigation of evil brings us nearer to an understan-
162
ding of the good and helps us on the path upward."
Regressing somewhat to nineteenth century European 
sociology one finds the French father of liberal sociology, 
Auguste Comte, advocating in extremely zealous terms the 
positive religion of humanity as replacement for the waning
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moral authority of Christian orthodoxy. To Comte and his
followers sociology was such a positive religion and in
all respects, except the theistic-atheistic nexus, and was
163
the secular equivalent of Roman Catholicism. In discus­
sing the "normative doctrine" of Comte's sociology, Lewis A. 
Coser explains that Comte
...elaborated a complex blue print of the good 
positive society of the future, a society directed 
by the spiritual power of priests of the new posi­
tive religion and leaders of banking and industry. 
These scientific sociological-priests...would be 
the moral guides and censors of the community, 
using the force of their superior knowledge to 
recall men to their duties and obligations...The 
scientific priests of the religion of humanity, 
having acquired positive knowledge of what is good 
and evil, would...help suppress any subversive 
ideas...The things to be administered were in fact 
human individuals. 163
Emile Durkheim's religion of humanity was concerned
to explain "the forces that created within individuals a sense
165
of moral obligation to adhere to society's demands." In
a less zealous fashion than Comte his sociology sought to
answer the question of how social order could be maintained
since "God is dead." A secular religion of society was his
answer; "society is the father of us all; therefore, it is
to society we owe that profound debt of gratitude heretofore
166
paid to the gods." Society as God for Durkheim,
...was not at all the illogical or a-logical, 
incoherent and fantastic being which has too 
often been considered. Quite the contrary the 
collective consciousness is the highest form of 
psychic life, since it is the consciousness of 
consciousness... it sees things only in their 
permanent and essential aspects. At the same
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time that it sees from above, it sees farther; 
at every moment of time it embraces all known 
reality... 167
Max Weber in his Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism explained that a "spiritualistic causal inter­
pretation of culture and history" is on par with a material-
168
istic interpretation of the same thing. Moreover, he
argued for Verstehen or a hermeneutics of sociology that 
could penetrate to the subjective realm of individual meaning 
and action. His reason for employing this hermeneutical pro­
cedure was based in his concern that, "There is no absolutely 
objective scientific analysis of culture, or of social phen­
omena independent of special and one-sided viewpoints accor­
ding to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or uncon­
sciously they are selected, analyzed, and organized for
169
expository purposes." Thus values, be they political,
religious or whatever cannot be isolated from the sociological
investigation of crime because as Coser notes, "every man
170
must follow his own demon, his own moral stance."
As Gouldner has laboriously written in his critical 
review of Parsonian functionalism the whole of American lib­
eral sociology, including criminology, is bound up with the
171
question of "good and evil." Talcott Parsons, as a secu­
lar theologian, boldly put is this way
There can be little doubt that the main outcome 
of (modern social progress) has been a shift in 
social conditions more in accord with the general 
pattern of Christian ethics than was medieval soci­
ety. . .The millennium definitely has not arrived
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(but in a whole variety of respects modern 
society is more in accord with Christian values 
than its forebears have been. 172
It was thus from orthodox Christianity that liberal
sociology derived its penchant for authority and order in
a world seemingly full of evil and chaos. If Parsons failed
to attribute everything in liberal sociology to orthodox
Christianity, (he did not include Christianity's anarchist
and socialistic impulses) he did understand that orthodox
Christianity "has been the central source of the order, the
unity and the progress of Western society” as much as it has
173
been "the most important single root of modern democracy” 
and etc., ad infinitum.
Liberal sociological criminology's emphasis on a 
science of crime, one that can explain, predict and recommend 
courses of action to prevent, reduce or eliminate crime may 
be a secular religious way of apprehending sin and evil. The 
reasoning here is based on the understanding that every meth­
odological rule is associated with some cosmological (i.e. 
metaphysical) assumption that often goes unstated. Since 
this is the case liberal criminology has a relation to trans­
cendence and myth in the same sense that scientific socialism's
dialectical materialism is grounded in some kind of cosmol- 
174
ogy. Moreover in the realm of praxis both liberalism and
orthodox Marxism are by nature engaged in apolegetics for 
their particular definitions of social order. Both politically 
support state power and their respective criminal justice
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apparatuses, just as Christian orthodoxy has traditionally 
done through its fine maze of authoritarian rationalizations. 
Both in point of fact have often been repressive and frequently 
"one-dimensional’1 justifications for the continued existence 
of power over humanity. Recently the philosopher of physical 
science Paul K. Feyerabend has acknowledged in this regard 
that sciences itself (no matter the political label)
...is much closer to myth than a scientific 
philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of 
the many forms of thought that have been developed 
by man, and not necessarily the best. It is 
conspicuous, noisy, and impudent but it is inher­
ently superior only for those who have already 
decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who 
have accepted it without ever having examined 
its advantages and its limits. And as the 
accepting and rejecting of ideologies whould be 
left to the individual it follows that the sep­
aration of state and church must be complemented 
by the separation of state and science, that most 
recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatice relig­
ious institution. Such a separation may be our 
only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable 
of, but have never fully realized. 174
From all of the above one can only note that the 
liberal criminological critique of radical criminology as an 
"academic prophesy" is itself a secular religious polemic; 
a polemic between religious orthodoxy and religious hetero­
doxy in secular guise. As it stands this author prefers 
religious heterodoxy because it has historically been more 
faithful to the libertarian ideals of primitive Christianity, 
even though in its orthodox Marxist and Bakuninist anarchist 
form that ideal has been disgraced when one would have expected 
its exaltation.
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Is Reconciliation Possible for Liberal and Radical
Variants of American Criminology?
On the face of it reconciliation at least in the
short run seems impossible. Kox^ever, the recent dialogue
176
between left-wing Christianity and left-Marxism. in addi­
tion to detente* between liberal American policy-makers and 
post-Stalinist policy-makers in the Soviet Union may prove 
a good lead for the academic reconciliation of liberal and 
radical criminologies. What is needed is a secular ecumenism 
that would allow for the diversity of secular ideas while 
at the same time approaches to what is commonly held can 
be maximized.
Yet a proposal for reconciliation would be dishonest 
if it did not understand that radical criminology by virtue 
of its prophetic quality necessarily stands in judgement 
of liberal criminology. Radical criminology has a rational 
for existence because of the political and religious bias 
of liberal criminology. Thus in order for reconciliation 
to be realized both approaches must change by moving from 
self-righteous sufficiency to humble defiency. Radical 
criminology must become self-critical and understand its 
own estrangement. Liberal criminology must become aware 
of its habit of supporting social injustices and oppression 
(in the name of order) and must discontinue such support.
Both approaches should be aware that they will pay a price, 
i.e., suffer for such a move. To rephrase Frederick Douglass 
slightly, "social power concedes nothing without a struggle."
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In a sense the greatest price will have to be 
paid by liberal criminology. This is because it has the
most to lose -such as: its conception of itself as science;
its status and close relationship to the power centers of 
the criminal justice system; its job security in academia; 
in sum its power, wealth and prestige. On the other hand 
radical criminology, as of yet, does not have all of the 
trappings of social acceptance that liberal criminology has. 
However, radical criminology must lose its desire for power 
as "power over others" and take on a multi-sum approach 
to the question of power. Both will have to lose the "ivory 
tower" mentality that sets them apart from the everyday 
world of complexity, strife, love and natural truth. Both 
must overcome the philosophical dualism that separates off 
different segments of humanity and often ends in racism, 
sexism, elitism, and classism, a few of those old irrational 
forces that creep into both theories. One could go on with
V
a litany of things each could do for reconciliation but that 
would be counter productive.
The essential quality for reconcilation must in 
the last analysis be a willingness to connect the core of 
that which is liberative in each theory. To this author's 
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